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ABSTRACT 
 
The aim of this research is to establish the bond between Friedrich Nietzsche and the 
anarchists, through the apparatus of “elective affinity”, and to challenge the 
boundaries of several anarchist trends – especially “classical” and “post” anarchism – 
and “ideologies” like anarchism and libertarian Marxism. Moreover, it highlights the 
importance of reading Nietzsche politically, in a radical way, to understand his utility 
for the contemporary anarchist movement. 
            The review of the literature concerning the Nietzsche-anarchy relationship 
shows the hitherto limited bibliography and stresses the possibility of exploring this 
connection, with the methodological help of Michael Löwy’s concept of “elective 
affinity”.           
The research opens with a discussion of anarchism, following the dominant 
model for categorizing anarchist traditions, presenting its basic features and currents 
and drawing on its historical development. This leads to the introduction of two points 
(the questioning of the anarchist canon and the exposure of the diversity that basic 
anarchist concepts bear among different anarchist currents) which contest the rigid 
ideological perception of anarchism in favour of a fluid and dynamic anarchy. There 
emerges the elective affinity with Nietzsche, serving a double goal: the unification of 
the distinct anarchist tendencies and the definition of the anarchist parameters in 
relation to other ideologies. 
            The following section of the thesis examines Nietzsche, by presenting the 
evolution of his philosophical thought and the fundamental theses of his perception of 
politics. It, then, continues with a detailed analysis of the main concepts of his 
philosophy based on the interpretation made by Gilles Deleuze, Alexander Nehamas 
and Keith Ansell-Pearson, thus structuring its interpretative context for establishing 
the Nietzsche-anarchy connection. This establishment is realized in a dual way. 
Firstly, by exploring the elective affinity through the “presence” of Nietzsche in the 
thought and politics of anarchist/libertarian thinkers (Goldman, Landauer, Benjamin) 
and currents (post-anarchism), and secondly by recognizing the anarchist worldview 
in the Nietzschean philosophy.  
            The first path (Nietzsche in anarchism) shows how Nietzsche has interacted 
with or has been absorbed by the anarchist way of thinking, whereas the second path 
(anarchism in Nietzsche) reveals the affinal worldview of the two parts by extensively 
using the interpretation context mentioned above.  
The final section of the thesis applies the whole analysis above on a 
Nietzschean reading of the December ’08 revolt in Athens based on the “Of the Three 
Metamorphoses” discourse from Thus Spoke Zarathustra. 
            What has been found is the existence of a clear bond, between Nietzsche and 
the anarchists, which even reaches the upper levels of Löwy’s “elective affinity”, that 
is Nietzschean Anarchism as a result of the two parts interactive fusion. The 
significance of this finding is that the relevant affinity may contribute to an 
alternative, to the dominant, perception of anarchism as an ideology. It may also 
designate its special features together with its weaknesses, meaning the objections of 
Nietzsche to certain aspects of the anarchist practices and worldview (violence, 
resentment, bad conscience), thus opening a whole new road of self-criticism for the 
anarchists of the twenty first century. In addition, the location and analysis of the 
elective affinity serves the debunking of the Nietzschean concepts used by 
conservative and right-wing readings in order to appropriate Nietzsche, and of the 
accusations that the German philosopher had unleashed against anarchists, which 
reveals his misunderstanding of anarchist politics.
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Nietzsche & Anarchism: An Elective Affinity 
and a Nietzschean reading of the December ’08 revolt in Athens 
 
  
PART A: INTRODUCTION-CHAPTER PLAN 
 
 
A.1/ Thesis Aims – Queries 
 
Central Hypothesis and Aims 
The central claim of my thesis is that Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophy promotes, 
even indirectly, basic anarchist notions. Hence, what I am primarily intending to show 
in this research is the existence of a clear bond between anarchist traditions and 
Nietzsche’s writings. 
 The claim is supported by a review of Nietzsche’s work, from an anarchist 
perspective, and, at the same time, a reading of anarchist thought with a Nietzschean 
spirit, that is through a body of basic philosophical concepts that underline his 
idiosyncrasy. I will re-examine basic concepts of Nietzschean philosophy by 
comparing them to the notions of prominent anarchists and libertarian thinkers, such 
as Walter Benjamin who cannot be classified as anarchist even though his approach to 
communism deviates significantly from Orthodox Marxism. I will then use these 
concepts to provide a Nietzschean interpretation of certain historical incidents and 
attitudes which refer straightforwardly to anarchist theory and practice. Despite the 
fact that Nietzsche expressed his hostility to anarchism several times, my argument is 
that his worldview, based on these concepts, dovetails with the anarchist one. 
Moreover, I will try to show that despite the validity of some of his accusations 
against the anarchists, it is the “lightness of the aristocratic spirit” of Nietzsche that 
explains a total rejection on his part: It is Nietzsche himself who says that aristocrats 
may misunderstand and miscomprehend reality because of an insufficient familiarity 
with what they despise. This happens because of their excessive self-affirmation, their 
light, joyful spirit.1 Thus, in a way, Nietzsche was, to some extent, prejudiced against 
anarchism, his aristocratic spirit led him to a rejection of anarchism, and the 
interesting point here is that this prejudice can be deconstructed through his own 
thought, as I am going to demonstrate in part C.2. 
                                                        
1 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, first essay, §10, in On the Genealogy of Morals 
and Ecce Homo, Vintage Books, New York 1989. 
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Contribution of the Dissertation 
The new dimension the thesis offers to the study of Nietzsche and anarchism lies in 
two basic fields. 
On the one hand, up to now, all works referring to Nietzsche and anarchism 
deal with Nietzschean philosophy selectively and partially, something logical and 
acceptable if we take into consideration that the most substantial essays are academic 
papers and that Nietzsche’s philosophy embodies quite contradictory concepts, or 
even posterior self-retractions of his early work.2 For example, the dominance of the 
Dionysian force over the Apollonian3 (actually, Nietzsche's preference for the 
former), as presented in Andrew Koch’s exceptional article,4 is a subsequent thought 
of the German philosopher and does not reflect the true vital contribution of the 
Apollonian force to the “transvaluation of the existent values” and to the birth of the 
“overman”. I intend to carry out a research that, through a deep analysis will combine, 
and deal with, all basic aspects of Nietzschean philosophy in order to clarify the 
philosophical bonds between anarchism and Nietzsche’s work and promote an 
anarchist interpretation of his.  
On the other hand, I am going to apply Nietzsche’s notions to specific 
incidents of anarchist history and, in particular, re-examine and interpret the events 
and choices of the anarchist movement during the December 2008 revolt in Athens 
from a Nietzschean angle. This is something that has been done before but, again, 
only limitedly.5 
This new dimension in Nietzschean and anarchist studies establishes an 
“elective” bond between Nietzsche and the anarchists, meaning a dynamic 
relationship which exceeds the limits of a mere influence even leading to the 
formation of a new anarchism (Nietzschean Anarchism). That results in challenging 
the boundaries between classical and post-anarchism and anarchism and libertarian 
Marxism, and therefore reading Nietzsche in a radical, political way which will be of 
significant utility for the contemporary anarchist movement, especially through the 
                                                        
2 See for example how Nietzsche himself held a different view on his The Birth of Tragedy after 
breaking up with Wagner. 
3 Dionysian and Apollonian forces constitute a dipole that  Nietzsche used a lot in order to discuss the 
correlation between our primal instincts and the control over them respectively. It first appears in The 
Birth of Tragedy and here it will be discussed in chapter B.4. 
4Andrew M. Koch, “Dionysian Politics: The Anarchistic Implications of Friedrich Nietzsche’s Critique 
of Western Epistemology”, in John Moore (ed.), I am not a Man, I am Dynamite, Friedrich Nietzsche 
and the Anarchist Tradition, Autonomedia, New York 2004. 
5 See for example the comparison between Nietzsche and the Libertarian Worker’s Movement: Daniel 
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conclusions drawn by the case study of December 2008.  
 
Nietzsche’s Interpreters 
Up to now, Martin Heidegger, Georges Bataille, Walter Kaufmann, Gilles Deleuze, 
Alexander Nehamas, Keith Ansell-Pearson and Sarah Kofman have been the most 
important interpreters of the German philosopher. Each of them approached Nietzsche 
with a personal and distinctive style offering several different views in the “Nietzsche 
studies” project. Heidegger holds a deep and, rather obscure, philosophical 
interpretation of Nietzsche whereas Kaufmann, who detested this obscurity on the part 
of Heidegger, is well known for Nietzsche’s rehabilitation after World War II: in the 
eyes of the Western world, Nietzsche was regarded as a prophet of Nazism. Georges 
Bataille comes closer to a more spiritual reading of the German philosopher defending 
the non-reductionism of his thought to theoretical frameworks that serve political, 
ethical or social goals and utilities, whilst Sarah Kofman analyses Nietzsche through 
Freudian psychoanalysis, focusing on his ambivalent perception of things. 
Nevertheless, and in order to explore the aims of my research, I chose to use the 
interpretative work of Deleuze, Ansell-Pearson and Nehamas. Their Nietzschean 
approaches are based on features (radical perception of Nietzsche’s philosophical 
concepts, literary style of his philosophy) that will be presented thoroughly in part B.4 
and that shed light on both the bond between Nietzsche and the anarchists (part C) 
and the selected case study (part D). 
 
Queries / Secondary Aims 
All the above, meaning the re-introduction of Nietzschean terms, their comparison to 
anarchist tradition and application on a specific historical incident, will not only be 
used as a path leading to the validation of my hypothesis but will also give an answer 
to two rising questions of great interest:  
a/What is the importance of reading Nietzsche not only as a philosopher or a poet but 
also as a (radical) political thinker? and  
b/What does Nietzsche have to say to contemporary radical movements and especially 
to the anarchist one? 
 The first question is clearly associated with the need to refresh and renovate 
politics through a subverting and radical path. Nietzsche’s ripe philosophy is one of 
                                                                                                                                                               
Colson, “Nietzsche and the Libertarian Worker’s Movement”, in John Moore. 
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the three “revolutions” of the nineteenth and twentieth century (the other two are 
Marx’s economics/politics and Freud’s psychoanalysis) that – with the exception of 
the extremely limited and distorting application by the Nazis – has not been tested in 
the area of politics as much as the other two. Freudian psychoanalysis, which owes a 
lot to Nietzsche’s thought,6 has been clearly associated with Marxist politics,7 and, 
furthermore, unlike Freudism and Marxism, Nietzsche’s philosophy is a schema that 
rejects any normativity or universality. Hence, in principle it stands closer to anarchist 
thought versus the other two and its perspectives constitute open challenges, for social 
and political life, that have not been taken up yet. At the same time it remains, 
historically, outside the socialist/anarchist field and thus, as I will show in part B.1, it 
fits the model of the “elective affinity”. Once Nietzsche’s thought is acknowledged to 
be political, it can form the starting point of a metamorphosis of the contemporary 
political scene, taking into account, of course, that contrary to what happened in the 
past, this time it will be the radical and not the reactionary currents that will adopt, 
interpret and put his vision into effect. Nietzsche’s perception as a political thinker is 
not something new in the Nietzschean literature but the vast majority of the relative 
books and articles8 give three options for his political preferences: Nietzsche is either 
                                                        
6 A. H. Chapman and M. Chapman-Santana, “The Influence of Nietzsche on Freud’s Ideas, British 
Journal of Psychiatry, Vol. 166, February 1995, pp. 251-53. 
7 See the activities of The Frankfurt School. 
8 Keith Ansell-Pearson, An Introduction to Nietzsche as Political Thinker: The Perfect Nihilist, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1994. 
Ronald E. Osborn, “Nihilism’s Conscience: Nietzsche’s Politics of Aristocratic Radicalism”, Modern 
Age, Vol. 52, No 4, Fall 2010, pp. 292-307. 
Brian Leiter, "Nietzsche's Moral and Political Philosophy", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Summer 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/nietzsche-moral-political/ (accessed on 12/4/2012). 
Martha Nussbaum, “Is Nietzsche a Political Thinker?”, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 
Vol.5, Issue 1, 1997, pp. 1-13. 
Paul Patton (ed.), Nietzsche, Feminism and Political Theory, Routledge, London 1993. 
Robert Guay, “Nietzsche, Contingency, and the Vacuity of Politics” in Jeffrey Metzger (ed.), 
Nietzsche, Nihilism and the Philosophy of the Future, Continuum, London 2009, pp. 158-70. 
Daniel W. Conway, Nietzsche and the Political, Routledge, London 1997. 
Don Dombowsky, Nietzsche’s Machiavellian Politics, Palgrave, New York 2004. 
Christian Emden, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of History, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 2008. 
Peter Bergmann, Nietzsche, “The Last Antipolitical German”, Indiana University Press, Indiana 1987. 
Bruce Detweiler, Nietzsche and the Politics of Aristocratic Radicalism, Chigago University Press, 
Chicago 1990. 
Lawrence J. Hatab, A Nietzschean Defense of Democracy: An Experiment in Postmodern Politics, 
Open Court Publishing, Illinois 1995. 
Tracy B. Strong, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration, University of Illinois Press, 
Chicago 2000. 
Leslie Paul Thiele, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of the Soul: A Study of Heroic Individualism, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton 1990. 
 Frank Cameron, Don Dombowsky (ed.), Political Writings of Friedrich Nietzsche, Palgrave, New 
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anti-political or in favour of authoritarian politics or close to liberal democracy. The 
bottom line is that no direct links have been made with anarchism, and in the few 
indirect ones, the supposed incompatibility between his thought and the anarchists is 
stressed. In part A.3 I will also refer to the limited works that promote such a 
connection. Therefore, there is enough room in the area of political philosophy to 
pose and develop consistently the argument of an affinity between the two parts.  
 Possible answers to the second question (What does Nietzsche have to say to 
contemporary radical movements and to anarchists in particular?) can offer an 
informal guide to the anarchist movements, which will help them proceed to a 
thorough self-criticism and a re-interpretation of important historical incidents. This 
will, consequently, help the justification or rejection of the respective historical 
choices, whilst the main goal for the anarchist movements is to relocate and re-
identify their special features that distinguish them from socialists and communists. 
 Moreover, a side effect/aim of the whole research will be the questioning of 
boundaries within the anarchist family – such as the dichotomy between classical and 
post-anarchism, but also between (current) ideological trends like anarchism and 
libertarian Marxism.9 This questioning will take place in part C.1 of my thesis, 
through Walter Benjamin by treating him as a representative of libertarian Marxism.    
 
Elective Affinity and its Effects 
The importance of the connection between Nietzsche and the anarchists lies in 
highlighting the “elective affinity” of the two parts and the whole research is 
supported by the discussion of this elective relationship. “Elective affinity” will and 
must play a crucial role in the process of bringing Friedrich Nietzsche and the 
anarchists together and, furthermore, can tell us a lot about both. 
As far as the German philosopher is concerned, this will be an indirect and 
secondary contribution to the already existing works of various writers that tried, with 
success, to free Nietzsche from the racial bonds that the Nazis tried to impose on him 
                                                                                                                                                               
York 2008. 
9 “Libertarian Marxism” refers to an antiauthoritarian perception of Marxism that opposes Marxism-
Leninism, Stalinism, Maoism and Trotskyism, as well as the reformism of the Social Democracy, 
whilst at the same time accepts basic Marxist tools, like the economic analysis or the class struggle. 
The connection between anarchism and libertarian Marxism has been the subject of various past works 
– see for example the approaches of Wayne Price, summarized in his article “Libertarian Marxism’s 
Relation to Anarchism”, http://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/wayne-price-libertarian-marxism-s-
relation-to-anarchism (accessed on 06/04/2013), or part six of Peter Marshall, Demanding the 
Impossible, A History of Anarchism, Harper Perennial, London 2008. 
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and to restore his reputation. For example, Karla O. Poewe says that Nietzsche’s anti-
Christianity and positive approach to eugenics was a clear sign of anti-Semitism and 
of an ideological leaning that anticipated Nazism.10 Nevertheless, these two features 
of his thought, if examined thoroughly and in accordance with the whole of his 
philosophical work, can show exactly the opposite. This was more or less achieved in 
works like those of Rudolf Kuenzli,11 Roderick Stackelberg12 and Maria 
Deppermann.13 
 Moreover, Nietzsche’s philosophic vision is open to other interpretions and 
can be placed in a social context, far removed from nationalist propaganda. This 
flexibility serves to remind us that he can not only be seen as a poet or an existential 
philosopher but also as a political philosopher. In other words, we can read Nietzsche 
in a more political, practical and less abstract way than we read existential 
philosophers, like Kierkegaard for example. As a result, anarchism might also become 
a virtualising field for his theory. 
From an anarchist point of view, the gain from this affinity is possibly even 
greater. With his compact and mature philosophy Nietzsche promises to provide the 
factor that will distinguish anarchism from the other movements within the socialist 
family and will identify its special features. As Richard Day puts it, all newest social 
movements have more or less adopted anarchist concepts – like anti-state propaganda, 
rejection of parliamentary politics, direct democracy and action – without necessarily 
considering themselves to be anarchist.14 So, what is needed is a new approach of 
anarchist identity among neo-anarchism (contemporary anarchism) and post-
anarchism15 but always on grounds of classical anarchist thought and deed, following 
the analysis of Tomás Ibañez.16 What I will argue is that Friedrich Nietzsche is more 
than suitable to play the role of the catalyst that can, firstly, recognize and express 
anarchist idiosyncrasy as it appeared in the revolutionary deeds of past centuries and, 
secondly, re-locate these features in specific historical events of the present. 
                                                        
10 Karla O. Poewe, New Religions and the Nazis, Routledge, Abingdon 2006, pp. 12-13. 
11 Rudolf E. Kuenzli, “The Nazi Appropriation of Nietzsche”, Nietzsche Studien 12, 1983. 
12 Roderick Stackelberg, “Nietzsche and the Nazis: The volkisch Reaction to Nietzschean Thought”, 
Research Studies, 51(1), March 1983. 
13 Maria Deppermann, “Nietzsche in the Soviet Union, Let us dig out the buried Nietzsche” in Ζήσης 
Σαρίκας (επιμ.), Ο Νίτσε και η Πολιτική, Νησίδες, Θεσσαλονίκη 2004 [Zisis Sarikas (ed.), Nietzsche 
and Politics]. 
14 Richard Day, Gramsci is Dead: Anarchist Currents in the Newest Social Movements, Pluto Press, 
London 2005, pp. 19-20. 
15 I will deal with all these terms in the B.2.4 part of this essay. 
16 Tomás Ibañez, “From Anarchism to Post-Anarchism”, Libertaria, No ¾, 2008. 
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The next important step is to consider the methodological issues raised by this 
“elective affinity”. These issues include the definition of both sides – anarchy as an 
“ideology” and Nietzsche as a political thinker, the context theory that will allow me 
to interpret the two parts, and the selection of a case study which illustrates this 
“elective affinity”. The following plan outlines how I am going to develop my 
research. 
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A.2/ Chapter Plan 
In this chapter, I would like to illustrate the structure of my thesis in order to organize 
the material and, thus, facilitate the reader's navigation. My thesis consists of five 
parts, most of which include more than two sub-chapters. 
 What precedes this chapter plan is the part of the Introduction that poses the 
aims of my research and the relative questions that emerge (A.1). It also outlines the 
methodological issues raised in order to support the main idea, which is the elective 
affinity between Nietzsche and the anarchists. 
 What follows this chapter plan is, firstly, the literature context of this research 
(A.3). Here, the reader will find information about essays that have been written about 
the direct or indirect connection of Nietzsche to the anarchists, classified by the 
approach taken toward this connection: positive or negative, political or philosophical, 
specified or general.  
 Part B is exclusively dedicated to the methodological issues mentioned in the 
Introduction and consists of five chapters: B.1 deals with elective affinity, giving 
some information about the history of the term and on how I choose to use it, notably 
borrowing from Michael Löwy. According to Löwy’s approach of elective affinity, I 
present its different levels or degrees, each of which answers to a different type of 
affinity between Nietzsche and anarchy. In addition, I refer to the literary context of 
“elective affinity” in Nietzschean and anarchist studies, to show that this term is not at 
all something new for any of this affinity’s poles, and shortly discuss the gains to be 
made from this affinity, for both Nietzsche and the anarchists. 
B.2 is the chapter of anarchy. It presents the definition and origin of 
anarchism, the presentation of its ideological dimension (B.2.1) and of the basic 
general features and trends in the anarchist family, extending to a libertarian version 
of Marxism (B.2.2 – B.2.4). What I argue here is that ideological approaches to 
anarchism are ineffective, especially when compared to a perception of anarchism 
based on elective affinity. The rigid boundaries of ideology contradict anarchism’s 
fluidity and anti-dogmatism, and thus alienate it from its dynamic nature. Therefore, 
although I follow the artificial categorization of “classical” and “post” anarchism, I 
will end up showing that elective affinity can help us understand the importance of the 
differences between anarchist trends since anarchy’s uniqueness lies in the ceaseless 
correlation, debate, interaction and convergence of them. That is, their elective 
affinity. Chapter B.2.5 covers the exponents of anarchism and libertarian Marxism 
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whose views and ideas I am going to use in order to establish the elective affinity with 
the German philosopher. 
The next chapter (B.3) belongs to Friedrich Nietzsche. Here, we come across a 
general schema of his philosophical ideas and of how they sit in the context of his 
periods of thought (B.3.1). Seeing Nietzsche through a political lens, and thus being 
able to compare his thought to the anarchist one, means defining the limits between 
philosophy in general and political philosophy in particular, in order to show that his 
ideas, although hostile to politics, where of a political nature, as well as purely 
philosophical (B.3.2). Nevertheless, Nietzschean ideas are expressed through basic 
key-concepts of his philosophy and in part B.4 I will refer to the context of 
interpretation of these concepts, meaning the different reading made by Gilles 
Deleuze, Alexander Nehamas and Keith Ansell-Pearson, that will allow me to present 
and define these concepts before using them for establishing the elective affinity. 
The last chapter of Part B (B.5) is a presentation of the case study I have chosen in 
order to construct Part D, where the upper Nietzschean concepts will be traced in 
certain anarchist practices.    
 The third part of my thesis is the establishment of the elective affinity between 
Nietzsche and the anarchists. This establishment will take place in two ways. By 
locating Nietzsche in anarchism (C.1), that is, reviewing how the German philosopher 
influenced specific anarchists, and vice-versa, Anarchism in Nietzsche (C.2), meaning 
the connection of Nietzschean ideas with original anarchist views, following the 
structural analysis of chapter B.4. In part C.1 the case of the libertarian Marxist 
Walter Benjamin will serve as a common ground for this affinity: The simultaneous 
connection of Benjamin to the anarchists and of Nietzsche to Benjamin will provide 
an additional, indirect, route to the affinity between Nietzsche and the anarchists.   
 Part D focuses on the case study. Here, I will elaborate on the Nietzschean 
reading of the December 2008 revolt in Athens using the “Of The Three 
Metamorphoses” passage from Thus Spoke Zarathustra as an interpretative tool of the 
revolt, as well as a reference point for reinforcing the elective affinity. Before reading 
the events of December through the Zarathustrian lens, I will give a detailed historical 
background of the political history in Greece in order to place the development and 
evolution of the Greek anarchist movement, until the days of December, within it. 
Then, I will present the mainstream reading of the events, made by the political 
parties and the media and I will contrast it with the anarchist reading, theorized by the 
 
 
 
 
10
Zarathustrian metamorphoses. This theorization will be unfolded in the core of part D 
which reads the revolt in three parts (before the assassination of Alexandros 
Grigoropoulos, during and after the three weeks of the revolt), respectively with the 
Three Metamorphoses of the Spirit (the Camel, the Lion and the Child). 
 In the last part of my thesis I will give an overall view of my work. That is, 
point out the hypothesis and aims of my research and the way I dealt with them 
through elective affinity and the case study, and present the conclusions I reached 
concerning the political nature of Nietzschean philosophy, the benefits for the 
anarchist movement and the relationship between Nietzsche and the anarchists per se. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11
A.3/ Literature Context  
Nietzsche’s affinity to the anarchists can be traced in several relevant essays that have 
hitherto been written and that can be divided into two basic groups.  
 
First Literature Group – Positive/Negative Approaches to Nietzsche and Anarchy 
This first group includes books that maintain a more philosophical, sociological, 
artistic and political approach to Nietzsche and therefore suggest a rather indirect 
reference to a possible connection with anarchism, either negative or positive. 
 For example, Charles Abram Ellwood includes Nietzsche among the most 
destructive negative critiques of human history (together with Rousseau and 
Bakunin), which finally led to a moral anarchy through the deconstruction of Western 
civilization.1 Moreover, he argues, Nietzsche’s devotion to power leaves no room for 
social solidarity and social living. David Frisby shares this opinion while extending 
the argument to say that although Nietzschean philosophy is a revival of Stirner's, it 
seems neither anarchistic nor socialistic, as it is atomistic and against every social 
orientation.2  
 An unbridgeable gap between Nietzsche and socialism/anarchism was also 
supported by Jacob Leib Talmon,3 Nikos Kazantzakis4 and Ike Okonta,5 more or less 
based on the same arguments about Nietzsche’s preference for hierarchy, order, anti-
egalitarianism and aristocratism, whereas Julian Young gives a softer “Nietzschean” 
objection to the state, saying that Nietzsche only rejected the type of state that turns 
humans into beings without will.6 For Pierre-Andre Taguieff, Nietzsche’s anti-
socialism can be understood in terms of his anti-Christianism, since “egalitarianism, 
herd mentality…should be recognized as Christian inheritances”.7 In particular, the 
whole book that hosts Taguieff’s article8 is a collection of critical approaches to 
Nietzsche based on a defense of the Enlightenment’s rationality, attacking Nietzsche’s 
                                                        
1 Charles Abram Ellwood, The Social Problem: A Constructive Analysis, Forgotten Books, n.p., 2012, 
pp. 85, 194-95. 
2 David Frisby, Georg Simmel: Critical Assessments, Routledge, London 1994, p. 64. 
3 Jakob Leib Talmon, The Myth of the Nation and the Vision of Revolution, University of California 
Press, California 1981, pp. 13, 468. 
4 Nikos Kazantzakis, Friedrich Nietzsche on the Philosophy of Right and the State, Suny Press, New 
York 2006, p. 62. 
5 Ike Okonta, Nietzsche: the Politics of Power, P. Lang, n.p., 1992, p. 72. 
6 Julian Young, Nietzsche's Philosophy of Religion, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2006, p. 
113. 
7 Pierre-Andre Taguieff, “The Traditional Paradigm – Horror of Modernity and Antiliberalism: 
Nietzsche in Reactionary Rhetoric”, in Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut (ed.), Why We Are Not 
Nietzscheans, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1997, p. 187. 
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“obsession with hierarchy”, his irrational views on religion and art and his reactionary 
stance on science.9  
 On the other hand, this first group of works also includes essays that hold a 
positive opinion concerning a possible connection of Nietzsche to the anarchists. 
 Hakim Bey links the Hyperboreans, mentioned by Nietzsche10 in order to 
introduce the new philosophers who try to find a way out of the labyrinth of decadent 
modernity that is dominated by dualism, metaphysics and nihilism, with the members 
of the Association for Ontological Anarchy, who have gone far beyond the death of 
God to the kingdom of monism, where spirit and matter have become one.11 Patrick 
Bridgwater speaks of the obvious influence of Nietzsche on the anarchist poet Herbert 
Read,12 a view shared by Ruth Kinna13 as well, whereas Teodor de Wyzewa, Robert 
John Ackermann, Hugo Ball and Mencken and Flathman spot pure anarchist concepts 
in Nietzschean philosophy.  
 Wyzewa, after thoroughly studying Nietzsche's work, reached the conclusion 
that the German philosopher combined Schopenhauer’s pessimism with Tolstoy's 
anarchy and Ibsen's temperament.14Ackermann and Mencken and Flathman also 
acknowledged him as an intellectual and spiritual anarchist: Ackermann because 
Nietzsche had certainly read and accepted the individualist anarchism of Stirner, 
which he saw as an escape from Hegel’s absolutism;15 and Mencken and Flathman 
because Nietzsche’s objection to society’s interference in the creative expressions of 
individuals through laws and obligations.16 In addition, Hugo Ball, the well-known 
Dadaist, held the opinion that like Bakunin (who was a political anarchist), Nietzsche 
was an (intellectual) anarchist as well.17 
 Speaking of the Nietzschean influence on the anarchist tradition, it is also 
                                                                                                                                                               
8 Ferry and Renaut. 
9 Ferry and Renaut, back cover. 
10 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, §1, 7, 8, 14, 47, in Twilight of the Idols and the Anti-Christ, 
Penguin Books, London 2003. 
11 Hakim Bey, The Temporary Autonomous Zone, Ontological Anarchy, Poetic Terrorism, Forgotten 
Books, n.p., 2008, p. 53. 
12 Patrick Bridgwater, Nietzsche in Anglosaxony: a Study of Nietzsche's Impact on English and 
American Literature, Leicester University Press, Leicester, 1972, p. 95. 
13 Ruth Kinna, Anarchism: Beginner’s Guide, Oneworld Publications, Oxford 2005, pp. 55-56. 
14 In Elga Liverman Duval, Teodor de Wyzewa: Critic Without a Country, Librairie Droz, Geneve 
1961, p. 86. 
15 Robert John Ackermann, Nietzsche: A Frenzied Look, University of Massachusetts Press, n.p., 1993, 
note 10, p. 77. 
16 Henry Louis Mencken, Richard E. Flathman, Friedrich Nietzsche, Transaction Publishers, New 
Jersey 1993, p. 192. 
17 In Seth Taylor, Left-wing Nietzscheans: the Politics of German Expressionism, 1910-1920, Walter de 
Gruyter, Berlin 1990, p. 174. 
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worth mentioning what Steven E. Aschheim and Richard Hinton Thomas have to say 
in their essays about the German philosopher. The former refers to Dionysus, the 
champion God of Nietzsche, as an abstract, fantastic escape into anarchy,18 an opinion 
also supported by Ernst Bloch.19 Bloch adds that socialism, anarchism, feminism and 
the vast majority of the youth uprisings fell under the influence of his libertarian 
touch.20 The latter describes the controversial relationship of Nietzsche to his 
contemporary anarchists (his vicious comments on the “anarchist herd” and the short 
or non-existent references to him in various studies of his time about anarchism),21 
insisting on the Nietzschean influence on German anarchists and especially on 
Landauer.22 Moreover, Thomas makes a very interesting and important point when 
saying that the voluntaristic and anti-determinist approach of the anarchists matches 
basic notions of Nietzsche’s philosophy.23 
 To all the above, one can add the more neutral commentary on Nietzsche from 
two very different writers, Élisée Reclus and Keith Ansell-Pearson, whose references 
to him are of great importance since they deal with two quite fundamental concepts of 
his thought: “resentment”24 and aristocratic radicalism.25 The former was used by 
Reclus to remind that, although in most cases opposition to the dominant order 
stemmed from feelings of injustice and of abhorrence towards exploitation, there were 
many cases that this creative rage degenerated to a reactive resentment. The latter, as 
Ansell-Pearson suggests, describes Nietzsche’s spiritual, and not racial, elitism 
(aristocratism), the anticipation of a human kind that will be capable of giving birth to 
new values, values of inspiration, creation and culture (radicalism).  
  
Second Literature Group – Positive/Negative Approaches to Nietzsche and Anarchy 
The second group of works bears, in general, the same approaches to Nietzsche but 
focus more on his relationship with the anarchists. As in the first category, here we 
                                                        
18 Steven E. Aschheim, The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany, 1890-1990, University of California Press, 
California 1994, p. 289. 
19 In Jacob Golomb, Robert S. Wistrich, Nietzsche, Godfather of Fascism?: on the Uses and Abuses of 
a Philosophy, Princeton University Press, New Jersey 2002, p. 268. 
20 Aschheim, p. 6. 
21 Richard Hinton Thomas, Nietzsche in German Politics and Society, 1890-1918, Manchester 
University Press, Manchester 1983, p. 48. 
22 Hinton Thomas, p. 15. 
23 Hinton Thomas, p. 48. 
24 Elisee Reclus, John P. Clark, Camille Martin, Anarchy, Geography, Modernity: the Radical Social 
Thought of Elisee Reclus, Lexington Books, Maryland 2004, p. 34. 
25 Keith Ansell-Pearson, An Introduction to Nietzsche as Political Thinker: the Perfect Nihilist, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1994, p. 95. 
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also meet opinions that are in favour or against such a connection. Nonetheless, the 
majority of the approaches see this link through a positive lens. 
 E. V. Zenker, in his book Anarchism, claims that Nietzsche gives anarchy a 
bad flavour. His anarchism is a bad one, not really anarchism at all.26 Contrary 
opinions to this view have since been expressed by Mohammed A. Bamyeh, Jonathan 
Purkis and James Bowen and David Weir. 
 Bamyeh suggests the division of anarchism into communist and libertarian and 
links Nietzsche to the second wing.27 He says that in Ecce Homo Nietzsche expresses 
his indifference towards improving humanity, as he is not interested in saving 
something he ignores.28 The same thing, according to Bamyeh, happens with 
anarchists. They only talk about things of which they are aware. They fight for human 
emancipation not like heroes but like actors. Like those who will set the foundations 
for self-liberation, not like themselves being liberators of others.29 
 Purkis and Bowen analyze John Carroll’s belief that Nietzsche’s (and 
Stirner’s) political anarchism is a logical consequence of his (their) ontological 
anarchism. According to this opinion, writers that hold an individualistic and 
irrational point of view stand out for their “anarcho-psychological” genealogy, which 
constitutes an alternative and antiauthoritarian scientific example. Stirner, Hakim Bay 
and Nietzsche can be regarded as such writers.30 
 David Weir speaks of Benjamin Tucker and his critique of Nietzsche’s 
political limitations. For Tucker, the German philosopher expressed some anarchist 
points but he cannot be regarded as an anarchist thinker in any way.31 Nevertheless, 
for Weir, the Nietzschean “overman” became the model for the ethical individualism 
that anarchism called for.32 
 Finally, we have the two most extended references to Nietzsche and anarchism 
to complete this literature review. The first is part of Peter Marshall’s history of 
anarchism and offers a quite essential, though still short, exposure of some basic 
Nietzschean notions that connect him directly to the anarchists. It is not by accident 
                                                        
26 E. V. Zenker, Anarchism, Read Books, n.p., 2008, note 1, p. 232. 
27 Mohammed A. Bamyeh, Anarchy as Order: the History and Future of Civic Humanity, Rowman & 
Littlefield, Maryland 2009, p. 22. 
28 Bamyeh, p. 29. 
29 Bamyeh, p. 30. 
30 Jonathan Purkis, James Bowen, Changing Anarchism: Anarchist Theory and Practice in a Global 
Age, Manchester University Press,  Manchester 2004, p. 61. 
31 David Weir, Anarchy & Culture: the Aesthetic Politics of Modernism, University of Massachusetts 
Press, n.p., 1997, p. 148. 
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that Friedrich Nietzsche is included - as a German Libertarian - in such an essay and 
Marshall makes that clear.33 The second essay is the only, up to now, exclusive effort 
to explore the limits of the interaction between Nietzsche and the anarchist tradition. 
John Moore gathered in one edition34 the articles of prominent thinkers, like Daniel 
Colson, Andrew Koch, Franco Riccio, Saul Newman and others, dealing with 
Nietzschean philosophy, trying to give an alternative dimension to his relationship 
with  anarchist political thought. 
  
Conclusions and Perspectives from the Existing Literature Context 
The conclusion we can reach by reviewing the above literature is that, firstly, there is 
only one work (Moore) directly addressing the nature of the relationship between 
Nietzsche and the anarchists. Nevertheless, this work is not a unified and coherent 
research but consists of several different papers each of which focuses on specific 
Nietzschean features (egoism, individuality, will to power, master-slave morality, 
overman, Dionysian and Apollonian, anti-statism, anti-dogmatism, nihilism, eternal 
return, resentment). Secondly, the general context indicates that both sides (those 
favouring and those rejecting the Nietzsche-Anarchists relationship) use more or less 
the same concepts from the arsenal of the anarchist and Nietzschean philosophy in 
order to support their view.  
This double conclusion gives a two-level perspective: on the first level, it 
seems that there is enough ground to think about elective affinity as a more explicit 
link between Nietzsche and the anarchists. There is sufficient evidence showing that 
the first degree of elective affinity, that is simple affinity, lies here as a potential 
analogy. Even the ideological heterogeny supported by those who reject the 
Nietzschean-anarchist relationship is a basic presupposition for the use of the 
“elective affinity” apparatus (See chapters B.1, B.2.2). 
On the second level, the challenge goes one-step further by trying to give 
simple affinity flesh and bones, systemize its exploration and upgrade it – from a 
potentiality to an activity. This can happen through a unified study of the two parts 
and of the way they interact in order to establish the elective affinity, not only on the 
grounds of prominent - but still selective - concepts but also on the basis that the 
                                                                                                                                                               
32 Weir, p. 170. 
33 Peter Marshall, Demanding the Impossible, A History of Anarchism, Harper Perennial, London 2008, 
pp. 155-62. 
34 John Moore (ed.), I am not a Man, I am Dynamite, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Anarchist Tradition, 
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hardcore of Nietzschean and anarchist philosophies offer (See part C). Moreover, a 
limited case study, in part D, will illustrate the higher degrees of elective affinity 
whilst raising, and trying to answer, specific questions regarding the utility of 
Nietzschean philosophy for anarchism and the consequences its active presence brings 
to the contemporary antagonist movement (see parts D and E). 
The next part deals with the methodology of this research starting with the 
presentation of elective affinity, its levels, presuppositions and potentialities. 
 
Summary 
This discussion has illustrated the aim of my research, specifically the 
acknowledgement and exploration of the bond between Nietzsche and the anarchists, 
through the apparatus of the “elective affinity”. It has also indicated the challenge of 
boundaries that exist between different anarchist trends as well as between 
“ideologies” like anarchism and libertarian Marxism. Moreover, it has shown the 
importance of reading Nietzsche politically in a radical way in order to understand his 
utility for the contemporary anarchist movement. Finally, the review of the literature 
concerning the Nietzsche-anarchy relationship has shown the hitherto limited 
bibliography and has stressed the possibility for exploring this connection, with the 
methodological help of the “elective affinity”.
                                                                                                                                                               
Autonomedia, New York 2004. 
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PART B: METHODOLOGY 
 
B.1/ Elective Affinity 
  
Quality and Levels 
The term of “elective affinity” comes mainly from Johann Goethe and Max Weber 
but, from my part, I intend to follow Michael Löwy's usage in his essay on Jewish 
libertarian thought.1 For Löwy, “elective affinity is a special kind of dialectical 
relationship that develops between two social or cultural configurations, one that 
cannot be reduced to direct causality or to ‘influences’ in the traditional sense”.2 It is 
all about a mutual and active attraction that can even result in a fusion. It is a tool that 
can help us comprehend a certain type of connection between seemingly irrelevant 
phenomena within the same field,3 which in this piece of research will be the 
political-philosophical one. Elective affinity is not an ideological affinity between 
different variants of the same social and cultural current.4 Later on I will refer to 
affinity within anarchist circles in order to show that the conversation about affinities 
is not something new for anarchism. To begin, however, elective affinity is used to 
describe a specific type of relation between two ideologically heterogeneous poles, 
that may start as a mere influence but that becomes a more active and mutual 
correlation, to fill the prior gap and cover the spiritual distance that formerly existed 
between the two poles.5  In parts C and D, this methodological tool will serve as a 
medium for the active correlation of Nietzschean philosophy and anarchist worldview 
and practice that can even reach a fusion of the two parts.  
 More specifically, the core of the definition consists of four main levels or 
degrees. According to Löwy.  the first one is that of  
 
simple affinity: a spiritual relationship, a structural homology… an analogy that 
[…] creates the possibility, but not the necessity, of active convergence… 
Transforming potentiality into activity, making the analogy dynamic, having it 
evolve towards active interaction - this depends upon concrete historical 
                                                        
1 Michael Löwy, Redemption and Utopia: Jewish Libertarian Thought in Central Europe. A Study in 
Elective Affinity, Stanford University Press, Stanford 1992. 
2 Löwy, Redemption and Utopia, p. 6. 
3 Löwy, Redemption and Utopia, p. 10. 
4 Löwy, Redemption and Utopia, p. 12. 
5 Löwy, Redemption and Utopia, p. 12. 
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circumstances such as… cultural movements or political events.6  
 
 So, simple affinity begins as a mere influence but it is something more, in a 
way that its dynamic, its potentiality, is the first decisive step for a possible (although 
not necessary) passing to the more advanced levels of elective affinity. I would say 
that this level responds to the application of Nietzschean philosophy to the specific 
“anarchistic” historical incidents mentioned above. The “political events” of Löwy’s 
first level of “elective affinity” can coincide with the historical events I will refer to in 
the present research, where the potentiality can turn into an active interaction - 
through a Nietzschean reading of various anarchist movement’s deeds and their re-
interpretation, or via an unconscious realization of Nietzsche’s “doctrines” on the part 
of the anarchists. That is, an interaction - although unconscious in most of the cases. 
 The second level, the “election”, is an evolved version of the first one. The 
two parts (Nietzsche and the anarchists) remain separated and distinctive but the 
mutual activation and certain kinds of interaction take place.7 
 The interesting part begins with the emergence of the third and fourth levels. 
The third level is the “articulation”, or combination of the two figures, which can lead 
to three types of union. Out of these three types proposed by Löwy, I will concentrate 
on the first two, the “cultural symbiosis” – where the two parts remain distinct but 
“are organically associated”8 and the “partial fusion”. I consider these two 
subcategories to be depicted in the theory of Emma Goldman and Gustav Landauer 
who were both deeply influenced by Nietzsche: Goldman’s reference to the German 
philosopher is a sample of “cultural symbiosis”, since she often used Nietzsche’s 
notions in order to enrich the philosophical background of her anarchist arguments. In 
the case of Landauer, this relationship has turned into a partial fusion. Landauer views 
the state and all repressive structures through a Nietzschean lens, as relationships 
between subjects. The two parts here are not distinctive as in the case of Goldman, as 
Landauer has absorbed a part of Nietzsche’s point of view. 
 The fourth and last level (or degree) of the “elective affinity” is the “creation 
of a new figure” out of the two part fusion. In this essay the creation of a new figure 
can be seen either in the determinative role Nietzschean philosophy played in the 
formation of post-anarchism, or in the sense of a re-definition of anarchist identity - 
                                                        
6  Löwy, Redemption and Utopia, p. 11. 
7  Löwy, Redemption and Utopia, p. 11. 
8  Löwy, Redemption and Utopia, p. 11. 
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through stressing particular components (anti-determinism, voluntarism) and rejecting 
others (resentment) - while staying faithful to the context of the Nietzschean critique 
towards anarchists. This could mean the introduction of a new figure/term, that of 
“Nietzschean Anarchism”, that may blossom on the grounds of this research’s 
conclusions. 
 Acknowledging the need to make “elective affinity” as clear as possible, 
especially since it is this essay’s methodological tool, I would like to expand some 
more on its nature and elaborate further on its different levels. 
 The first question that might come to the reader’s mind is what exactly 
differentiates elective affinity from the usual link between two structures, meaning the 
ideological affinity. The answer lies in the development of the comment made above 
on the prior distance that exists between the two types. Hence, elective affinity, 
contrary to ideological affinity, does not seek to reunite things that are already united 
in a broader or an indirect sense - since they belong to the same ideological family. 
That would be the case if we wanted to talk about the affinity between anarchism and 
communism or anarchism and the concept of freedom or anti-statism. Nevertheless, 
the intention here is to speak of two types that are like “skew lines”, as called in 
Mathematics; two straight lines of this kind are neither parallel nor do they have a 
meeting point. They are incompatible; any correlation between the two is impossible 
since they belong to different geometrical planes. 
 The same thing applies here to Nietzschean philosophy and anarchism. Since 
these types do not belong to the same field, to the same “geometrical plane”, 
ideological affinity would be useless, if not meaningless. Elective affinity comes in to 
combine things that have a prior distance with each other, a heterogeneity that cannot 
be discussed with the use of a tool that will not recognize it as such in the first place. 
Therefore, I chose elective affinity as the reference point of the connection between 
Nietzsche and anarchism exactly because I take their heterogeneity for granted. 
 The second question emerging is how elective affinity can go beyond the 
limits of a mere correlation, escaping from the barriers of a simple influential 
relationship between the two types. At this point, we must review the different and 
gradual levels of elective affinity. Although the first level (simple affinity) starts as an 
analogy, it instantly bears the seed of a potential evolution to the second, third and 
fourth levels. Whereas mere influence is like the intersection of the two lines of our 
prior geometrical example that allows them to follow their own different directions 
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henceforth, simple affinity is the starting point of various other connections; lines that 
will become parallel or asymptotic, or even different vectors that give a brand new 
resultant, thus developing a mutual interaction of a gradual effectiveness. The other 
three levels just confirm this deviation from a normal influence. Their different 
intensities depict the different ways through which anarchism and Nietzschean 
philosophy will structure their fruitful interaction. 
 At this point, one more dimension must be clarified. Elective affinity, as 
introduced by Michael Löwy, speaks constantly of a mutual impact to the two types 
that interact. In our case, it is clear that at first sight mutuality does not apply. 
Anarchists are to a great extent aware and in favour of Nietzsche’s philosophy but the 
German philosopher seems to ignore or reject anarchist ideas and practices. 
Nevertheless, further down – in part C – I will show that this rejection on Nietzsche’s 
part can be confuted through his own arguments. Moreover, the absence of a 
conscious interaction with anarchist ideas does not lower the elective affinity 
Nietzsche has with the anarchists or the importance of elective affinity as a tool for 
the exploration of their relationship. On the contrary, this absence of deliberate 
interaction is an additional reason why mainstream types of correlation, like 
ideological affinity or mere influence, are inadequate, since they presuppose a higher 
level of volition. The unique type of connection between Nietzsche and anarchism, 
the conscious attraction on the part of the anarchists as well as the “ignorant” stance 
of Nietzsche towards a political current whose ideas he shares - both of which lead 
even to the creation of a new figure - need the dynamic nature of an interpretative tool 
like elective affinity, instead of the superficial, static and limited context of an 
analogy or a mere influence. 
 In summation, “elective affinity” is, firstly, a tool of different quality than 
ideological affinity or simple correlation. It is based on the prerequisite of an existing 
distance between the two types analysed and builds on it. Secondly, it is a lot more 
than a mere influence, meaning that it calls for a more active and mutual relationship 
that can even reach a status of fusion.9 This interaction depends on certain historical 
conditions that take the form of cultural changes or political incidents, both of which 
take place in the context of Nietzschean philosophy and anarchist history. To 
paraphrase Löwy, “elective affinity” does not occur in the azure of pure (political) 
philosophy: it is encouraged by specific historical and social conditions. This is the 
                                                        
9  Löwy, Redemption and Utopia, p. 12. 
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case in certain anarchist events, where the presence of Nietzschean philosophy 
unfolds. 
  
Elective Affinity in Nietzschean and Anarchist Studies 
However, “elective affinity” is not something new in terms of Nietzschean 
scholarship. Almost every dissertation on Nietzsche refers to the direct or indirect 
influence the German philosopher had on his contemporaries and successors and 
therefore, according to Löwy’s multi-definition, “elective affinity” is present to most, 
short or extended, relevant works.  
 George Stack’s Nietzsche and Emerson, An Elective Affinity10 is a typical 
example of Nietzsche’s affinity to his contemporaries, whereas, according to Michael 
Tanner, books like those of Steven Aschheim11 and Patrick Bridgwater12 sketch the 
general Nietzschean impact on German and British thought respectively.13 Tanner 
also mentions the recognition of Nietzsche, on the part of the post-structuralist and 
deconstructivist movement, as their reference point and source of inspiration.14 
Moreover, Max Horkheimer, in his dialogue with Adorno and Gadamer, stresses the 
close affinity between Nietzsche’s ultra-conservatism and revolt.15 
 Additionally, we also come across “elective affinity” in essays on anarchy or 
even in the writings of prominent anarchists. For example, the whole approach of 
anarchism made by Peter Marshall16 and Max Nettlau17 is, in fact, an exposition of 
historical incidents and the “elective affinity” between anarchists and anarchistic ideas 
of the past (even of Ancient Greece18) and the present. Furthermore, great anarchists, 
like Peter Kropotkin, never missed the chance to refer to the special affinity anarchist 
ideas always shared with the libertarian worldview of many well-known writers, 
artists and philosophers of their era, like Ibsen, Whitman, Zola, Mill and others.19 In 
                                                        
10  George J. Stack, Nietzsche and Emerson, An Elective Affinity, Ohio University Press, Ohio 1993. 
11 Steven Aschheim, The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany, 1890-1990, University of California Press, 
California1994. 
12 Patrick Bridgwater, Nietzsche in Anglosaxony: a study of Nietzsche's impact on English and 
American literature, Leicester University Press, Leicester 1972. 
13  Michael Tanner, Nietzsche, A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994, p. 1. 
14  Tanner, p. 3. 
15 H.G. Gadamer, T.W. Adorno, M. Horkheimer, Για τον Νίτσε, Ίνδικτος, Αθήνα 2003, p. 22 [On 
Nietzsche and us (Uber Nietzsche und uns)]. 
16 Peter Marshall, Demanding the Impossible, A History of Anarchism, Harper Perennial, London 2008. 
17  Max Nettlau, A Short History of Anarchism, Freedom Press, London 1996. 
18  See the article of D. Ferraro, “Anarchism in Greek Philosophy”, Anarchy, No 45 (November 1964), 
pp. 321-25. 
19 Peter Kropotkin, “Anarchism – Encyclopedia Britannica Article”, in Roger Baldwin (ed.), 
Kropotkin’s Revolutionary Pamphlets, Dover Publications, New York 1970, pp. 299-300. 
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spite of including Nietzsche’s works in this category, Kropotkin seemed to believe 
that individualists like Nietzsche (and Stirner) stand far from the working masses and 
the anarcho-communist ideas workingmen prefer.20 This is an “orthodox” point of 
view that, despite revealing the ideological heterogeny between Nietzsche and 
anarcho-communism, is questioned by the above literature review and is to be further 
challenged in part C. 
 Nevertheless, “elective affinity” remains a rather controversial term in the 
field of anarchist studies, a controversy that has to do with the inside conflicts 
between the many different anarchist currents. Murray Bookchin’s detestation for 
lifestyle anarchism21 brings forward the debate for an “elective affinity” between 
social anarchism and individualist, hedonist, primitivist, feminist, situ, 
poststructuralist and gay anarchisms that, notwithstanding, his polemic shows that the 
existing affinitive relationships are not sufficient for all these trends to get along with 
social anarchism. This is due to their differences on means and desired goals, 
according to him. In the same spirit, Saul Newman rejects anarcho-capitalism, not 
because he does not share anarcho-capitalist’s concern about individual freedom and 
autonomy but because he considers it to be trapped into the fetishistic circle of money 
and private property.22 This is also the case for anarcho-syndicalism and the 
objections prominent anarcho-communists express against it.23 
 The Big Anarchist Survey results highlight the contentiousness of the term 
“elective affinity” within anarchist circles.24 Here, responses to two questions 
(questions 23 'Which of the below do you consider to be problematic trends in 
anarchism today (multiple options possible)?' and 25 'Which, if any, of the following 
tendencies do you consider to be not genuinely anarchist (multiple options 
possible)?'), make it obvious that those identifying with particular currents of 
anarchism believe some other currents to be problematic and see little affinity 
between them. Nevertheless, in every case the point is that by the time one enters into 
such a debate he/she acknowledges, to some extent, the affinity between his/her trend 
and the one criticized. 
                                                        
20 Kropotkin, “Anarchism – Encyclopedia Britannica Article”, p. 297. 
21 Murray Bookchin, Social Anarchism or Lifestyle Anarchism: An Unbridgeable Chasm, AK Press, 
San Francisco 1995. 
22 An Interview of Saul Newman to Süreyyya Evren, Kursad Kiziltug, Erden Kosova about 
poststructuralist anarchism, http://community.livejournal.com/siyahi/2019.html (accessed on 3/9/2010). 
23 See the article by Murray Bookchin “The Ghost of Anarcho-Syndicalism” in which Bookchin 
recapitulates all objections against this anarchist current. http://dwardmac.pitzer.edu/ 
Anarchist_Archives/bookchin/ghost2.html (accessed on 14/10/2010). 
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 As showed, the contentiousness of the approach captured by the term “elective 
affinity” is not something new in anarchist studies but at the same time, it depends on 
the occasional reading one makes in order to accept or reject it. As a result, my 
reading of “elective affinity” will and must play a crucial role in the process of 
bringing Friedrich Nietzsche and the anarchists together through a gradual process, 
unfolded in part C and D.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
24 http://pimpmygarden.org/anarchistsurvey.com/results/ (accessed on 14/10/2010).  
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B.2/ The A-(n)archists 
 
Origin and “Definition” 
The term anarchy is quite an old one and its etymology derives from the Greek word 
αρχή, which means authority, and the letter “α”, that, when used before a word, 
expresses the lack of what the word describes. So, anarchy (αναρχία) literally means 
“without authority”. 
 We can find references to anarchy in Plato’s Republic (575a) and in Aristotle’s 
Politics (1302b), but anarchy, as a social and political movement, is something 
completely different, a phenomenon of the nineteenth century. What anarchy (or 
anarchism, in terms of ideology) represents is a revolt whose roots can be traced back 
to philosophical and religious movements like the Stoics and the Cynics in ancient 
Greece, as well as the Gnostics and the Anabaptists in the Middle Ages. In particular, 
the Cynics, with their critique of democracy, authority and the social conventions, 
bore a life stance clearly defined by anarchistic ideals. But the elective “religious” 
affinities are also making anarchism a heir of all the utopian and millenarian religious 
movements with emphasis on an eschatology, which aimed at the earthly “kingdom” 
of justice, equality and fraternity. 
 However, the Enlightenment may also claim the paternity for anarchism. 
Freedom, equality and political action are concepts that, fermented during the chain 
reactions of the French Revolution, led anarchists to criticize its very methods and 
goals. 
 This ambiguity - of idealism and materialism, of faith and rationalism - has 
become one of the basic characteristics of anarchism in general, as it detests 
homogeneity, authenticity and dogmatism. According to Tomás Ibañez, we have to 
accept the imperfect and provisional nature of anarchism because only then will it, 
indeed, keep up with its principles.1 
 If we are to give an, as short as possible, definition, we could say that an 
anarchist is someone who rejects every kind of external authority, including the state, 
believing that society and individuals would function well without them.2 However, 
my approach to anarchism does not claim to be “the” approach. Within the vast range 
                                                        
1 Tomás Ibañez, “From Anarchism to Post-Anarchism”, Libertaria, No ¾, 2008. Every part of this 
article has been taken (and translated into English) from its Greek edition, “Από τον Αναρχισμό στον 
Μεταναρχισμό” [From Anarchism to Postanarchism], Παρέγκλιση, No 1, p. 3. 
2 Marshall, p. xiii. 
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of perceptions of anarchist thought and its evolution my outline here is neither 
uncontested nor unique, and for this very reason it comes to confirm the above view 
of Ibañez about the fluid and imperfect nature of anarchism that keeps it safe from 
dogmatism and homogeneity. Additionally, and in spite of following a mainstream 
model for categorizing anarchist tradition (meaning the division to “classical” and 
“post” anarchism, “new” anarchist movements, etc.) my intention is to gradually 
promote anarchism’s diversity and dynamism in order to expose the inefficient 
description of anarchism with tools of ideology. It is “anarchy versus anarchism”, 
where the flexible, multilevel elective affinity opposes the rigid boundaries of 
ideology, and the compatibility/inseparability of practice and theory surpass the 
ideological dominance of theory over practice. 
 
B.2.1/ Anarchism as an Ideology  
Speaking of anarchism in terms of ideology requires a short introduction to political 
ideas and ideologies. 
 For Michael Freeden, the definition of ideology is neither definite nor 
generally accepted since the amount of its different conceptualizations has produced 
various approaches that seem to confuse scholars. Some forms that ideology has taken 
up to now is an expression of distorted and power-serving political thinking or a 
simplistic label for classifying political belief-systems and the historical traditions  
these systems stem from.3  
  
Freeden goes even further by attempting to give an, even provisional, definition. For 
him, ideology  
 
is a set of ideas, beliefs, opinions, and values that: 1) exhibit a recurring pattern, 
2) are held by significant groups, 3) compete over providing and controlling 
plans for public policy, 4) do so with the aim of justifying, contesting or 
changing the social and political arrangements and processes of a political 
community.4 
  
It is very interesting to note that some of the above meanings and features are 
                                                        
3 Michael Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach, Oxford University Press, 
New York 2006, p. 1. 
4 Michael Freeden, Ideology, a Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2003, p. 32. 
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rejected by anarchism. Of course, this does not necessarily mean that anarchism 
cannot be regarded as a political ideology. That would depend on how crucial one 
considers these features and meanings to be for their definition of ideology - for 
example, anarchism does not claim a monopoly of truth and it does not compete over 
controlling plans for public society, at least not in the way Freeden describes it.5 
Moreover,  
 
…the study of ideology is most profitably recognized as the study of actual 
political thought - the concrete thinking of political communities and within 
political communities”6 and “…human discourse has an ideological dimension 
to it, but that it cannot be reduced to that dimension alone.7 
  
Hence, political ideas can guide political action and can form material life. 
They do not emerge in a vacuum, but are shaped by historical and social 
circumstances within which they develop. Political theory feeds political action. There 
is a constant interaction between ideologies and the social activity called “politics”. 
The former is an internal dimension of the latter.8 
 We cannot reject ideologies since it is through them that we interpret reality, 
without, of course, meaning that ideologies represent an objective, external reality.9 
The point is that ideas and ideologies provide a perspective for understanding and 
interpreting the world, they fall in our cultural framework through which we interpret 
our experience, guide our action and define our world. People do not view the world 
the way it really is, but the way they expect it to be, through a veil of beliefs, opinions 
and assumptions.10 It is very interesting that Nietzsche would agree on the very 
concept of this argument, about interpretation and reality, bearing, nevertheless, two 
objections: he would substitute ideology with will and he would reject the existence 
of an objective reality. For him “there are no facts, only interpretations”.11 
 Taking into consideration all the above, together with Freeden’s argument that 
“an ideology is a wide-ranging structural arrangement that attributes meaning to a 
                                                        
5 Freeden, Ideology, a Very Short Introduction, p. 34. 
6 Freeden, Ideology, a Very Short Introduction, p. 123. 
7 Freeden, Ideology, a Very Short Introduction, p. 124. 
8 Freeden, Ideology, a Very Short Introduction, p. 124. 
9 Freeden, Ideology, a Very Short Introduction, pp. 2-3. 
10 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, Basic Books, New York 1973, p. 145. 
11 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, Vintage Books, New York 1968, aphorism 481. 
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range of mutually defining political concepts”,12 I will proceed to an exposition of 
anarchism’s basic features and currents. However, what we should keep in mind – in 
order to deal with it right away – is that, even if political theory and political action 
are inseparable, ideology means that in such a relationship theory prevails over 
practice by determining it through shaping and constraining its possibilities. 
 
B.2.2/ Features and Currents of (Classical) Anarchism 
This section provides some features and currents of Anarchism, and the aim is to 
provide an outline of the most basic anarchist characteristics and trends, suitable for 
the comparison that will take place between Nietzschean and anarchist philosophy in 
part C, challenge the ideological boundaries within anarchism (part C.1) and, finally, 
provide the basis for the case study of part D. 
 The choice of these characteristics has been made by selecting the main 
principles and currents presented in most works of anarchist literature, a part of which 
is used throughout this thesis, either as works of prominent anarchists or essays of 
anarchist history. Nevertheless, the treatment of these descriptors is rather indicative, 
exactly because of the basic argument presented here. That is, the approach of 
anarchism in terms of elective affinity rather than ideology, resulting in the 
acceptance of a more fluid and flexible anarchist nature that, as shown further down, 
can expand its limits in order to embrace currents like libertarian Marxism.    
 
Ideology and Experience 
Tomás Ibañez stresses the need to distinguish between two bodies of anarchism, the 
body of ideology (a system of principles and opinions which is, more or less, coherent 
and well structured) and the body of historical experiences (social-political 
movements, groups, struggles, symbols, antagonist practices). The ideological body 
shaped itself within ferments of a specific era, has certain time and space coordinates 
and, inevitably, undergoes alterations whenever new debates come up.13 Some of its 
most basic characteristics are the following: 
  
Authority and Freedom 
The dispute between authority and freedom, which focuses on the exclusion of 
authority in favour of freedom, can be regarded as the foundation stone of 
                                                        
12 Freeden, Ideology, a Very Short Introduction, p. 52. 
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anarchism.14 All its basic characteristics actually stem from this antiauthoritarian 
critique and the demand for liberty. Nonetheless, one must seriously take into 
consideration the ambiguous perception of the term “authority” within anarchist 
circles. For example, Bakunin accepted the natural authority of competent individuals 
and many anarchists have argued that people “in authority” are acceptable as long as 
they act on the basis of egalitarianism and consent. Additionally, Simon Critchley 
tries to “replace an idea of anarchism based around the idea of freedom, a humanist 
idea of individual freedom, with an anarchism of responsibility”15, by speaking of an 
infinite commitment to an ethical demand, a freely accepted “authority”. In this case, 
“the coercion that is exerted is a kind of self coercion. I put myself under a demand, 
freely, and that’s what conscience would be in that sense”.16 Nevertheless, this 
critique of the libertarian impulse of anarchism, in favour of responsibility, does not 
contrast the demand for liberty but rather reinforces it, especially if we recall 
Kropotkin’s arguments in Anarchist Morality about the unbreakable bond between 
freedom and responsibility. Therefore, it is not authority anarchists reject but rather 
authoritarianism.17 An example of this view can be seen in the way the anarchist 
troops were self-managed during the Spanish Revolution, where there was always a 
commander elected by the fighters, whose duties were strictly administrative and who 
could be recalled at any time.18 
 
Equality  
“Equality” has not only to do with fighting for justice, but with the rejection of an 
unequal distribution of authority - among groups and individuals - as well, which 
becomes an obstacle for the practice of freedom. The anarchist concept of equality is 
more radical than the liberal understanding of equality before the law or equality of 
opportunity precisely because anarchists reject the authoritative system that produces 
these laws and opportunities. Moreover, the other central concept of freedom allows 
the existence of various “inequalities” for the avoidance of both a dominant 
mediocrity as well as tyranny. For example, Bakunin accepted the physical and social 
                                                                                                                                                               
13 Ibañez, p. 2. 
14 Ibañez, p. 3. 
15 Infinitely Demanding Anarchism: An Interview with Simon Critchley, 
http://www.ucd.ie/philosophy/perspectives/resources/Simon_critcheley_interview.pdf (accessed on 
14/4/2012), p. 14. 
16 Infinitely Demanding Anarchism, p. 18. 
17 Marshall, p. 647. 
18 Robert Alexander, The Anarchists in the Spanish Civil War, Janus Publishing, London 2007, Vol. 1, 
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equality of humanity19 but he could also accept economic inequality through the 
collectivist system he supported. Kropotkin, by adopting the communist definition of 
justice (from each according to ability, to each according to need), also favoured a 
certain type of inequality that took into consideration the special abilities and needs of 
the individual, always in a communal context. Likewise, Bookchin called for “an 
equality of unequals”, thus recognizing the particularity of every individual within a 
communist framework.20    
 
Revolution 
“Revolution” is not an objective goal per se but a road to anarchy, and it could easily 
be substituted by other means if these proved themselves to be more effective against 
authority. Therefore, the concept of revolution, especially as a particular event, is not 
fundamental for anarchism, no matter how important its position in the imaginary of 
the anarchist tradition. We come across this view in Emma Goldman’s realization that 
to reconstruct a society you have to use example and education21 rather than guns,22 in 
Malatesta’s belief that after a short period of insurrection, anarchy would come as a 
result of a gradual evolution rather than a violent revolution,23 and Landauer’s 
concept of revolution as a non-violent and constant procedure that embraces all 
aspects of life.24   
 
Direct Democracy 
The “rejection of parliamentary representation”, the “practice of direct democracy and 
direct action”, the “direct control of the representative procedures” and the right of 
minorities to exist, even in the shadow of majority decisions, all come from the will to 
take decisions through non-authoritarian procedures and to avoid a “mediocrity 
rule”.25 In addition, one basic principle applied to the anarchist decision-making 
procedures is that of “consensus”, an effort to combine all tendencies appearing 
during an assembly in order to avoid the dipole majority-minority that preserves a 
                                                                                                                                                               
pp. 167-69. 
19 Mikhail Bakunin, “Revolutionary Catechism”, in Dolgoff, Sam (ed.), Bakunin on Anarchy, Vintage 
Books, New York 1972, pp. 78-79. 
20 Marshall, p. 49. 
21 Emma Goldman, Red Emma Speaks, Wildwood House, London 1979, p. 46. 
22 Goldman, Red Emma Speaks, p. 207. 
23 Marshall, p. 358. 
24 Gustav Landauer, “Revolution”, in Gabriel Kuhn (ed.), Gustav Landauer, Revolution and Other 
Writings, PM Press, Oakland 2010, pp. 112-13, 129, 135-36. 
25 Peter Kropotkin, “Anarchist Communism”, in Roger N. Baldwin (ed.), Kropotkin's Revolutionary 
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type of dominance, that of majority over minority. 
 
Means and Ends 
The “accordance between principles and practices” is also a derivative of the 
authority-freedom conflict, since the aim of this accordance is for anarchists not to 
give in to practices of dominion, and, as a result, never to use means that are in 
contradiction with the desirable goals.26 This is mainly because of the idea of 
“prefiguration”, a pre-taste of the future in the present, contrary to the Machiavellian 
politics of Bolsheviks. As Cindy Milstein puts it, prefigurative politics is the vision of 
direct action where the means coincide with the ends. This consistency makes room 
for the future here and now and gives a model of ethical politics for tasting what we 
are fighting for.27    
     
Anti-Statism 
“Anti-statism” is an expression of anarchists’ detestation of the authority the state 
exercises over society, an authority regarded as absolute, compulsory and unlimited. 
Anarchist thought rejects the liberal notion of the “social contract”, attributing the 
existence of the state in a condition of dominance.28 Nevertheless, views of the state 
differ among anarchists: classical anarchists, like Bakunin and Kropotkin, believe that 
the state is the generator of authority and dominion, whereas thinkers like Landauer, 
or post-anarchists of the twentieth and twenty first century see it not as a structure but 
as a complex of relationships29 that mainly derives from, and not only give birth to, 
authority.  
 
Solidarity 
“Solidarity” is another basic feature of anarchist thought and it is present in almost 
every famous anarchist work.30 It is not only a vital ingredient of a future, 
emancipated, anarchist society but a necessary weapon in the hands of people for their 
                                                                                                                                                               
Pamphlets, Dover Publications, New York 1970, pp. 51-52. 
26 Ibañez, pp. 4-5. 
27 Cindy Milstein, “Reclaim the Cities: From Protest to Popular Power”, The Anarchist Library, 
http://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/cindy-milstein-reclaim-the-cities-from-protest-to-popular-power 
(accessed on 12/9/2013).  
28 Marshall, p. 22. 
29 Day, p. 16. 
30 See, for example, Kropotkin’s Ethics: Origin and Development, Kessinger Publishing, New York 
2007, pp. 174, 293, and Bakunin’s Statism and Anarchy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
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conquest of anarchy, as well. According to Reclus, even the radical slogan of 
anarchist communism “from each according to ability, to each according to need” 
seems conservative before a distribution according to solidarity. Because for him, 
need remains an egoistic principle that is renewed only within the context of the needs 
of others, meaning in solidarity.31 
Violence 
 “Violence” is something that has divided anarchists through time. Between the edges 
of terrorism and pacifism, anarchists have adopted many intermediate stances with 
most of them holding a distinction between the violence of the oppressor and the 
violence of the oppressed. What that means is that although violent phenomena are 
not welcomed in an anarchist society, violence might be seen either as a way of 
confronting the violence of the oppressors, like Kropotkin believed,32 or as an instant 
expression of a sentimental discharge, a (divine) violence that liberates, according to 
Walter Benjamin.33 
  
The Anarchist Corpus/Contesting the Ideological Approach of Anarchism 
All the above components have contributed to the formation of an anarchist corpus 
which leads to either a macro-ideological or a micro-ideological34 version of what 
anarchism stands for. Nonetheless, there are two main reasons for which an 
ideological approach to anarchism is flawed. The first has to do with the anarchist 
canon, meaning the representation of anarchism as a fixed ideology through the work 
of specific nineteenth century anarchist writers and the additional reduction of their 
thoughts to “certain clusters of ideas that only help to confirm prejudices about the 
‘classical anarchists’”.35 Secondly, even if we overlook the arbitrary selection of the 
prominent thinkers/core concepts and agree on a conceptual corpus of anarchism, this 
would mean that the perception of these concepts within anarchist circles is widely 
shared. Yet, this ideological approach itself seems to contradict this conclusion as it 
(rightfully) acknowledges different currents within anarchism. Where do these 
                                                                                                                                                               
1990, pp. xxxiii, 17, 220. 
31 Marshall, p. 342. 
32 See “The Significance of Kropotkin’s Life and Teaching”, in Roger N. Baldwin (ed.), Kropotkin's 
Revolutionary Pamphlets, Dover Publications, New York 1970. 
33 Walter Benjamin, “Critique of Violence”, in Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms Autobiographical 
Writings, Schocken Books, New York 1978, pp. 296-97. 
34 As defined by Freeden in chapters 6 and 7 of his work (Freeden, Ideology, a Very Short Introduction, 
pp. 78-81, 98). 
35 Süreyyya Evren and Duane Rousselle (ed.), Post-Anarchism, a Reader, Pluto Press, New York 2011, 
p. 4.  
 
 
 
 
32
different tendencies stem from? Without a doubt, they come from the different 
interpretation of the concepts that constitute the common ideological corpus.  
 Let us analyze these two objections to the ideological approach of anarchism 
in more detail.  
 
The Anarchist Canon 
The selection of the prominent thinkers/core concepts of anarchism was not the result 
of an “apocalyptic” process of religious type but a subjective product of the writers 
that have composed the history of anarchism. Different writers ended up with a 
different group of thinkers and this relativity reminds us of the Nietzschean labeling 
(in the case of morality) for the absence of objectivities, since every epoch bears its 
own values.36 The same thing is happening here. At the end of the nineteenth century, 
Paul Eltzbacher regarded Proudhon, Godwin, Stirner, Bakunin, Kropotkin, Tucker 
and Tolstoy as the most prominent anarchists,37 whereas six decades later, George 
Woodcock’s Anarchism followed Eltzbacher’s selection except for Tucker.38 Two 
years after Woodcock, Irving Horowitz considered Bakunin, Malatesta, Sorel and 
Kropotkin to be the key thinkers,39 whereas for Henri Arvon the prime group 
consisted of Godwin, Stirner, Proudhon, Bakunin and Tolstoy40 and James Joll 
broadened the list by including Voline, Goldman, Godwin, Cafiero, Kropotkin, 
Malatesta, Makhno, Bakunin, Babeuf, Durruti, Stirner, Proudhon, Fourier and 
others.41 Max Nettlau also included a large number of theorists/activists in his history 
of anarchism, in 1971, consisting of Landauer, Duhring, Reclus, Margall, Bakunin, 
Kropotkin, Malatesta and Merlino among others.42 In the 80s, Alan Ritter only 
referred to Godwin, Proudhon, Bakunin and Kropotkin,43 whilst Daniel Guérin 
omitted Godwin, Tucker and Tolstoy but included others like de Paepe, Guillaume, 
Pelloutier, and Pouget.44 In the 90s and the 00s the number seems to increase and 
                                                        
36 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, first essay. 
37 Paul Eltzbacher, Anarchism: Exponents of the Anarchist Philosophy, Freedom Press, London 1975, 
ref. in Ruth Kinna, Anarchism: A Beginner’s Guide, p. 10. 
38 George Woodcock, Anarchism, University of Toronto Press,  Toronto 2004, ref. in Ruth Kinna, 
Anarchism: A Beginner’s Guide, p. 10. 
39 Irving Horowitz, The Anarchists, Dell, New York 1964, ref. in Süreyyya Evren and Duane Rousselle 
(ed.), Post-Anarchism, a Reader, p. 14. 
40 Henri Arvon, L’ Anarchisme, Presses Universitaires De France, n.p., 1964, ref. in Süreyyya Evren 
and Duane Rousselle (ed.), Post-Anarchism, a Reader, p. 14. 
41 James Joll, The Anarchists, Harvard University Press, 1980 (first edition in 1964). 
42 Max Nettlau, A Short History of Anarchism (first published in French in 1971). 
43 Alan Ritter, Anarchism: A Theoretical Analysis, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1980, ref. 
in Süreyyya Evren and Duane Rousselle (ed.), Post-Anarchism, a Reader, p. 14.  
44 Daniel Guérin, No Gods, No Masters: An Anthology of Anarchism, AK Press, Oakland 2005 
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reduce according to the historian, with Peter Marshall expanding the anarchist canon 
drastically, by including almost all the above theorists/activists45 contrarily to Colin 
Ward and Daniel Colson who focused only on Godwin, Proudhon, Bakunin, 
Kropotkin, and Stirner, Proudhon, Bakunin, retrospectively.46  
 The fundamental point is that the effort to detect a coherent corpus of thinkers 
and (their) concepts to define what anarchism is, has led to arbitrary conclusions and 
to a selective anarchist canon.  Accordingly, more recent trends of anarchy – like 
post-anarchism – claim not only to refresh but also to correct the supposed false views 
of classical anarchists. 
 
The Anarchist Currents 
The second objection has to do with the panspermia of philosophical differentiations 
that led to the formation of the basic currents within the anarchist tradition I present 
below. Taking into account that anarchism draws from socialism and liberalism alike, 
there are two main categories that include these currents: Social anarchism and 
Individualist anarchism. The former is closer to socialism whilst the latter stands 
closer to liberalism. 
 In the first category we come across “mutualism”, “collectivism”, “anarcho-
communism” and “anarcho-syndicalism”.  
  
Mutualism 
“Mutualism” might be placed between individualism and collectivism since, although 
looking forward to a social reformation, it still shares some individualist principles 
like private property (or, more accurately, “possessions” as Proudhon, its main 
representative, put it).  
 
…society should be organized, without the intervention of a State, by individuals who 
are able to make free contracts with each other. To replace the existing State and 
Capital, mutualists proposed, and tried to create, a co-operative society, comprising 
individuals who exchange the necessities of life on the basis of labour value and 
                                                                                                                                                               
(originally published in French in 1980), ref. in Ruth Kinna, Anarchism: A Beginner’s Guide, p. 10. 
45 Marshall, Demanding the Impossible, ref. in Ruth Kinna, Anarchism: A Beginner’s Guide, p. 10. 
46 Daniel Colson, “Nietzsche and the Libertarian Worker’s Movement” and Colin Ward, Anarchism: A 
Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2004, both ref. in Süreyyya Evren and 
Duane Rousselle (ed.), Post-Anarchism, a Reader, pp. 13-14. 
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obtain free credit through a people’s bank. Individuals and small groups would still 
posess their instruments of labour, and receive the produce thereof.47  
 
Collectivism 
“Collectivism” stands between mutualism and anarcho-communism, in a way that 
constitutes a developed financial system of mutualism together with a social model of 
communism. Its principle is “from each according to his ability, to each according to 
work done”. Bakunin was the first to use this term48 and his example was widely put 
in action during the Spanish Revolution by the peasants and communities that adhered 
to anarchist principles. 
 
Anarcho-Communism 
“Anarcho-communism” is a radical form of collectivist anarchism since it elects a 
community based on extreme solidarity and self-government. The motto here is “from 
each according to ability, to each according to need”, highlighting the principles of 
mutual aid and cooperation in all fields of everyday life for the members of the 
commune. Anarcho-communism is the current of anarchist tradition that clashes the 
most with Marxist communism, since both communisms dream of an anarchist 
society but through different paths. Kropotkin’s vision of self-sufficient and 
independent communes and Malatesta’s highlighting of the central role the will and 
tolerance must play in such societies, are all hostile to Marxist determinism and 
centralization. 
  
Anarcho-Syndicalism 
Anarchism reached its zenith as a social mass movement in Spain 1936, immediately 
before the Spanish Revolution and during it. The accomplishment of many of 
anarchism’s goals took place due to “anarcho-syndicalism”, a current of social 
anarchism that is based on autonomous, revolutionary syndicates as a model of a 
future anarchist society. The syndicates are for anarcho-syndicalism what collectives 
are for collectivist anarchism and communes for anarcho-communism, and its special 
features include the rejection of conventional politics, direct action, self-determination 
and an ultimate weapon, the myth of a general strike. 
 The second, main category of the anarchist tradition, Individualist anarchism, 
                                                        
47 Marshall, p. 7. 
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consists of “egoism and libertarianism”.49 
 
Egoism 
“Egoism” is based upon the idea of a sovereign individual and its principles have best 
been put forward in Max Stirner’s The Ego and His Own.50 Nonetheless, egoism must 
not be reduced to an extreme self-interest philosophy - thus perceived in a Lockean or 
Hobbesian way - for egoism is the current that places the individual in the centre of 
the moral universe without denying cooperation of the egoist individuals.51 
 
Libertarianism 
Libertarianism is a term we come across at both ends (Right, Left) of the political 
spectrum, but here I will focus on the anarchist and Left perception of it. 
Libertarianism combines the view of a stateless society with the protection and 
preservation of individuality. Henry David Thoreau, Benjamin Tucker, William 
Godwin and Josiah Warren best developed this argument and although they avoided 
using the term “anarchist”, their thought remains within an anarchist context.  Many 
anarchists (used to) refer to anarchism as “libertarian socialism”. This happens either 
to distinguish anarchism from its negative historical components (like terrorism), or to 
stress the position of anarchism within the socialist family.  
 However, libertarianism also appears in the field of the broader Left as 
“antiauthoritarian communism/Marxism” and thinkers like Walter Benjamin or 
Cornelius Castoriadis can be included in this family. The timeless interaction of 
libertarian thinkers with the anarchist tradition shows that the boundaries of 
anarchism can extend even to some trends of the antiauthoritarian Left. After an 
extended, and historically detailed, presentation of schools of anarchism, Ruth 
Kinna52 reaches the conclusion that the several typologies of anarchist schools seem 
to give  
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49 (Right-wing) Libertarianism and Anarcho-capitalism are usually included in the currents of 
Individualist anarchism but in my opinion both are rather an extreme edition of liberalism than part of 
the anarchist family. The basic reason for this is that they focus not on the emancipation of people in 
whole, but on the emancipation of the market and the profit. A stateless society is not necessarily an 
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50 Johann Kaspar Schmidt (Max Stirner), The Ego and His Own, Dover, New York 1973, first 
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a picture of confusion. The tendency of each new generation of writers is to 
have expanded the number of anarchist schools and to have redefined their 
membership, making the boundaries between schools increasingly diffuse.53 
 
Hence, the case of Walter Benjamin, which will be examined separately in part C.1, is 
to give evidence for a connection between anarchism and libertarian Marxism through 
the flexibility of elective affinity and the inclusion of Friedrich Nietzsche to this 
connective schema. 
 
Elective affinity Versus an Ideological Perception of Anarchism 
For all the above, I argue that “elective affinity”, as illustrated in part B.1, is a much 
more productive approach to anarchism than ideology. Although we can trace the 
existence of the above political concepts in all currents of anarchism, the different 
ways that these concepts are usually interpreted and prioritized seem to reveal an 
ideological body that is not coherent.  
 To borrow Michael Freeden’s words, these political concepts are like pieces of 
furniture. The way we choose to combine them takes us to a different room, that is, to 
a different ideology.54 And it is true that this set of furniture, meaning the way every 
concept is linked to all the rest,55 is common to all trends of anarchism. What is 
different - something that we do not come across in any other ideology, at least not to 
such an extent - is the definition of some of these concepts within every current. In 
other words, what is different is not the arrangement of the furniture but their colour, 
size or the material they are made from, factors that maintain the affinity between 
these trends, whilst favouring a significant diversity and leaving little room to the 
homogeneity that a strict ideological approach presupposes. Even Kropotkin 
questioned the coherence of the anarchist worldview when acknowledging that what 
defined anarchism were not the theories elaborated by people like himself but the 
numerous propagandist materials circulated by almost every single anarchist.56 
 In this context, let us, for example, examine the concept of anti-statism. On the 
one hand, classical anarchists consider the state to be something concrete, evil and the 
very source of human exploitation. On the other hand, post-anarchists regard it as a 
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certain complex of human relationships, because of power and exploitation, which 
keeps on reproducing both, rather than being the source of them. Nevertheless, all 
agree that the state, in relation to freedom and human emancipation, plays a negative 
role. So, the way the state and freedom “furniture” are combined leads us to the 
“room of anarchy”, but the differences in size and colour of the “state-furniture” in 
this example show the weak points of a pure ideological approach. 
 In addition, Freeden suggests that an ideology decontests all political concepts, 
aiming at attributing a clear and certain meaning to them. 57 Yet, this does not always 
happen in anarchism, where we may come across concepts that hold a central role but 
these concepts are not decontestable at all. Power for example, as illustrated in 
chapter B.2.4, seems to be perceived differently by classical anarchists and post-
anarchists in terms of its nature and the role it plays in anarchist politics and theories. 
Furthermore, whilst for Freeden “all ideologies begin with non-negotiable 
assumptions”58 post-anarchism seems to question such a starting point. With its 
pluralism, it rejects the normativities and axioms of classical anarchism. However, 
even classical anarchist thought seems to carry within it the seeds of questioning 
every certainty concerning human nature (one of anarchism’s supposed “non-
negotiable assumptions”), as Richard Day stresses below and as I am going to show in 
part C.1.  
So, there is definitely some kind of confusion deriving from the analysis of 
anarchist trends but this confusion can designate the significance of the elective 
affinity approach. Kinna describes how Horowitz regarded different schools of 
anarchism not as carriers of “separated doctrines” but as “alternative responses to 
particular historical, cultural and political conditions”.59 This reference to different 
social/political contexts not only explains but also welcomes the fluidity between 
anarchist tendencies, and at the same time brings the unification of anarchism, under a 
leading idea. The difference versus Eltzbacher’s legalistic analysis and the rigid 
ideological approach is that the core values can be expressed in several ways, 
depending on the specific cultural and political conditions of their time. Moreover, 
this contextual approach, which focuses on the historical development and evolution 
of anarchism, favours the examination of anarchism’s positive content contra to the 
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usual definition of anarchism in negative terms, as opposition to the state.60 Here 
comes elective affinity to foster the interaction between the several conceptual 
interpretations and tendencies of anarchism without selective readings that would 
create stagnation and dogmatism. This is how anarchism turns into anarchy, and is 
being recognized as theoretical as well as practical at the same time, maintaining its 
open, anti-static, dynamical character. In addition, this open character can 
embrace/include the affinal characteristics of currents such as libertarian Marxism. As 
I will show in part B.2.5, libertarian Marxism can be linked to anarchy, in the name of 
Walter Benjamin thanks to an anti-ideological approach of anarchism through elective 
affinity, by broadening the boundaries of anarchist thought and giving its basic 
characteristics a more flexible essence.            
 As a result, I would argue that although “all forms of political thinking have 
an ideological dimension”,61 an approach to anarchism highlighting “elective affinity” 
rather than promoting an ideological profile, may contribute much more to the effort 
of decoding anarchy and linking it both to Nietzsche and libertarian communism. The 
unification of an anarchy that preserves its several different components can be easily 
understood under the affinal Nietzschean project of “becoming who you are” that will 
be analytically exposed in part B.4. There we will see that the unification of one’s self 
is a dynamical process that requires the incorporation and balance of many different 
qualities, impulses and experiences. This unification is also the way that one can 
locate and affirm our qualitative differences from others. In the same way, the elective 
affinity between Nietzsche and the anarchists may help “to define the parameters of 
anarchism in relation to other ideologies”62 something that answers the second query 
of this research (as stated in part A.1).  Finally, the promotion of anarchy’s positive 
content is of great interest and importance since the most basic accusation of 
Nietzsche towards anarchists was the negativity nestling in their resentful feelings and 
bad conscience. This is how the elective affinity with Nietzsche can lead to a positive 
re-ordering of anarchism, aiming at evaluating and dealing with possible reactive 
elements of anarchist behaviours.  
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B.2.3/ Beyond Classical Anarchism: The New and Contemporary Anarchistic Social 
Movements 
 
In the previous chapter, we saw the importance elective affinity has in order to 
approach anarchism in an alternative, rather than ideological, way. The activation and 
ongoing project of elective affinity has to do with the harmonization of anarchist 
tendencies, so it is directly interested in the development and evolution of the 
anarchist movement and the emergence of new tendencies within anarchist circles. 
Chapters B.2.3 and B.2.4 deal with the anarchist(ic) movements of the era after 1968, 
present their main characteristics, which are typically anarchistic, and delineate their 
affinal relationships. Additionally, I will examine the post-anarchist current and will 
give a first hint of what will be completed in the end of chapter C.1. That is, the 
understanding of post-anarchist not as a “post” but as one more tendency of 
anarchism. 
 
New Anarchistic Movements: Anti-Hegemony and Politics of Affinity 
The red line for crossing the borders of “classical” anarchism could be the new social 
movements of the 60s, 70s and 80s which, even though they did not define themselves 
as such, they could be included in the anarchist family, for they openly adopted 
anarchist principles and practices, such as direct action, non-hierarchical formations, 
direct democracy, voluntarism, self-discipline, mutual aid, solidarity, etc.  
 In this category, we come across “movements” that kept an antagonistic stance 
towards the dominant political scene from 1968 until the big demonstrations of Seattle 
in 1999. These “movements” are May 68 in Paris, Autonomia in Italy in the 70s, 
Autonomen in Germany in the 80s and 90s and other affinal ventures throughout 
Europe in this period. 
 All of these movements represent an effort on the part of the social 
antagonism, consisted of the new subjects of the Western metropolis, to respond to 
advanced capitalism. Occupations, open assemblies and collective decision forums; 
the rejection of hierarchy and representation, clashes with the police for asserting the 
right to resist statist and financial repression, are some of these movements’ 
characteristics in their effort to realize tomorrow’s dreams today. 
Additionally, my definition of contemporary, anarchist(ic), radical movements 
includes groups that follow tactics similar to those Richard Day calls “contemporary 
radical activism”. These movements are contemporary in the way that they connect 
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with the activism of 90s and early 00s, which has its roots in the new social 
movements of 60s - feminism, red power, the struggle of gays and lesbians, etc. - and 
in the Marxist and anarchist socialist traditions. They are also radical since their 
intention is not to reform or beautify the dominant structures and procedures, but to 
block and demolish them, aiming at the overthrow of the causes, not only that of the 
symptoms.63 
 Most of these aforementioned movements - some more, some less - did not 
and do not wish to establish a hegemony, as Antonio Gramsci put it64. That is, they do 
not try to take power or impose their worldview on a large scale.  
 
From the refusal of work to the construction of concrete alternatives to the 
existing order, these dispersed and constantly morphing tactics nonetheless 
share some common characteristics. They are not oriented to allowing a 
particular group or movement to remake a nation-state or a world in its own 
image, and are therefore of little use to those who seek power over 
others…Rather, they are appropriate to those who are striving to recover, 
establish or enhance their ability to determine the conditions of their own 
existence, while allowing and encouraging others to do the same.65  
 
This is why most of these “movements” are not movements that traditional sociology 
might recognize. As far as their anarchistic character is concerned, this is because of 
the implicit adoption of traditionally anarchist methods - direct action, non-
hierarchical formations, voluntarism, mutual aid, solidarity, etc. - as mentioned in 
section B.2.2. Because of these anarchistic characteristics, and although only a small 
percentage is self-defined as purely anarchist, these groups can be regarded as an 
evolution, a contemporary version of the classical anarchist movement of the 
nineteenth and early twentieth century. 
 In particular, these groups exist within a frame of affinity, they are the so 
called “affinity groups” which act by openly questioning the core of hegemony. They 
are identified by relationships freed from universality, compulsion and hierarchy and 
their bonds are based on mutual aid and common ethical commitment.66 Living in a 
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relationship based on affinity not only it means to come together with those with 
whom you share common principles, but also to actively hold off, and stand against, 
all those whose practices maintain a reality of distinctions, domination and 
exploitation.67 A politics of affinity does not put identities aside but rather abandons 
the illusion of stable and coherent identities, the view that a certain identity is better 
than others are, and the belief that the state must act as an arbiter for what each 
identity should be given.68 Contrary to revolutionary struggles, which try to impose 
their effect on all aspects of present society by taking over state power, and also 
contrary to politics of reformation, that seek to alter certain domains, on a global 
level, by reforming state power, these movements/networks/tactics of affinity do not 
aim at an holistic effect. They are rather willing to block and resist state and corporate 
authority on a local, national and international level by deconstructing the hegemonic 
character of (neo)liberal and (post)Marxist theory and practice.69 
 Moreover, their struggle cannot be just reduced to class struggle or economic 
issues but represent a wide range of action: racism, patriarchy, the exploitation of 
nature, gender issues, etc.  
 From this perspective, the affinity frame can include: autonomist groups (for 
example, non-Leninist components of the Autonomia movement), groups that practice 
in Temporary Autonomous Zones, as Hakim Bey suggests, networks like Reclaim the 
Streets, open assemblies or groups that take action in order to protect nature or/and to 
create and preserve “green zones” in the urban scenery of the contemporary 
metropolis, fighters in the Animal Liberation Front and the Earth Liberation Front, 
squat movements, etc. 
  
B.2.4/ Neo-anarchism / Post-anarchism   
 
Post-Anarchism 
Post-anarchism refers to the call for a review of basic anarchist concepts and their 
evolution, as well as the emergence of other characteristics that exist within the 
anarchist tradition in a less profound way. It goes together with post-structural 
theories and the current of post-modernity and as a term “was first used by 
intellectuals influenced by the French post-modernist thinkers, especially in their 
                                                        
67 Day, p. 186. 
68 Day, p. 188. 
69 Day, p. 45. 
 
 
 
 
42
opposition to ‘totalizing systems’ and their analysis of power”.70 For Saul Newman, 
Foucault’s post-structural analysis of power, and the exposure of the multiple and 
hidden dominations that pervade society extended the classical anarchist critique of 
power but at the same time made the epistemological basis of this critique seem 
problematic, by rejecting the axioms about human nature and rationality.71 This is 
what Newman calls “anarchism’s uncontaminated point of departure”,72 meaning the 
classical anarchist belief that humans possess a natural morality, an essence that is 
fundamentally good and rational.  
 Moreover, the essential link Todd May sees between anarchism and post-
structuralism “is the denial that there is some central hinge about which political 
change could or should revolve”.73 It is very important to say that, in terms of 
genealogy, the starting point of prominent post-structuralists is Nietzsche and his 
forerunner, Max Stirner. Both, via their attack on the Enlightenment, 
humanitarianism, essentialism and subjectivity, played their role in the debate 
between individuals and society. Consequently, post-anarchism stresses the 
differences between Individual and Social Anarchism, whilst acknowledging the 
advantages of both currents: Individual Anarchism offers an insight, concerning the 
burning issues of liberty and autonomy, whereas Social Anarchism seems to be more 
productive in relevance to collective political action. At the same time, post-
anarchism strongly questions the traditional idea of “society” on which social 
anarchism has been founded, meaning the questioning of society as a rational and 
sociable organic wholeness, favoured as such by thinkers like Kropotkin and 
Bookchin.74 
 Thus, post-anarchism seeks to combine the classical anarchist concepts of 
equality and emancipation with the pluralistic contemporary political struggles that 
are open to multiple identities and perspectives and are mainly expressed by the new 
social movements mentioned above. 
 
Neo-Anarchism 
Neo-anarchism is the contemporary anarchism, after the decline anarchism suffered 
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during the October Revolution and the Spanish civil war. It is a critical anarchism or a 
transitional stage from classical anarchism to post-anarchism, a first step towards the 
birth of something new and different to classical anarchism, but always in the field of 
the battle against dominance and authoritarianism. 
For Tomás Ibañez, the self-criticism of anarchism, and its shift towards post-
anarchism, goes through a critique of the absolute concepts of the Enlightenment, 
especially those of an autonomous, unified and essential subject and of the universal 
value of its principles.75 In post-anarchism absolutism loses ground to relativism, 
tomorrow’s revolution gives its place to today’s revolt, structures are reduced to 
human relationships, objective truths become subjective interpretations and the stable 
and clear identities of modernity now turn into more pluralistic and obscure ones.   
 What keeps post-anarchism in the anarchist tradition is that these elements of 
questioning basic Enlightenment concepts are also immanent in classical anarchism, 
something that will be discussed further on in this research. The important point is 
that (classical) anarchism is the only “ideology” based on the Enlightenment which 
questions, if not undermines, its very foundations. In this way not only does it keep up 
with its principles (as an anti-dogmatic worldview) but it also builds up a very 
interesting and interactive relationship with the similar worldview of Friedrich 
Nietzsche.  
 
B.2.5/ Figures of Anarchism (A) and Libertarian Marxism (L/M) 
The ideas and concepts illustrated in the previous sections, concerning the anarchist 
tradition, will be used to establish the elective affinity mainly through specific figures 
of anarchist and libertarian thought such as Mikhail Bakunin (A), Peter Kropotkin 
(A), Errico Malatesta (A), Gustav Landauer (A), Emma Goldman (A) and Walter 
Benjamin (L/M). 
 Bakunin, Kropotkin and Malatesta are generally considered to be prominent 
anarchists and if one wished to refer to anarchism in any way it would be rather 
peculiar not to include at least one of these thinkers. 
 Bakunin implemented anarchist ideas and stressed the deep theoretical and 
practical differences between anarchists and Marxists – differences that will be also 
discussed in the case study presented in part D.  
Kropotkin was the most systematic and scientific anarchist thinker and the one 
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who most intensively dealt with ethics and morality introducing, in this way, a 
genealogical approach of thinking that could unveil the origins of bourgeois values.  
Malatesta, an active agitator and revolutionary, was one of the anarchists who 
was most consistent with his ideas. Believing that truth is not a fixed quantity76 and 
opposing any kind of scientific or mechanistic fatalism (even the one of his friend and 
comrade Kropotkin), by favouring the will power,77 he developed an extremely anti-
dogmatic stance, insisting that anarchy does not belong to any particular philosophical 
system. He is also renowned for his articles about violence and the end-means 
correlation.  
Landauer and Goldman will be treated separately for two reasons. The first is 
that Nietzsche openly influenced them both and therefore I will examine their 
contribution to the elective affinity in the chapter C.1. The second reason is that, as 
mentioned in the introduction, one of this research’s objectives is to question the 
boundaries between different anarchist currents and especially between “classical” 
and “post” anarchism. Landauer and Goldman, standing into the “classical” anarchist 
era like Nietzschean preachers, are the most suitable figures to do so. 
Finally, Walter Benjamin – whose thought will also serve the establishment of 
the affinity in chapter C.1 – is a prominent libertarian Marxist whose case, I will 
argue, illustrates how libertarian Marxism is much closer to anarchism than to 
mainstream/orthodox Marxism. Hence, the use of his ideas, for which I will 
straightaway give the rationale, will question the boundaries between ideologies like 
anarchy and libertarian Marxism or, even better, libertarian communism.  
The role of Benjamin in this thesis is a conjunctive one since I intend to use 
Nietzsche, Benjamin (as a representative of libertarian Marxism) and anarchism as the 
three vertexes of the same triangle.  
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The three sides of this triangle stand for the connection between Nietzsche-Benjamin, 
Nietzsche-anarchism and Benjamin-anarchism. Hence, apart from the straightforward 
connection between Nietzsche and anarchism, the parallel connections of Nietzsche to 
Benjamin and of Benjamin to anarchism will serve as a double-checked evident 
affinity between anarchism-Nietzsche (through Benjamin), and Benjamin (libertarian 
Marxism)-anarchism (through Nietzsche). This schema is, apparently, based on a 
fundamental mathematical property, the transitive property of equality, revised here in 
terms of elective affinity: If a = b and b = c, then a = c.    
Benjamin is a very idiosyncratic thinker mainly because of the, seemingly, 
controversial components of his philosophy. The combination of German 
romanticism, Judaic messianism and historical materialism produces a heretic view of 
time, progress and revolution.  
The primary and most significant connection between Benjamin and 
anarchism was made by Benjamin himself in works like Critique of Violence, where 
he praises the idea of a revolt without prior organization and without the presence of a 
party.78 Similarly, in his essay on Surrealism, he identifies the model of revolution 
with anarchism by binding revolt to revolution.79 Hence, he expresses a clearly 
anarchist view when implying that if revolution does not take the form of a simple 
revolt then it will not be able to escape depression.80 In addition, Benjamin perceived 
general strike in an anarcho-syndicalist way. For him, the goal of such a strike has 
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nothing to do with a reformist strike of the Left that aims at just replacing the 
oppressors with new ones. On the contrary, it seeks to destroy the state, its power and 
all its institutions.81 
The above combination of romanticism, messianism and historical materialism 
is not only heretic from a scientific point of view (against historicism, progress and 
objectivity) but from a Marxist-communist one as well. Benjamin approaches Marx 
quite selectively rejecting fundamental theses of scientific socialism like historical 
necessity or the dogma of the inevitable progress, keeping in his arsenal historical 
materialism and class struggle. Therefore, even when it seemed that he shifted from 
anarchism to communism we cannot say that he actually embraced Marxism. One 
more reason for this is  
…Benjamin’s limited knowledge of Marxist literature as well as of the 
writings of Marx himself. Apart from that it should be attributed to Benjamin’s 
aversion to dogmatism as well as to certain forms of communist practice 
during his lifetime.82 
 
Even when noting that anarchist methods are not applicable, his critique of the 
communist ends as nonsense asserts that his ends are still anarchist.83 
In thesis I of his Theses on the Philosophy of History Benjamin puts theology 
in the service of historical materialism, meaning a spiritual fuel to the materialist 
machinery, in order to free the latter from the deterministic and reformist plans of 
communists and social democrats, respectively.84 For him, class struggle is a dialectic 
of the material and the spiritual that exceeds the mechanistic model of infrastructure 
and superstructure. The struggle is material but its motive is spiritual. Class struggle 
for Benjamin is not the development of the productive forces or the antinomy between 
the productive relationships, but the war between the oppressed and the oppressive, 
the exploited and the exploiters,85 a war that clearly questions the historical victories 
of the oppressed since it undermines the legitimacy of the authority of the past and 
present dominant classes. Hence, Benjamin opposes the evolutionary and 
deterministic Marxist view, which justifies the bourgeois victories, praises the 
                                                        
81 Benjamin, “Critique of Violence”, p. 291. 
82 Sagriotis, p. 8. 
83 Sagriotis, p. 9. 
84 Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History”, in Illuminations, Pimlico, London 1999, 
Thesis I, p. 245 and Michael Löwy, Fire Alarm: Reading Walter Benjamin’s On the Concept of 
History, Verso, London 2005, p. 25. 
 
 
 
 
47
evolutionary laws of history and stresses the immaturity of the conditions for social 
emancipation.86 This is the reason that his version of “dialectics” departs from the 
orthodox Marxist one by insisting on joining the past with the present and theory with 
practice.87 
On these terms, continuity, thus progress, belongs to the dominant classes. The 
only moments of freedom are the moments of discontinuity, when the oppressed 
revolt and seek to emancipate themselves.88 Therefore, Benjamin rejects the 
tranquility of social democrats and communists when staying inactive and waiting for 
the, supposedly, inevitable advent of revolution. On the contrary, he argues that every 
historical moment has its own revolutionary capacity,89 for a direct, revolutionary, 
anarchistic and messianic disruption of history’s continuity. 
Moreover, in addition to progress, Benjamin criticizes the Left for one more 
reason, in the same way anarchists have been doing so: bureaucracy. The blind trust in 
the party, the fetishism of the unmistaken avant-garde, has become an end in itself 
that has enslaved and paralyzed the oppressed without permitting them to act.90 “Our 
consideration proceeds from the insight that the politicians’ stubborn faith in progress, 
their confidence in their ‘mass basis’, and, finally, their servile integration in an 
uncontrollable apparatus have been three aspects of the same thing”.91  
In summation, Benjamin’s thought, although expressed in a more communist 
context must not let us forget the purely libertarian, thus, anarchist character of this 
communism. After all, in his own words “ethics, applied to history is the doctrine of 
the revolution; applied to the state, it is the doctrine of anarchy”.92 
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B.3/ The Political Friedrich Nietzsche 
B.3.1/ The Philosopher and his Legacy 
Friedrich Nietzsche can be considered the most critical thinker in the history of 
Western thought, not only because of his influence on his subsequent philosophers but 
mainly because he was the first one that chose to systematically bring down the whole 
construction of the Western way of thinking, starting from the philosophers of ancient 
Greece up to his contemporaries.  
 This deconstruction inevitably included the most significant names of the 
Western tradition such as Socrates, Plato,1 Luther, Kant2 and Hegel3 while, at the 
same time, he attacked the well-established constitutions of society,4 art,5 science,6 
morality7 and religion.8 The substratum for Nietzsche’s “philosophizing with a 
hammer”,9 and the theoretical frame of his approach in this research, was the severe 
attack on the Enlightenment and the explicit challenge of its heritage - that is, in short, 
rationality, the concept of truth and the triplet of the French Revolution: Liberté, 
Egalité, Fraternité.10 
 Nietzsche’s opposition to the rational way of thinking was a simultaneous call 
for a return to the “weltanschauung” of the pro-Socratic philosophy in Greece. 
Combining the notions of obscure philosophers, like Heraclitus, with the central and 
crucial role Tragedy played in the everyday life of the Greek “polis”, he attempted to 
bring out the values of heroism, transformation of life, aristocracy of the spirit and the 
anti-static (anti-platonic) view of living. The substratum of all these was the 
unexplored and bottomless world of “will”, which he inherited from Schopenhauer, 
this vital flow of energy that clearly preferred thinking to knowledge, sentiments to 
moral codes, self to subject, exegesis to truth. 
 Without any doubt, we can claim that within the nineteenth century - the 
hardcore of modernity, where the world was changing drastically based on the 
                                                        
1 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Twilight of the Idols, “The Problem of Socrates”, in Twilight of the Idols and 
the Anti-Christ, Penguin Books, London 2003. 
2 Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ. 
3 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, Continuum, New York 2005, pp. 8, 139-79. 
4 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, book two. 
5 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy and other writings, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 2007. 
6 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Penguin Books, London 2003, “Of Science”. 
7 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, Penguin Books, London 2003, part five. 
8 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, third essay. 
9 “How to Philosophize with a Hammer”: Subtitle to Nietzsche’s Twilight of the Idols. 
10 Lewis Call, Nietzsche as Critic and Captive of Enlightenment, http://www.scrye. com/~station/ 
dissertation.html (accessed on 8/11/2010). 
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principles of the Enlightenment - the era of post-modernity had already begun and 
Friedrich Nietzsche was its main representative. His conception of human nature 
ceased to be rational and essential, against every acceptable method of his time. What 
he put in effect, was a purely psychological approach that equated psychology to the 
feeling of power, of “will to power”. For that reason, he chose to study the origins of 
his contemporary Western society via a genealogy of morals,11 not in a historical, 
passive and supposedly objective way but actively and through the lens of his values.  
 In addition, this new perspective, concerning the study and interpretation of 
history and the view of a different and superior man type, created a legacy that was 
passed down to prominent thinkers and artists in all fields of  human science and 
creativity: philosophers (Georg Brandes, Martin Heidegger, Jacques Derrida, Michel 
Foucault, Gilles Deleuze), psychologists (Sigmund Freud, Carl Jung), novelists and 
poets (Nikos Kazantzakis, Thomas Mann, Hermann Hesse, Rainer Maria Rilke) and 
so many others were more or less deeply influenced by the heretic, subverting and 
progressive notions of the German philosopher. 
 
Categorization of Nietzsche’s Works 
The development of Nietzsche’s works is usually treated in three main divisions and 
periods of time: early (1872 – 1876), middle (1878 – 1885) and late (1885 – 1888). 
The first period, which includes the Birth of Tragedy and the four Untimely 
Meditations, stresses the metaphysical nature of the artist and the need for cultural 
rebirth and revival. The idea, typifying Western culture, that the individual describes a 
coherent and stable whole is rejected by Nietzsche through the dipole of Dionysus and 
Apollo. Nietzsche does not see the individual as a fixed stability but as a complex of 
inferior and superior forces which guarantee the plurality of the self. Nevertheless, 
Nietzsche is not against a united self, but this unity is not a presupposition – as 
Descartes suggests – but a desirable goal, a continuous and harmonious connection of 
all our different tendencies, with the inferior ones (those that are life-denial) obeying 
the superior ones (those that are life-affirmative). Schematically, the qualitative 
distinction of the forces and tendencies belongs to Dionysus, whereas the project of 
conjunction is an Apollonian task. 
After The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche’s interest shifted significantly towards 
the issues of knowledge and science, though art still played a central role in his 
                                                        
11 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, first essay, §1, 2. 
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worldview.12 In the second essay of Untimely Meditations – “On the Uses and 
Disadvantages of History for Life” – Nietzsche favours direct experience, over indirect 
knowledge of history, to be the motive for human action,13 a view that can be linked 
with anarchists’ direct experience and action versus the historically deterministic plan 
of some Marxists.  
The second period, marked by Human, All Too Human, Daybreak and the Gay 
Science, concentrates on the overcoming of metaphysics and the acceptance of science 
and especially physics. Human, All Too Human, a book for free spirits, is dedicated to 
Voltaire as a sign of Nietzsche’s siding with the Enlightenment: He now rejects 
Wagner and all kinds of knowledge based on supernatural, and not scientific, means. 
His “invitation to the free and enquiring mind to subject prejudices, customs, and 
beliefs to scrutiny”14 answers the similar anarchist call for a holistic critique to 
society’s institutions or foundations like morality. 
Nevertheless, Nietzsche’s overcoming of metaphysics does not constitute a full 
surrender to the arms of science. In The Gay Science, the German philosopher deals 
with the “Death of God” in the same liberating way Bakunin did when he said, in God 
and State, that if God exists then man is nothing. However, like anarchists, he does not 
rely on science for finding adequate answers. Since humans are only partially logical, 
he prefers to keep his distance from both metaphysics and blind faith to science.15    
Between the second and the third period stands Nietzsche's magnum opus, 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Here, it is clearly stated that after God’s death and the 
sovereignty of nihilism, the world will hear about its new meaning, that is, the 
“overman”. Together with this concept, Nietzsche introduces “the will to power” and 
develops the theme of “eternal return” that was first mentioned in The Gay Science.  
All these concepts will inspire prominent anarchists and libertarians either in the way 
of the first (“simple affinity”- Malatesta, Bakunin, Kropotkin), second (“election” – 
Benjamin), third (“articulation” - “cultural symbiosis” and “partial fusion”- Goldman, 
Landauer) or fourth level (“creation of a new figure” – post-anarchism) of elective 
affinity. 
Works like Beyond Good and Evil, On the Genealogy of Morals, Twilight of 
the Idols, Antichrist and Ecce Homo belong to the third and last period where 
                                                        
12 Keith Ansell-Pearson, How to Read Nietzsche, Granta Books, London 2005, pp. 4, 16. 
13 Carol Diethe, Historical Dictionary of Nietzscheanism, Scarecrow Press, Maryland 2007, p. xiii. 
14 Diethe, p. xiii. 
15 Diethe, p. xiv. 
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Nietzsche aims for the “transvaluation of values” and the war against Christian 
morality. In Beyond Good and Evil he warns against a passive and mechanical 
acceptance of the current values of “good” and “evil”, whereas in On the Genealogy of 
Morals he develops a new approach to philosophical issues, foreshadowed in Human, 
All Too Human. He calls this approach “historical philosophizing” or “historical 
method”16 opposing the reactive analysis of history by his contemporaries. Finally, in 
Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche deals not with the origins of morality, as he did in On 
the Genealogy of Morals, but with the iconoclastic project of its foundations.  
 However, this essay aims to pass Nietzsche’s philosophy through a political 
filter and put forward those basic and radical concepts of his thought that can be 
associated with anarchist theory and practice. This filtering will take place in parts C 
and D, by directly connecting Nietzschean philosophy to anarchist thought and by 
reviewing certain historical incidents of anarchism from a Nietzschean angle.  
 
B.3.2/ Nietzsche as a Political Thinker 
Political philosophy can be said to constitute an important subgroup of philosophy in 
general and this is mainly because it is difficult, if not impossible, to define the 
distinguishing line between philosophy’s subgroups. According to Robert Simon,  
 
political and social philosophy is concerned with the moral evaluation of 
political and social institutions, and the development, clarification, and 
assessment of proposed principles for evaluation of the political and social 
order.17  
 
From this point of view, Nietzsche cannot only be regarded as an existential 
philosopher, but as a political philosopher as well. All his works, even those that at 
first sight seem to be purely artistic - like The Birth of Tragedy - always carry out a 
dual function: exploring the moral and, more indirectly, the political culture of the 
past and the present, and suggesting a brand new life model that seeks to embrace 
human activities as a whole, including the political ones too. 
 Moreover, as David Miller opines, by referring to a relevant painting of 
Ambrogio Lorenzetti in the Palazzo Pubblico of Siena, political philosophy deals with 
                                                        
16 Ansell-Pearson, How to Read Nietzsche, pp. 4, 22-23. 
17 Robert L. Simon, “Social and Political Philosophy - Sorting Out the Issues”, in Robert L. Simon 
(ed.), Social and Political Philosophy, Blackwell Publishers, Massachusetts 2002, p. 2. 
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government, not in a strict sense (which party rules, etc.) but as a complex of human 
relationships,18 something that Nietzsche strongly believed, influencing thinkers like 
Landauer and Foucault. 
 In addition, and in order to acknowledge Nietzsche’s political approach as 
inseparable from the rest of his philosophy, once and for all, we must also take into 
consideration what Aristotle says about humans, being political animals who naturally 
want to live together.19 For Aristotle, the only beings that are not political and bear no 
need of co-living, are gods and beasts.20   
 However, the “political” theory of Friedrich Nietzsche is complicated, 
contradictory and mostly controversial. The superiority of monism over dualism,21 the 
rejection of every kind of metaphysics, the ideas of hierarchy and competitiveness, the 
“will to power”, the “transvaluation of values” and the “overman”, constitute the main 
components of his thinking. It is the ambiguity of those terms that has led thinkers 
from every part of the political spectrum22 – Nazis, Anarchists, conservatives and 
radicals – to adopt his philosophical and political heritage and thus has provoked a 
timeless debate over his political taste, one aspect of which – his affinity to anarchists 
– is the main theme of the present thesis. 
  
Nietzsche and the Western Culture 
Nietzsche confronted Christianity, the Enlightenment and their heritage – democracy, 
progress, egalitarianism, nationalism, socialism and state – and questioned the 
Western way of thinking as a whole by promoting a mortal path that leads beyond 
good and evil, opposing every objectivity, authenticity and dogmatism. For Theodor 
Adorno, Nietzsche’s work was a holistic negation of mainstream philosophy and  
liberation from the lies of “truth”, ideology and morality, in favour of what he used to 
call “life”.23 This way is how Nietzsche went on to reveal the totalitarian 
(universality, rationality, one truth in society and science) and manipulative 
(nationalism, Christianity) aspects of the modern way of thinking while still living in 
                                                        
18 David Miller, Political Philosophy, a Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press, Oxford 
2003, p. 1. 
19 Aristotle, The Politics, Penguin Books, London 1992, I.2. 
20 However, for Nietzsche there is also a third case: their combination, which is a philosopher! See in 
Twilight of the Idols, “Maxims and Arrows”, aphorism 3. 
21 Zarathustra, the well known (anti) hero - philosopher of Nietzsche has two equally favourite animals, 
the eagle and the snake. In this way, Nietzsche wants to abolish the dipole of idealism (represented by 
the flying of the eagle) and materialism (expressed by the crawling of the snake). 
22 Perhaps Jean-Jacques Rousseau was the only thinker to have undergone such a wide and multilevel 
appropriation, but not in the direct way Nietzsche has. 
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it. 
 As far as his theory on the individual and their political environment is 
concerned, Nietzsche held an opinion, especially in his early writings, similar to that 
of some earlier philosophers, like Kant. On the one hand, he believed in the autonomy 
the great spirits should have, concerning their relationship with the state but on the 
other hand, those free spirits would have to avoid questioning the political authority if 
they wanted to protect their tranquility and creativeness from the herd and the riots. 
Nevertheless, as the years passed by, without abandoning the vitality of autonomy and 
freethinking, he developed an interest for politics since he acknowledged the non-stop 
interaction between intellectuals and modern democracy.  
 These two different conceptions of “politics”, express nothing more than two 
antagonist currents, both arising from the Enlightenment: promoting the need for 
autonomy while disdaining the fundamental axiom of equality. This differentiation 
sketches the Nietzschean political model of governing: the one that governs himself 
has the ability to govern the others, and vice versa. Only those who are capable of 
prevailing are truly worthy of being free.24 
  
Nietzsche and Democracy 
Another important dimension of the Nietzschean “political” work is the relationship 
he had with democracy. His criticism, as a radical aristocrat,25 has to do with the fear 
that the masses, under the flag of egalitarianism, would rush to destroy the fountain of 
culture, the aristocracy. It is obvious that Nietzsche was not a democrat, since the 
absolute equality democracy called for, was, for him, equalization towards the depths 
of society, where its less remarkable members would be given the chance to prevail. 
Nonetheless, Nietzsche acknowledged the formation and development of two 
different human types, both stemming from democracy, whose battle gives a boost to 
life and creativity. On the one hand there is the weak man who seeks to put an end to 
his polemic nature, cannot face the diversity of his drives and values, so desires a 
peace that will end the creative war of his inside. On the other hand, the era of 
democracy favours another human type, the man who welcomes the war inside him 
and develops a mastery of unifying and controlling his contradictory drives. This is 
                                                                                                                                                               
23 T. Adorno in Gadamer, Adorno, Horkheimer, p. 15. 
24 Philippe Raynaud, “Nietzsche” in Ζήσης Σαρίκας (επιμ.), Ο Νίτσε και η Πολιτική, Νησίδες, 
Θεσσαλονίκη 2004, pp. 18-19 [Zisis Sarikas (ed.), Nietzsche and Politics]. 
25A label first given to him by the Danish academic and great admirer of his, Georg Brandes. 
 
 
 
 
54
the type of a strong, victorious and marvelous man,26 approved by Nietzsche and 
attributed to the context of democracy.  
 In addition, Nietzsche’s criticism of liberal democracy goes through state, law 
and political emancipation. For him, the state represents the dominant “will to 
power”, since, according to him, political superiority stands for psychological 
superiority.27 Under these psychological terms, he puts forward his own political 
pathology where in monarchy a people looks forward to a leader, a saviour, 
aristocracy is the belief in a superior caste and democracy represents the 
deconstruction of everything exceptional and great, through equality of the 
individuals.28 
 The dominant “will to power” of every state is expressed through the 
imposition of the laws:  
 
To talk of  ‘just’ and ‘unjust’ as such is meaningless, an act of injury, violence, 
exploitation or destruction cannot be ‘unjust’ as such, because life functions 
essentially in an injurious, violent, exploitative and destructive manner…states 
of  legality can never be anything but exceptional states, as partial restrictions 
of the true will to life….29 
  
 Moreover, and as far as the political emancipation is concerned, Nietzsche 
considers it to be the passing from an organic form of life (community) to an 
imaginary, mechanical structure (society) where the instincts of the herd and the 
mediocrity is being hatched. The datum is that the oppressed masses desire the power 
they do not have and try to obtain through four “democratic” steps: Firstly, they free 
themselves. Secondly, they demand to be recognized as such (free) and fight for equal 
rights and “justice”. Then, they take advantage of the democratic representative 
system and, by drawing the powerful ones to their side, ask for privileges. However, 
during the last step they come to demand full, exclusive power and, through 
democracy, they finally get it. The result is that all the values that aristocracy and 
democracy bear, now change places, in terms of naturalness. The aristocratic ideal 
                                                        
26 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, Penguin Books, London 2003, 
aphorism 200. 
27 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, first essay, §6. 
28 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, aphorism 752. 
29 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, second essay, §11. 
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that used to dominate the great masses of slaves now seems anti-natural.30 
The confusion that emerges concerning the political taste of Nietzsche is 
obvious, since he seems to attribute not only the prevalence of the herd to democracy 
but the emergence of a strong human type too. As mentioned before, this confusion 
constitutes the main reason why his philosophical construction appealed to diverse 
and conflicting ideologies. This also explains the variety of essays written about him, 
even from the dawn of the twentieth century, shortly after his death. Nonetheless, 
there are many significant clues that reinforce a research towards anarchy, as shown 
in chapter A.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
30 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, aphorism 215. 
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B.4/ Context of Interpretation 
 
Qualitative Type of the Interpretation Context 
As mentioned in the first part of the introduction, the main idea of my research is to 
review Nietzsche’s work from an anarchist angle and apply his philosophy to certain 
historical anarchist practices. This implies a context of interpretation that will be 
accord with the idiosyncrasy of the two parts, meaning the rejection of an a priori 
methodological validity and of the existence of an ultimate methodology for 
explaining (or re-defining) Nietzsche’s ideas and their use for approaching certain 
historical incidents of anarchism. Thus, my reading of Nietzsche is not meant to be an 
“objective” one but a rather active reading between the lines in order to overcome the 
paradoxes generated by his peculiar style of writing. What I mean by this is that we 
must take into consideration that parody and irony stand as central features in 
Nietzsche’s discourse,1 and in accordance with his own view, whatever appears in the 
forefront or on the surface is nothing but a mask that needs further and deeper 
investigation.2 As Alexander Nehamas says,  
 
Nietzsche inevitably confronts his readers with two sets of paradoxes. One set 
is contained within his writing. It belongs to the content of his work, and it 
includes for example, his view of the will to power, the eternal recurrence, the 
nature of the self, and the immoral presuppositions of morality. This set of 
paradoxes is part of what interpretations of Nietzsche’s work aim to 
understand. The other set is generated by his writing. It is a product of his 
work, and it puts the very effort to understand him, to offer an interpretation of 
his views, including the first set of paradoxes, into question.3  
 
The key word here is “perspectivism”, meaning Nietzsche’s persistence that 
every aspect is just an interpretation among many others, including his own aspects. 
Perspectivism accepts no facts independent of interpretation, no neutral standard that 
can judge if an interpretation is right or wrong.4 Perspectivism reveals that the various 
points of view depend on values5 and this is how “there are no facts, only 
                                                        
1 Gadamer, Adorno, Horkheimer, pp. 14, 30. 
2 Gadamer, Adorno, Horkheimer, p. 30. 
3Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche, Life as Literature, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 2002, p. 1. 
4 Nehamas, p. 3. 
5 Nehamas, p. 5. 
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interpretations” for Nietzsche. Therefore, my “reading between the lines” suggests an 
active and subjective reading, an interpretation that will go under the mask of the 
Nietzschean style of writing in order to attribute an alternative meaning to his 
references to anarchists. 
  In the case of Friedrich Nietzsche, this is quite important for two reasons: 
firstly, the only way to review Nietzschean utterances in a radical and subversive way 
is to avoid being trapped in the intensively aphoristic style of his notions. When he 
speaks of “masters and slaves”, or talks about “aristocracy”, it would be easy and 
quite objective, following a positivist model, to conclude that he is anything but in 
favour of any socialist, never mind anarchist, ideas. Therefore, keeping in mind 
Nietzsche’s ambiguous style, together with a re-conception of his notions, which may 
seem to share a lot of common ground with the anarchists, we can construct a rather 
consistent web that will allow the diffusion of Nietzsche’s hostility to anarchism.  
The second reason is that, more or less, Nietzsche himself adopts such an anti-
positivist and anthropological approach whenever he seeks to explain certain deeds or 
situations. For example, his exceptional On Genealogy of Morals is a typical approach 
of this kind – a genealogical approach – for he does not focus on external and 
objective facts but rather on an effort to understand and explain the quiet, 
subconscious and secret meanings that hide inside the subjects of his discourse.  
Of course, one problem remains. Could not such an alternative reading, of the 
relationship between Nietzsche and the anarchists, be considered totally arbitrary? 
Especially if we think about all the cruel words he has uttered against socialists and 
anarchists in general. I do not argue that a conservative, even a fascist, reading of 
Nietzsche should be automatically regarded as inferior to an anarchist one. However, 
this does not mean that some interpretations are not better than others.6 Following 
Nietzsche’s “methodology”, I will try to give a coherent and persuasive connection 
between the various tendencies of his philosophy, especially those that bear an “anti-
anarchist” charge. Our case here, in terms of political philosophy, is the ability to 
overcome the first, negative, impression of Nietzsche’s opinion of anarchists, in order 
to interpret his ideas less superficially and provide a narration that will even embody 
those elements of Nietzschean philosophy that seem to challenge it. Hence, this 
narration aspires to be superior to a fascist or conservative one in retrospect and in 
terms of quality, validity and credibility, meaning that will not leave out those aspects 
                                                        
6 Nehamas, p. 3. 
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that seem to contradict it.  
In accordance with all the above, the rejection of an ultimate methodology –  
meaning an a priori most valid and accurate method – stands for the rejection of an 
absolute truth. This thesis goes together with the Nietzschean and the anarchist 
worldview, that if there is not an objective and unique truth, then we can create a local 
truth. That would be an Apollonian illusion in the servitude of Dionysus, created 
through an alternative and subversive reading and an active interpretation of ideas and 
meanings, like the one Nietzsche and Walter Benjamin, the prominent libertarian 
thinker, called for. Nietzsche‘s and Benjamin’s concern consisted in resisting the 
“idolatry of the factual”, meaning the prevailing historicism of their era which dealt 
with history “objectively” and, as a result, from the side of power.7  
  
Interpretative Tools 
In this chapter I will present the methodological context to support the exploration of 
the elective affinity between Friedrich Nietzsche and the anarchists. It draws on a 
combination of approaches to Nietzsche by three prominent scholars – Alexander 
Nehamas, Gilles Deleuze and Keith Ansell-Pearson – the interconnection of basic 
Nietzschean philosophical concepts – such as “will to power”, “perspectivism”, “slave 
and master morality”, “hierarchy of forces”, “Apollonian and Dionysian”, 
“genealogy”, “nihilism”, “truth and knowledge”, “transvaluation of values”, 
“overman”, “resentment”, “bad conscience”, “eternal return” – and the way these 
concepts are treated by these scholars. The following analysis will not only support 
the establishment of the elective affinity between Nietzsche and the anarchists 
elaborated in part C, but, in addition, it will serve as a substratum for the relocation of 
these concepts in the case study of part D.  
 The contestability of interpretations, as illustrated in part A.3 of the literature 
review, shows the variety of Nietzschean (political) readings, where conservative 
perceptions of Nietzsche are of significant quantity. My aim here is to weave 
Nietzsche’s philosophical concepts in a way that the offered interpretative context for 
parts C and D will also debunk the hitherto conservative given meanings that are used 
to indirectly justify the supposed incompatibility between Nietzsche and the 
anarchists and include “will to power”, “overman”, “master/slave morality”, “amor 
                                                        
7 See the more detailed approach in chapter C.1 (Walter Benjamin) of the present thesis. 
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fati” 8 – as an antirevolutionary and conservative motto – “hierarchy”, “nihilism”, 
“resentment”, “bad conscience”, the ambiguous (anti)Semitism of Nietzsche, even his 
– compatible with the Nazis – antinationalism, since “his concern for the preservation 
and enhancement of European culture (even to the extent that it might ‘rule the 
world’), [is] a concern he shared with the National Socialists in their struggle against 
democracy and communism”.9  
The selection of the works of Deleuze, Nehamas and Ansell-Pearson as 
interpretative tools has not, then, been made in order to provide an original 
interpretation of the German philosopher but rather to locate, promote and apply the 
elective affinity of the two parts. This selection does not, of course, seek to connect 
the above scholars with anarchism – not even in the case of Deleuze, whose 
relationship with  anarchist thought has already been sufficiently established10 – but 
my intention is to use Deleuze’s interpretation of Nietzsche as a basis, enriched by the 
artistic reading of Nehamas and the fruitful11 approach made by Ansell-Pearson. 
 
Nietzschean Concepts 
If I had to give a quite compact structure to the interconnection of the Nietzschean 
concepts listed above, I would say that everything begins with genealogy, the method 
that promotes a critical approach to historical values. The issue here is what value 
certain values have, meaning how these values were created.12 Genealogy aims at 
discovering and exposing the values that every value comes from – it is, at the same 
time, the value of the origin and the origin of the value.13 This process reveals the 
partiality of simple views that end up becoming universalities, offspring of dogmatic 
and ontological approaches of the world like the one made by Socrates and Plato.14 
Thus, genealogy is the alternative, Nietzsche gives, to ontology. It allows several 
alternative options of the world without discovering and imposing a pre-constructed 
                                                        
8 Jerry Woodruff, “The Use and Abuse of Friedrich Nietzsche – Review of Curtis Cate’s Friedrich 
Nietzsche, in The Occidental Quarterly, Vol.6, No 2, Summer 2006, p. 62. 
9 Woodruff, p. 65. 
10 See Nathan Jun, “Deleuze, Derrida, and Anarchism”, Anarchist Studies, vol.15, No 2, 2007, pp. 132-
56 and Saul Newman, War on the State: Stirner and Deleuze’s Anarchism, The Anarchist Library, 
http://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/saul-newman-war-on-the-state-stirner-and-deleuze-s-anarchism 
(accessed on 2/12/2012). 
11 Ansell-Pearson’s reading may fail to make any possible connections between Nietzsche and 
anarchism but at the same time it emphatically rejects connections to Nazism. Moreover, his 
interpretation of basic Nietzschean concepts gives interesting perspectives for the exploration of the 
given elective affinity.  
12 Deleuze, p. 1. 
13 Deleuze, p. 2. 
14 Nehamas, p. 32. 
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reality because it relies on the flux image of the world given by the “will to power”.15  
 The history of a thing is the history of its senses. But the one who attributes 
sense to a thing is the force which appropriates it. Therefore, the history of a thing is 
the succession of the forces which take possession of it and, by actively interpreting it, 
attribute a meaning to it.16 This conclusion takes us to Nietzsche's “will to power”. 
Genealogy not only interprets but also evaluates, and this evaluation is the active 
work of force. The concept of force in Nietzsche is a force that always refers to 
another force and this is how force is called will. Will to power is the differential 
element of force, an internal complement of it that distinguishes it from other forces.17 
It is the genealogical element of force, both differential and genetic, from which the 
difference of forces in quantity and quality stems, “force is what can, will to power is 
what wills”.18 Depending on their difference in quantity, forces are either dominant or 
dominated. Depending on their difference in quality forces are active or reactive. 
However, the difference in quantity is irreducible, therefore in order to estimate it, 
that is, to say which is the dominant and which the dominated force, we must first find 
out, in terms of quality, which force gives meaning to a certain thing, event or 
phenomenon, which is the force that appropriates it. Since every force is related to 
other forces, will to power is not exercised on mater but on another will – we have the 
will that commands and the will that obeys.19 Moreover, as mentioned above, 
genealogy is also the process of evaluation of values. So, if will to power interprets, 
thus, names the quality of force, that means that it has also qualities itself. Whereas 
force is active or reactive, will to power is affirmative or negative.20 What Nietzsche 
calls noble, high and master is either an active force or an affirmative will. What he 
calls base, vile and slave is either a reactive force or a negative will.21 
 The difference of quality in forces is a matter of different origin. The 
affirmative lies in the ground of action, the negative in the ground of reaction, from 
the very beginning. The active force affirms its difference from other forces, turns this 
difference into affirmation and satisfaction. On a second level, it denies the other 
forces, but only as a consequence of its own self-affirmation. On the contrary, the 
reactive force ends up affirming itself only after it has denied whatever is different 
                                                        
15 Nehamas, pp. 104-05. 
16 Deleuze, p. 3. 
17 Deleuze, pp. 6-7, 49. 
18 Deleuze, p. 50. 
19 Deleuze, pp. 6-7. 
20 Deleuze, pp. 53-54. 
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from it.22 Active forces are self-defined, contrarily to the reactive ones. This 
fundamental difference in quality is mainly depicted in the practice of each force: 
even when the reactive forces prevail, by neutralising the active ones, this does not 
turn them into active ones. Their triumph is not sufficient for this because their 
method in order to prevail is to act through separation. They separate the active force 
from what it can do and, therefore, they do not become active but rather decompose 
the active force so that it becomes reactive too. Hence, the triumph of reactive forces 
never happens due to the composition of a force higher than the active one, but 
because of a substraction or a division.23 
 We can now see how an affirmative will to power is related to what Nietzsche 
calls “perspectivism”. Such a will is affirmative in a way that it sees itself as a view of 
the world by which its creator can live his/her life.24 It gives everything a new 
meaning according to its values without arguing that everyone should comply with 
this view. This is how perspectivism differs from dogmatism and metaphysics that 
promote an objective world, a world in itself, which can be viewed and lived only by 
a certain “true” model. So, perspectivism is the process through which “free spirits”, 
meaning those who realise that everything is interpretation without loosing anything 
from their will to create, choose to construct or describe a world which reflects their 
own values and desires, especially the desire to know that this is the world they 
create.25 
Nevertheless, Nietzsche’s perspectivism does lead us to relative concepts. One 
of them is Nietzschean hierarchy which expresses his belief that not all perspectives 
are equally good. Another is the issue of truth and knowledge which, in turn, is 
combined with the dipole that characterises The Birth of Tragedy, the “Apollonian 
and Dionysian”.  
Nietzsche’s hierarchical approach starts from forces, and through the forces of 
the body expands to humans and human society. No matter how negative it may seem 
to anarchists at first sight, hierarchy for Nietzsche bears a dual meaning, both aspects 
of which are compatible with anarchist thought. This seemingly contradictory position 
can be understood if we go through these two aspects: The first one stands for the 
difference between active and reactive forces, the supremacy of the former to the 
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latter.26 This supremacy is neither static nor fatalistic but simply expresses 
Nietzsche’s “good taste”, meaning his preference to forces and wills that are self-
affirmative and self-defined. His champion is not the powerful but the person who is 
one with what they can do. What he considers to be slavish is not the least strong but 
something that can be separated from what it can do. This explains the second aspect 
of Nietzschean hierarchy. It is the triumph of the reactive forces, it is the slave that 
prevails without stopping being a slave, it is the dominated master who has stopped 
being one. Examples of such a reactive hierarchy for Nietzsche are the Church and the 
state.27 Hence, Nietzsche approves the hierarchical relationship of things not as an 
inevitable or presupposed status, a value per se (thus he rejects certain versions of 
hierarchy like the Church and the state) but as a reflection of his preference to 
affirmation over negation, of what he chooses or rejects. Anarchists also reject 
reactive hierarchies but at the same time their desires and preferences act like an 
internal criterion of categorizing things, expressing an active hierarchy of “good 
taste”.    
 Truth for Nietzsche is a value that no one has, genealogically, tried to find the 
value of its origin28 or designate the force that possesses it. His commitment to 
perspectivism reflects the shift that took place in his thought when from believing (in 
The Birth of Tragedy) that there may be some ultimate facts concerning the real nature 
of the world, he ended up arguing (in The Twilight of the Idols and The Will to Power) 
that there is no antithesis between things in themselves and appearance.29 True world 
and its appearance is one and the same thing. Thus, Nietzsche opines that we cannot 
identify the world per se (here he agrees with Kant) because the world our empirical 
terms refer to is rather a world constructed by our categories of thought.30 The quest 
for truth reveals the denial of this apparent world in favour of a true, better world, it is 
a quest not in the name of what the world is (misleading, deceiving, blinding) but in 
the name of what the world is not (truthful, stable, “sincere”).31 Hence, knowledge is 
opposed to life, a world-beyond is opposed to this world. The seeker of truth and 
knowledge wants a better life, so he denies this life. The seeker of truth and 
knowledge is marked by the same ascetic ideal – the will to nothingness and to escape 
                                                        
26 Deleuze, p. 60. 
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this life – with all other moralists: priests, scientists and ascetic philosophers.32 
 The most representative ascetic philosopher for Nietzsche is Socrates (as 
presented by his disciple, Plato). In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche argues that 
existence is something terrible, unbearable and full of pain that can be lived in three 
ways: through the (Dionysian) madness of the one who gets drunk, through the 
(Apollonian) illusion of the one who dreams and, finally, through the (Socratic) lie of 
the one who thinks.33 The innovative presentation of the Apollo – Dionysus dipole is, 
among other things, a critical opposition to the theoretical optimism of Socrates who 
argues that not only can we know the world but we can also correct it.34 Apollonian 
and Dionysian are two competing but also complementary impulses. Apollo is the god 
of light and of dreams whilst Dionysus is the god of ecstasy and intoxication. Apollo 
is related to visible form, knowledge and moderation whereas Dionysus is associated 
with formless flux, mystical intuition and excess. In addition, according to the 
Apollonian model, the world consists of separated individuals, contrarily to the 
Dionysian model where individualities have become one with a single living being, 
one with the primordial unity.35 
 Apollo’s illusions are linked to our surroundings. They create structures that 
will help us forget the pain and horror of existence and will separate us from the unity 
of everything, they will individualise us. The Dionysian intoxication comes to unveil 
the Apollonian illusions and abolish the “self” by unleashing dynamics that lead to the 
loss of consciousness and individuality. Although intoxicated, man now sees clearly, 
faces the horror of existence whilst Apollo prepares his new illusion. Dionysus is the 
hero of the early Greek tragedy. He is the god that undergoes the pain of 
individualisation since he was cut to pieces by the Titans as a child. He suffers 
because he is separated from the primordial unity;36 his suffering is the suffering of 
every human being. For this reason, tragic drama – the dipole of Apollo and Dionysus 
– is the objectivation of Dionysus in a form and in a world that are both Apollonian:37 
through Apollonian illusions tragic drama turns horror, pain and will to death into will 
to life, god of light is the transforming spirit of “principium individuationis”, through 
                                                        
32 Deleuze, pp. 96-97. 
33 Introduction by Pierre Heber-Suffrin in Friedrich Nietzsche, La Naissance de la Tragedie, C. 
Bourgois, Paris 1991. 
34 Ansell-Pearson, How to Read Nietzsche, p. 9. 
35 Ansell-Pearson, How to Read Nietzsche, pp. 10-11. 
36 Ansell-Pearson, How to Read Nietzsche, p. 12. 
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which salvation takes place within appearance.38 With the creation of tragic myth 
Apollo serves Dionysus in a way that the human will to salvation will be discharged 
by the suffering and death of the tragic heroes, through death and annihilation. What 
Dionysus suggests in order to overcome the contradiction between life and suffering, 
between primordial unity and individualisation, is a higher satisfaction by 
participating in the primordial will through music. Contrarily to other art expressions, 
music is not an appearance but the primordial will itself. It can bypass the world of 
appearance and give us access to the world of will. Only the spirit of music can give 
us the pleasure produced by the destruction of individuality.39 Furthermore, music’s 
(primordial will’s) concepts and action vent through Apollonian images. This is how 
tragic drama is created. What we have is a dramatic expression of the Dionysian 
solution to the contradiction mentioned above.40 Ancient Greeks were aware of the 
horror and insanity of this life and by inventing Apollo and Dionysus they could 
justify this life as it really is.41 The affirmative stance of Dionysus, with the help of 
the formative abilities of Apollo, makes life worth living, both for gods and humans. 
Hence, Dionysus opposes Socrates’ optimism by affirming life as it is. 
 The Birth of Tragedy also makes a first reference to nihilism. In this work the 
affair is of a cosmic nature – horror of existence favours a will to nothingness – but in 
Nietzsche’s later works it is examined in a historical and cultural context, as 
devaluation of humanity’s highest values.42 What Nietzsche calls nihilism is the 
denial of life, the underestimation of existence, and two of its basic versions are 
resentment and bad conscience.43 Nihil does not mean something that has no 
existence but stands for a value of nil. Life takes such a value when denied and 
underestimated by being compared to a supposed true world that lies over this 
apparent one. The foundation of this denial and underestimation is will to 
nothingness. However, nihilism also takes a second meaning. It is not will any more 
but mere reaction. When life was denied in favour of true and higher values, now 
even these values are denied. Nihilists deny everything, every ideal, apparent or 
true,44 and this is how they ended up killing God. “Death of God” is a death out of 
pity, meaning out of the tolerance of a sick and weak life, out of the pity of God for 
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the reactive man. This man – the reactive, the nihilist – kills God because he cannot 
stand his pity anymore. This pity, the practicing of nihilism, turns will towards 
nothingness.45  
God’s affair gives birth to “resentment” and “bad conscience”. First, it is the 
idea of God that represents the will to nothingness, because the existence of a true, 
ideal being automatically leads to a hereafter by underestimating this life. But hating 
this life means favouring a reactive life based on a heterogeneous determination: 
“they the evil ones, the sinners…we the good”.46 This is the consciousness of 
resentment that uses hatred as the principle of everything, even of the self-
determination. 
Second, God’s death changes the direction of resentment from others to our 
self. God died because of our sins, we are guilty for his death and this is how our debt 
to God is created. But we will never be able to pay this debt, only its interest, and thus 
our guilt never ends. The internalization of resentment forms the bad conscience, 
feeds our guilt and although it causes feelings of love, it is a love for a reactive type of 
life, the result of hating life as it is.47 
The liberation from nihilism, resentment and bad conscience requires the 
overcoming of man, even of the best one. This is because, for Nietzsche, nihilism is 
not a side effect but the motor of human history.48 Therefore, we need a new way of 
thinking, a subversion of the genealogical principle, a “transvaluation”.49 This 
procedure is not a matter of just changing values but of changing their fundamental 
principle. Affirmation is the most representative feature of the “overman”, 
“transvaluation of values” means to turn negation into affirmation.50  
Let me now unfold the complementary relationship within the last group of 
Nietzschean concepts. Affirmation is expressed through a positive nihilism, it is the 
activation of the reactive forces whose hierarchy can lead to a dynamic unity of the 
self – it makes one become who one is. This is the “overman”, who has proceeded to 
a transvaluation of the existing values and places one’s self beyond good and evil. 
He/she represents the “master morality” and a mode of life that is continuously 
reaffirmed by the idea of “eternal return”. 
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The nihilism Nietzsche rejects is an imperfect nihilism that limits itself to the 
element of negative, but transvaluation, meaning the transformation of negative to 
affirmative, the activation of the reactive forces, is the ultimate form of nihilism that 
can overcome itself, a nihilism that destructs itself by destructing the old values and 
the principle these values are based on. No other critique of the existent values is true 
and radical. Transvaluation, this affirmative nihilism, this transformation of negative 
to positive, is a passage to a new foundation of life.51 Therefore, we should not regard 
it as a substitution but as a conversion. This is what Dionysus, god of affirmation, 
calls for. Denial and destruction are conditions of saying “yes”.52 Active destruction 
means that nihilism breaks up with reactive forces, and the will to nothingness takes 
the side of affirmation. Since the will to power is the differential element of force, its 
forces are now transformed from reactive into active.53 If we can affirm every single 
moment, then we actually affirm our own selves.54 Accepting the incidents of our past 
means accepting the data that made us what we are in the present. When the creative 
will says “this or that happened because I wanted so” it means neither accepting the 
past passively/fatalistically nor changing it actually. Instead, it means that every 
incident of the past, and – more specifically – every choice of ours, is what brought us 
to the present. We can affirm the present if we affirm everything that gave birth to it 
and thus make it a point of departure for a creative future. The meaning of the past 
depends on its relationship with the future. Only a creative and affirmative present 
and future can redeem the past.55 So, when one accepts what one has done it is like 
incorporating all his past actions into a harmonic and unified plan. This plan is the 
ongoing and endless project of becoming who we are,56 and those who put it into 
practice, who want to become who they are, are the creators who point towards the 
overman, they represent the type of artists that create their own selves.57 This artful 
creation is nothing but a dynamical, internal, hierarchy of thoughts, desires and deeds, 
a hierarchy between higher and lower forces that allows us to take responsibility for 
all our choices and thus find in them who we are.58 
As mentioned above, this project of unifying ourselves is not a linear 
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procedure that leads to a final and definitive status. The objective is not a static end 
but the dynamic procedure of becoming. The constant effort for this unification is also 
illustrating the moral principles of the overman. Unlike what conclusions we may 
reach when Nietzsche says “there are no moral facts”,59 or argues that we cannot tell 
the difference between good and evil in advance,60 the overman is not immoral in the 
common sense of the term. To return to genealogy, we see that different values used 
to bear different meanings in different societies. Hence, whilst a drive and an activity 
have no moral character per se, they acquire one once we give them a context.61 The 
price of being fruitful is to be full of creative internal oppositions that may even end 
up in a criminal behaviour.62  Nietzsche is aware of this and although in almost every 
crime he sees features that a man must not miss,63 he identifies the criminal with a 
strong man type made ill.64 Therefore, Nietzsche does not imply that we shall give our 
drives and impulses free rein. When criticizing the weak and petty for castrating the 
human instincts, he is not in favour of an unrestrained practice. The greatness of the 
self lies in the ability to manage our impulses, to be sufficiently self-controlled in 
order not to suppress our drives but to give them a creative way out.65 This human 
training and cultivation is not equal to the end of morality but symbolizes the 
awareness of its true nature.66 And above all, the overman’s morality bears the basic 
characteristics of self-affirmation and self-determination, mentioned above. This is 
the “morality of the master”, the practice of affirmation and creation of new values.67 
On the contrary, “slave morality” is the logic of reaction, a self-affirmation that comes 
only because of denying what is different and desirable but impossible to achieve. 
While the masters are artists that dedicate themselves to the project of becoming who 
they are, the slaves are unable to unify themselves and do not take responsibility for 
the choices made in the past. Therefore, they always seek to find someone else to 
blame for their own failures. The result is the approach of the fragments of one’s self 
always through the denial of someone else. 
Finally, the idea of “eternal return” is the ultimate judge that will confirm, or 
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not, the way we have chosen to live68 and the success, or not, of the ongoing project 
for unifying ourselves, for becoming who we are. When the question “are you ready 
to live your life again and again, countless times, with all its great and petty 
moments” is posed, our answer will determine the quality of our project. If we answer 
yes, it means we accept and recognize every past action as our own so, if everything 
returns we are ready to welcome it with the greatest affirmation. If the answer is no, it 
means that not only our past but also our present seems to be the life of someone else. 
If we are not ready to embrace our choices in eternity then every single moment of 
our life has been nothing but denial. Eternal return gives the opportunity for a 
Dionysian affirmation of the world as it is,69 or brings the curse of escaping this life 
by squinting towards a hereafter.70 Standing in a Dionysian relationship to existence 
means we can utter “amor fati”.71 This is the way to re-interpret and redeem the past, 
live the present and create the future actively. 
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B.5/ Selecting the Historical Incidents of Anarchism 
The interpretation context of the previous section lays the ground for the next step 
which is the utilization of Nietzsche’s thought, taking place in parts C and D, in order 
to establish the desirable “elective affinity” and re-examine parts of anarchist 
practices through a Nietzschean prism. Therefore, this essay will also include a case 
study already connected to the history of anarchism. The question here is how this 
case study should be selected in order to play its role in the “elective affinity” project. 
The answer to this question consists of two components. 
 Firstly, this incident must constitute a space-time context of actions that echo 
basic anarchist theses and beliefs. This way we get a sufficiently typical sample of 
anarchist expression in order for it to be filtered through a Nietzschean lens. 
Secondly, and in connection with the first component, such a historical moment must 
be acknowledged as important and critical for anarchist history. If so, the conclusions 
that will be reached will be of much greater force. 
 On this basis, I refer to a historical period that combines these two upper 
components, the revolt that took place in Greece, and mainly in the city of Athens, in 
December 2008. The anarchist nature of this revolt has been recorded in many articles 
and essays that have since been written.1 However, what needs to be stressed is that 
this nature of the revolt has been recognized within the Greek anarchist movement 
itself and is regarded to be of great importance for the anarchist movement in Greece. 
This is visible in all the brochures that were circulated during and after the revolt, and 
the years that followed. The fact that relevant academic research of this uprising is 
still limited or incomplete should not detract from the singular importance and unique 
characteristics of the incidents that took place during and after the riots. Moreover, the 
newness of the events offers an interesting perspective for studying and exploring the 
                                                        
1 Some of the  articles/essays with a more academic profile are the following: 
Loukia Kotronaki and Seraphim Seferiades, “Athens December 2008: The Spatial Prerequisites of an 
Uprising”, http://www.re-public.gr/en/?p=2744 (accessed on 10/5/2013). 
Stavros Stavrides, “The December 2008 Youth Uprising in Athens: Spatial Justice in an Emergent 
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2008”, Situations, Vol 3, No 2 (2010), pp. 145-57. 
Rania Astrinaki, “‘(Un)hooding’ a Rebellion: The December 2008 Events in Athens”, Social Text, No 
101 (2009), pp. 97-107. 
Christos Iliopoulos, “We Wish you a Merry Crisis and a Happy New Fear. A postscript from the 
December riots in Athens”, Anarchist Studies, Vol 17, No 1 (2009), pp. 16-17. 
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correlation of their anarchistic character to Nietzsche’s view of deconstruction and 
creation through a process of “transvaluation of values”. 
Additionally, the events of December took place in a period when the world 
economic crisis was reaching its peak. The Greek revolt had a global impact and 
constituted an answer to the “society of the spectacle” as well as to the measures of 
social control and repression. This included symbolic actions of anti-commercial 
significance such as burning the huge artificial Christmas tree in Athens’ central 
square, the occupation of the Greek National Opera and confrontation between the 
protesters and the riot police that had been positioned for a long time in the central 
neighbourhoods of Athens, playing the role of an army of occupation.  
 The presentation and analysis of  December 2008 will be based on the 
Nietzschean notions that will structure my thesis: Anti-determinism, “resentment”, 
“eternal return”, “overman”, “will to power”, “Apollonian and Dionysian”, “master 
and slave morality”, “bad conscience”. These concepts shall make their appearance 
through a Nietzschean review of the historical events by connecting certain incidents 
and behaviours with a Nietzschean notion and explaining them through this prism, 
and this is how such an analysis will form an alternative reading of history and 
contemporary radical politics, that is, through a psychological procedure of analysis 
rather than a strict social-political one.  
 In addition, the importance of such a review also lies in the fact that “elective 
affinity” must not be examined only at a theoretical level but also at a practical one. A 
considerable advantage of this procedure must also be noted: Nietzsche seemed to 
detest anarchists for both their worldview and actions. Consequently, it is very 
intriguing that the explanation for the severity of Nietzsche’s critique of his 
contemporary anarchists lies in an elaboration of his thoughts, and that, by this 
analysis, we can expose the limits of Nietzsche’s politics. 
 The resources for all the discussion of the historical events of December ’08 in 
Athens are a personal collection of newspaper articles, videos, photos and 
proclamations that cover the whole period just before, during and after the uprising 
and a limited secondary literature which provides the historical background to 
December. Every reference will be selective since my aim is to detect certain actions 
and connect them with Nietzsche’s philosophy.  
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Summary 
This part of the thesis has presented the methodological dimension of my research. 
Starting with elective affinity, I have followed the definition developed by Michael 
Löwy, I have talked about its different levels and have shown that, as a general term, 
it is not new either for Nietzschean or for anarchist studies. 
 I have then dealt with the anarchist part by following the dominant model for 
categorizing anarchist traditions, presenting its basic features and currents and 
drawing on its historical development. This has led me to introduce two points that 
question the rigid ideological perception of anarchism in favour of a fluid and 
dynamic anarchy where elective affinity with Nietzsche emerges, serving a double 
goal: the unification of the distinct anarchist tendencies and the definition of the 
anarchist parameters in relation to other ideologies. 
 The other part I have dealt with is Nietzsche, by presenting the evolution of 
his philosophical thought and the fundamental theses of his perception of politics. I 
have then continued with a detailed analysis of the main concepts of his philosophy 
based on the interpretation made by Gilles Deleuze, Alexander Nehamas and Keith-
Ansell-Pearson. Thus, I have structured my research’s interpretative context for 
establishing the Nietzsche-anarchy elective affinity. 
 Lastly, I have talked about the historical period that I will use in my case study 
part and have given a rationale for its selection.
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 PART C: Nietzsche and the Anarchists – Establishing the Elective Affinity 
Having introduced the concept and different degrees of elective affinity in part B.1, 
this part of the thesis aims to recognize elective affinity and its levels through a 
connection between Nietzsche and the anarchists in order to establish the elective 
affinity of the two sides.  
Nietzsche’s relationship to the anarchists of his time was rather conflictual, as 
he considered them - like all the rest of the socialists - to be of the same kind with the 
Christians, meaning decadent and resentful out of weakness, with a hatred and a thirst 
for revenge.1 As mentioned in the previous part, Nietzsche viewed egalitarianism as a 
threat to free spirits; and confronting all basic concepts of the Enlightenment literally 
means that he also opposed anarchism, on a theoretical basis at least.  
 The stance of anarchists towards Nietzsche varied, though in most cases can 
be considered quite positive. As Spencer Sunshine notes,  
 
There were many things that drew anarchists to Nietzsche: his hatred of the 
state; his disgust for the mindless social behavior of ‘herds’; his (almost 
pathological) anti-Christianity; his distrust of the effect of both the market and 
the State on cultural production; his desire for an ‘overman’ — that is, for a 
new human who was to be neither master nor slave; his praise of the ecstatic 
and creative self, with the artist as his prototype, who could say, ‘Yes’ to the 
self-creation of a new world on the basis of nothing; and his forwarding of the 
‘transvaluation of values’ as source of change, as opposed to a Marxist 
conception of class struggle and the dialectic of a linear history.2 
 
 Emma Goldman, Herbert Read and Gustav Landauer identified Nietzsche as a 
true philosophical rebel, quite close to anarchist ideals and aims. Translations of 
Nietzsche’s works, and positive comments on them, frequently appeared in American 
anarchist journals like The Blast, Liberty (edited by Benjamin Tucker), Freeland and 
Mother Earth (edited by Emma Goldman).  Tucker hails Nietzsche as a great teacher 
of individualism and stresses his remarks against the state.3 The transvaluation of 
values was a Nietzschean notion that charmed Emma Goldman, giving a boost to her 
                                                        
1 Nietzsche, The Antichrist, aphorism 57. 
2 Spencer Sunshine, “Nietzsche and the Anarchists”, http://radicalarchives.org/ 2010/05/18/nietzsche-
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3Robert C. Holub, “Nietzsche: Socialist, Anarchist, Feminist”, http://infoshop.org/library/pdfs/ 
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view of anarchists as the ones who could overcome old traditions, transvalue the dead 
social values and create new, beautiful things.4 Murray Bookchin similarly used this 
concept in support of the Spanish anarchist project when he wrote that workers must 
no longer see themselves as class beings, “proletarians” and “masses” but as human 
beings, creative personalities and self-affirming individuals through a transvaluation 
of values.5 
 Federica Montseny, a well-known anarchist and feminist, used the concept of 
future-woman, based on Nietzsche’s overman, in order to show that women could 
fight sexism and revise their social role through art and literature. Rudolf Rocker 
shared the same opinion about culture’s revolutionary creativity when he used many 
of Nietzsche’s sayings to reveal the destructive role of nationalism and of the state.6 
  Of course, there were also negative comments about Nietzsche’s individualism 
made by prominent anarchists. Kropotkin, for instance, “called the individualism of 
Nietzsche ‘spurious’, remarking that it could exist ‘only under a condition of 
oppression for the masses’ and in fact destroyed individuality ‘in the oppressor 
himself as well as in the oppressed masses’”.7 More generally speaking, it is quite 
reasonable that the objections Nietzsche held towards anarchists were at the same 
time the objections anarchists expressed about Nietzsche, concerning his preference 
for hierarchy, elitism and power.  
 It is also worth mentioning that even during the Nazi regime in Germany, and 
with the appropriation of Nietzsche having already taken place by Hitler’s 
propagandists, the influence of the German philosopher was still present in states like 
the Soviet Union, where he was considered a philosopher of fascism and bourgeois 
decadence. Spiritual anarchists, like A.A. Meier and Nikolai Berdyaev tried to use the 
Dionysian force of Nietzsche for reviving Christianity, as well as an antidote to both 
Bolshevism and Stalinism.8   
 Today, post-anarchists, like Saul Newman and Richard Day, try to find 
answers to post-modernity’s burning political and social issues by also using 
Nietzsche’s critique of Western epistemology and modernity’s worldview, in 
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6 Sunshine. 
7 Peter Kropotkin, Kropotkin’s Revolutionary Pamphlets, Kessinger Publishing, Whitefish 2005, p. 5. 
8 Maria Deppermann, “Nietzsche in der Sowjetunion. ‘Den Begrabenen Nietzsche Ausgraben’”, 
Nietzsche Studien, 27, 1998. The reference has been made from the Greek translation in Ζήσης Σαρίκας 
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accordance with those anarchist concepts that clearly stand against any absolutism.9  
 There are also some incidents in Nietzsche’s personal life that seem to connect 
him, at least symbolically, with an anarchistic point of view: There was a period, in 
1880, that Nietzsche chose to be literally stateless. He had just completed Human, All 
Too Human, a book that clearly rejected nationalism and preached the abolition of 
nations in favour of the rising of a mixed race, that of the “European man”.10 This 
period was one of a crisis, not only in his physical condition (Nietzsche’s health was 
gradually deteriorating) but in his intellectual one as well. Far from participating in 
the general euphoria over the remarkable, almost “divine”, achievements of his era (in 
arts, science, economy and politics), Nietzsche was feeling the coming of an 
avalanche that would reach its peak with the “death of God” and would unveil the 
very human – all too human –, and not divine at all, foundations of Western culture, 
two of which were the nation and the state. In this context he was wandering in many 
French, Swiss and Italian cities, having renounced his German nationality and not 
having yet obtained the Swiss one.  
In addition, in a draft of a letter in early December 1888, addressed to Kaiser 
Wilhelm II, Nietzsche speaks of the doom of every kind of authority, a spiritual war 
within which every sense of politics will be lost.11 By that time he had already 
completed Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Twilight of the Idols and Ecce Homo where he, 
more or less, defines what a war means to him. For Nietzsche, war is not of a physical 
but of a spiritual interest, an aggressive pathos against the ideas of someone who is 
considered to be equal. This attack is not on people but on ideas without bad feelings 
or hatred.12 It is a war waged for the sake of personal opinions, for the sake of ideas. It 
is a battle between spirits that promotes courage, bravery, pride and self-discipline 
over pity, touchiness, and despisal. It is not a good cause that justifies the means/war, 
but the good means/war that justifies a cause.13 But, above all, the declaration of such 
a war is the need for a transvaluation of all current values with the simultaneous 
                                                        
9 See Saul Newman, “Anarchism and the Politics of Ressentiment”, in John Moore (ed.), I am not a 
Man, I am Dynamite, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Anarchist Tradition, Autonomedia, New York 2004 
and Day, pp. 9-12. 
10 Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1996, 
aphorism 475. 
11 Friedrich Nietzsche, Τελευταίες Επιστολές, 1887-1889, Άγρας, Αθήνα 2003, letter 28, p. 138,  [Last 
Letters] taken from the relevant edition by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, Friedrich Nietzsche, 
Samtliche Briefe Kritische Studienausgabe, Januar 1887 – Januar 1889, Nachtrage/Register, vol. 8, 
letter 1171. 
12 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, “Why I Am So Wise”, aphorism 7. 
13 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, part I, “Of War and Warriors”. 
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destruction of all idols: “how to philosophize with a hammer”.14 One such idol is 
politics, an idol which fights spirituality in many decadent ways: either by nationalist 
expressions [“Deutschland, Deutschland über alles”]15 or by meaningless chatter, 
theatrical pretending, ceaseless flattering and the oppressive, inflexible, lying nature 
of politicians.16 Nietzsche makes himself clear: “culture and the state…are 
antagonists…All great ages of culture are ages of political decline: what is great 
culturally has always been unpolitical, even anti-political”.17 The one that spends 
one’s strength for power politics and parliamentarianism – among other things – has 
nothing left to spend for creativity, self-overcoming and will.18 However, only one 
condition describes the end of authority and domination with a simultaneous 
emergence of a spiritual war – an anti-political stance that is in favour of creativity 
rather than political plans and projects – and this condition is anarchy. As a result, 
Nietzsche – even in a state of mental or emotional tension – seems to appreciate and 
welcome these anarchist features, although he does not recognize them as such when 
speaking of the anarchist political movement of his days.  
Nevertheless, the establishment of the elective affinity between the German 
philosopher and the anarchists will be demonstrated, in the first place, through a more 
detailed presentation of “Nietzsche in Anarchism and Libertarian Marxism” and 
“Anarchism in Nietzsche”. This relationship is explored by examining  the way 
Nietzsche clearly influenced Emma Goldman, Gustav Landauer, the libertarian 
Marxist Walter Benjamin and post-anarchist thinkers, and how this elective 
relationship can be detected and, thus, gradually established, in accordance with the 
aforementioned development and evolution of Nietzschean thought. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
14 Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, preface. 
15 Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, “What Germans Lack”, aphorism 1. 
16 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, part I, “Of the Flies of the Market-Place”. 
17 Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, “What Germans Lack”, aphorism 4. 
18 Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, “What Germans Lack”, aphorism 4. 
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C.1/ Nietzsche in Anarchism (A) and Libertarian Marxism (L/M) 
Emma Goldman (A) 
Goldman was the best-known anarchist of the twentieth century to make extended and 
detailed references to the German philosopher during her lectures,1 conversations and 
through her articles and other works.2 However, Goldman’s admiration for Nietzsche 
had a very special starting point.  
For Goldman, expressions of cultural nature, such as literature, music and 
drama, were of equal revolutionary importance to political direct action since, 
according to her, anarchism was not just another political theory trying to give 
satisfactory answers to burning political questions but a worldview that embraced 
every aspect, stance and expression of human life, whilst opposing old values.3 This 
preference to culture, and its connection to politics, was mainly expressed through the 
Mother Earth publication, “A Monthly Magazine Devoted to Social Science and 
Literature”4, which wanted to be “a place of expression for the young idealists in arts 
and letters”.5 This venture was nothing less than the fulfilment of a chronic need of 
Goldman to “combine [my] social ideas with the young strivings in the various art 
forms in America”.6  
As a result, Mother Earth’s, and particularly Goldman’s, interests focused, 
among other things, on personalities that used to be the guiding and inspiring force for 
intellectuals and artists, personalities like Stirner and Nietzsche7 whose emancipative 
individualism fits with their artistic idiosyncrasy. After all, as mentioned already in 
parts A.3 and B.1, artists like Ibsen, Whitman or Zola through their works were 
considered to be the proof of a close connection of anarchism to certain intellectual 
movements.  
On these terms, Nietzsche – commonly accepted as a master of writing – could 
play an important role in the anarchist cultural explosion, for he not only  shared the 
same feelings about the revolutionary nature of art but also because he was 
propagating that the “transvaluation of values” could come true through a cultural 
                                                        
1 For a list of Goldman’s talks on Nietzsche between 1913 and 1917 see the appendix of Leigh 
Starcross, “‘Nietzsche was an Anarchist’, reconstructing Emma Goldman’s Nietzsche lectures”, in 
Moore, pp. 37-38. 
2 Especially in her autobiography, “Living My Life”. 
3 Emma Goldman, Living My Life, Penguin, New York 2006, p. 125. 
4 This was the magazine’s subtitle. 
5 Goldman, Living My Life, p. 229. 
6 Goldman, Living My Life, p. 229. 
7 Holub, p. 11. 
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rebirth.8 At this point, Goldman’s commitment to Nietzsche was also reinforced by 
her shift towards written expression, driven by her estimation of the deeper impact a 
book can have in comparison with a lecture or oral expression in general.9  
As a result, Goldman praised Nietzsche not only for his vision of 
“transvaluation” but also for the way of writing - the style - he chose in order to 
express this vision.10 She acknowledged that he could not be regarded as a social 
theorist but, definitely, as “a poet, rebel and innovator”. Therefore, the “aristocrat” or 
“modern” labels used for him as an accusation by those radicals that disliked him – 
like Ed Brady, Goldman’s comrade and partner at the time – were also accepted by 
Goldman but were attributed to his pioneering and renovating way of thinking and his 
creative potentiality. Consequently, for her, Nietzsche was an aristocrat indeed, but 
one of spirit not of birth or social class, in the same way that all true anarchists were 
also.11 
 Goldman’s utilization of Nietzschean philosophy was not just limited to the 
location of an affinity between the anarchists and the German thinker but stretched to 
serve as a methodological tool for her passionate lectures on issues having to do with 
the First World War, the state, the Church, morality, human relationships (free love, 
jealousy) and even with matters much closer to her feminist interests, such as 
women’s emancipation and birth control.12 Her distinctively radical approach on 
issues like homosexuality, that were regarded as taboo even by her anarchist 
comrades, could be attributed to the Nietzschean “twilight of the idols”, meaning the 
complete deconstruction, and not just the improvement, of every repressive norm 
concerning the social and sexual role of women. For that reason, and although she 
was a passionate supporter of women’s rights, she opposed the suffrage movement as 
a reformist one, an “illusory approach rooted in middle-class”.13  
The elaboration of the relevant arguments were based either on specific 
Nietzschean concepts (the rejection of majorities, “beyond good and evil” morality, 
                                                        
8 See for example The Birth of Tragedy, the third part of On the Genealogy of Morals and the Untimely 
Meditations, works that either directly or indirectly point at the direction of transvaluating the values of 
the past and the present.  
9 Emma Goldman, Anarchism and Other Essays, Filiquarian Publishing LLC, Minneapolis 2005, 
preface, pp. 5-6.  
10 Starcross, p. 32. 
11 Goldman, Living My Life, p. 126. 
12 Starcross, pp. 33-34. 
13Judith Faucette, “Women’s Rights Activist & Anarchist Emma Goldman”,http://judith-
faucette.suite101.com/womens-rights-activist-anarchist-emma-goldman-a65719 (accessed on 
1/12/2011). 
 
 
 
 
78
the “transvaluation of values”, artful living and the creative “Overman”14) which 
underpinned her preference for constant flux and dislike of narcotic stability, or on the 
characteristic that Goldman most admired in Nietzsche, that is, his radical 
individualism. It is this individualism (together with that of Stirner) that Goldman 
used firstly to clarify the different meaning she was giving to this term – openly 
rejecting the American version of it15 – and secondly, in combination with 
Kropotkin’s collectivism in order to stress the achievements of cooperation between 
individuals.16 The result was to point out the value of anarchism as a harmony 
between socialism and individualism. As Kevin Morgan argues, in an article that 
explores the “dark side” of Goldman’s individualism,17 her anarchist individualism is 
not altruistic, not “for the good of the people”, but egotistic. Goldman declares to be 
an anarchist because the suffering of others makes her suffer too; consequently her 
contribution to the cause is in order to eliminate suffering and unhappiness of others 
which also make her unhappy. This uncovering of “altruism” and its radical re-
approach as egoism is developed in Kropotkin’s Anarchist Morality,18 as well as in 
Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil,19 On the Genealogy of Morals,20Twilight of the 
Idols21 and Ecce Homo,22and does not necessarily mean an anti-social or anti-human 
egoism. It just clarifies that the deepest motivations even of an “altruistic” action are 
distilled to giving pleasure to one’s self and that altruism is trapped in feelings of pity 
and disrespect for those who receive it.  
Moreover, by using this concept of Nietzschean individualism and will, 
Goldman attacked the monolithic and deterministic Marxist view of history by using 
phrases directly referring to Nietzsche and by presenting a type of individual very 
close to the one Nietzsche supported, an anti-essential version of the subject: 
 
                                                        
14 For a more detailed usage of these Nietzschean concepts by Goldman see Penny Weiss, Loretta 
Kensinger (ed.), Feminist Interpretations of Emma Goldman, The Pennsylvania State University Press, 
Pennsylvania 2007, pp. 91-107, 151, 218-19, 221-22. 
15 Emma Goldman, “The Individual, Society and the State”, 
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/goldman/works/1940/individual.htm (accessed on 
25/3/2009). 
16 Ibid. 
17 Kevin Morgan, “Herald of the Future? Emma Goldman, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Anarchist as 
Superman”, Anarchist Studies, 2009, vol.17, No2. 
18 Kropotkin, “Anarchist Morality”, pp. 83-88. 
19 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, aphorisms 33, 221. 
20 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, Preface. 
21 Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, aphorism 35. 
22 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, “Why I am so Wise”, aphorism 4. 
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No one single factor in the complex of individual or social behaviour can be 
designated as the factor of decisive quality. We know too little, and may never 
know enough, of human psychology to weigh and measure the relative values 
of this or that factor in determining man’s conduct. To form such dogmas in 
their social connotation is nothing short of bigotry; yet, perhaps, it has its uses, 
for the very attempt to do so proved the persistence of the human will and 
confutes the Marxists (…) Fortunately even some Marxists are beginning to 
see that all is not well with the Marxian creed. After all, Marx was but human - 
all too human - hence by no means infallible.23  
 
It is clear from this passage that Goldman tried, through Nietzsche, to 
distinguish the anarchist view of human history from the Marxist one, by bringing 
into play all the features that the “metaphysical economic determinism” - the Marxist 
class struggle - had cast out, meaning man’s individual and collective will, his psychic 
life and his mental orientation. She emphasized how the application of economic 
determinism in Russia overlooked the human factor, neglecting the need for an 
inspiring and energising ideal.24 Consequently, the revolutionary process in Russia 
was very soon deflected, by loosing the character of a liberating project. As Goldman 
notes in the Afterward of My Disillusionment in Russia, economic determinism was 
unable to explain why a social revolution erupted in a non-industrial country like 
Russia instead of Western countries like the United States, France or Germany, and 
was not sufficient to keep the revolutionary spirit alive25 (a conclusion that was fully 
completed with the collapse of the USSR in 1991). 
On the other hand, her Nietzschean approach provided an alternative 
explanation to both issues. Since the philosophy of a new social order should be 
“based on the released energies of the individual and the free association of liberated 
individuals”26 the mission of the social revolution could be nothing other than “a 
fundamental transvaluation of values”27 of social and human values. This explains 
both why revolution did not happen in an economically developed country of the 
West and why it was possible in Russia. Additionally, it provides a crucial 
                                                        
23Goldman, “The Individual, Society and the State”. 
24Goldman, “The Individual, Society and the State”. 
25 Emma Goldman, My Disillusionment in Russia, Dover Publications, New York 2003, pp. 242-44. 
26 Goldman, “The Individual, Society and the State”. 
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explanation for the failure of the Russian revolution. It was because of the distortion 
of these values, on the part of the Bolsheviks, which can be summarised by the slogan 
“the end justifies all means”28 and the relative practices that, not only overlooked but, 
drowned the human element in favour of a deterministic plan.  
 
Gustav Landauer (A) 
Nietzsche’s influence on Gustav Landauer can be identified throughout the whole 
work of the latter. Specific thoughts and views make this connection seem 
inescapable, even when Landauer does not refer to Nietzsche in a direct way. As 
Martin Buber wrote in 1929,  
 
…[Landauer] fought in the revolution against the revolution for the sake of the 
revolution. The revolution will not thank him for it. But those will thank him 
for it who have fought as he fought and perhaps some day those will thank him 
for whose sake he fought.29  
 
In his lonely way, he was “accompanied” by ideas able to give a critical boost 
to the individual and social transformation he had in mind. For Landauer, revolution is 
inextricably related to art since the latter helps the spiritual rebirth of the individual 
which is a primary presupposition for the revolutionary transformation of society. 
According to his belief, the result of poetry is revolution which is renascence and 
creation.30 Additionally, Landauer rejects historical materialism and communist 
teleology because for him socialism can never be absolute but always in accordance 
with the individual and social changes. This rejection of absolutism also applies to 
anarchism and the vision of an anti-authoritarian society. The social transformation 
goes through the individual’s rebirth; only we – no party, no avant-garde – can save 
ourselves, whenever we decide it and long for it.31     
In the period of his early anarchism, Landauer wrote a novel, reflecting the 
influence by Nietzsche, which was named after a chapter of his favourite Nietzschean 
                                                                                                                                                               
27 Goldman, My Disillusionment in Russia, pp. 258-59. 
28 Goldman, My Disillusionment in Russia, p. 260. 
29 Maurice Friedman, Martin Buber’s Life and Work, Wayne State University Press, Detroit 1988, p. 
256. 
30 Gustav Landauer, Το Μήνυμα του Τιτανικού [Titanic’s Message], Τροπή, Αθήνα 2000, translator’s 
preface, p. 9. 
31 Landauer, Το Μήνυμα του Τιτανικού [Titanic’s Message], pp. 10-12. 
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book, Thus Spoke Zarathustra. The novel, titled Der Todesprediger (Preacher of 
Death),  has been described as a libertarian adaptation of Nietzsche.32 Moreover, in a 
passage from a biographical essay he wrote about his youth, Landauer confessed his 
attraction for Nietzsche's unique literary style (the same, more or less, attraction Emma 
Goldman also felt); his approval of the role that emotion played in Nietzsche’s 
philosophy; and his siding with the Heraclitian “to become” over the Platonic “to be”, 
in order to state, as Nietzsche had done, his rejection of the eternal truths that Platonic 
Ideas represented. 
 
Ibsen’s influence was soon joined by that of Nietzsche, especially of his 
Zarathustra (…) Now with Nietzsche, I encountered a thinker in whom thought 
did not dominate emotion, but in whom thought and emotion were united (…) 
There was poetry, rich and colorful language, compelling verbal imagery, 
rhythm and dance (…) And yet, as in the case of Ibsen, reality was not 
disregarded: there was activity in Nietzsche’s spiritual quest, there was 
permanent destruction and creation, collapsing and rebuilding.33 
 
For Nietzsche, the concept of “become” stems from Heraclitus, meaning the 
ceaseless interaction of opposite things, the “everything flows”34 that does not hide a 
stable nature under the constant change but is the nature of things itself. This flux 
includes a continuous creation and destruction, unification and breakup. Plato opposed 
Heraclitus’ theory because Plato’s World of Ideas, together with the existence of a 
unique truth that inhabits it, needed a stability that could be reached only by those who 
would overcome the false world of phenomena – the Heraclitian world – and would 
allow their souls to acknowledge it as their place of departure for the false world of 
senses. This knowledge of (the one) truth can be achieved – as Plato suggested 
through Socrates’ words – when thought dominates emotions and leads to self-
knowledge, to the state of eudemonia. However, for Nietzsche this theory means two 
things, and he rejected both: firstly, the World of Ideas is nothing but a world of 
stagnation that cannot give birth to anything new and, at the same time, is 
underestimating the world of senses and emotions, the world we live in. Secondly, the 
process of self-knowledge does not stand for a personal quest for someone to find 
                                                        
32 Gabriel Kuhn – Siegbert Wolf, Introduction, in Kuhn, p. 21. 
33 Landauer, “Twenty-Five Years Later: On the Jubilee of Wilhelm II”, in Kuhn, p. 64. 
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what suits them best but a quest leading to the same end for everyone. The end of this 
journey will be the one and absolute truth, a dogma, an idol.  
Landauer’s appropriation of Nietzsche’s preference for Heraclitus to Plato, led 
him to the same conclusions (anti-dogmatism, self-determination) which marked all of 
his life and social-political practice. His commitment to “become” can also be seen in 
combination with his dedication to the Nietzschean concept of the will. Landauer 
argued that solving social problems in a radical way takes a voluntaristic denial of 
cooperation with the existing state institutions, and the development of alternative 
relations instead. This process can never be completed or securely established. It is all 
about “a great balancing of forces”, an endless and ongoing struggle.35 Landauer 
detested stagnation as much as Nietzsche. 
It is very interesting how Landauer utilised Nietzsche in order to express his 
view of the present and the future of humanity and to oppose the deterministic 
teleology of Marxist thought. When Nietzsche spoke of Apollo and Dionysus in The 
Birth of Tragedy, still under the influence of Schopenhauer, he described Apollo as the 
god of individuality, him who extracted us from the primordial unity of everything. As 
mentioned in part B.4, this extraction caused humans an unspeakable horror and pain 
before the meaningless abyss of existence, feelings that were temporarily cured by the 
instant re-unification with the universe, through the metaphoric and literal intoxication 
that the god Dionysus was offering during his fests. Finally, the absence of a meaning 
and a telos in human existence, not to mention the overwhelming horror of it, were 
turned into an affirmation of life per se through the cooperation of the two gods in the 
Attic tragedy. This conjunction justified life not as a passageway to a hereafter but as a 
“here and now” work of art, able to give joy and satisfaction to the terrified 
individuals.  
Similarly, Landauer in “Through Separation to Community”, an article that 
shows that he was clearly influenced by Nietzsche and Meister Eckhart,36 says that our 
“individual” is at the same time our most “general” that connects us with the whole 
“all-one” world, leading us to unity with it.37 Speaking some more of the notion of 
                                                                                                                                                               
34 Τα Πάντα Ρει. 
35 Marshall, pp. 412-13, and Day, p. 126. 
36 Meister Eckhart was a mediaeval mystic (1260-1327) that seems to have influenced Nietzsche with 
his affirmation of life and the acknowledgement of a divine creativity within humanity. See aphorism 
292 of The Gay Science, where Nietzsche invokes Eckhart concerning morality, whereas for a process 
of linking Eckhart with Nietzsche see Aschheim, pp. 210-11. 
37 Landauer, “Through Separation to Community”, in Kuhn, p. 96. 
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individuality he, indirectly, makes use of the Apollo-Dionysus dipole: 
 
I reject the certainty of my I so that I can bear life. I try to build myself a new 
world, knowing that I do not really have any ground to build it on; All I have is 
a need. This need, as a part of life, includes a liberating, joyful strength: I know 
from now on that I live, that I perceive and act in my own, self-created world. 
Then, however, in order not to be a godforsaken loner, I accept this world and 
surrender my I. I do this to feel one with the world in which my I has 
dissolved. Just like someone who jumps into the water to kill himself, I jump 
into the world – but instead of death, I find life.38 
 
   Landauer does not project liberation, or salvation, in a distant future that will 
come after humanity will have, deterministically, passed through the Marxist historical 
stages. For him, utopia, which is “the driving force behind all revolutionary action”, is 
not some “far-away dream that we endlessly chase”, because revolution is a 
“permanent action”. Therefore, utopia is a force present in our daily lives.39 The same 
view is expressed in a more political, compared to the above philosophical-mystical, 
manner in For Socialism, where he attacks the monolithic Marxist view of history and 
via a purely Nietzschean argument does not consider historical determinism to be the 
reason for the coming of socialism but the creativity of the will: 
 
Socialism, you Marxists, is possible at all times and with any kind of 
technology. It is possible for the right people at all times, even with very 
primitive technology, while at all times, even with splendidly developed 
machine technology it is impossible for the wrong group. We know of no 
development that must bring it. We know of no such necessity as a natural law 
(…) Capitalism will not necessarily change into socialism. It need not perish. 
Socialism will not necessarily come, nor must the capital-state-proletariat-
socialism of Marxism come and that is not too bad. In fact no socialism at all 
must come (…) Yet socialism can come and should come — if we want it, if 
we create it.40 
 
                                                        
38 Landauer, “Through Separation to Community”, p. 97. 
39 Gustav Landauer, Revolution and Other Writings, Introduction, p. 30. 
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Additionally, the importance of the will in Landauer’s thought can be seen 
through the active way by which a person recreates his world, based on his desires and 
this Nietzschean type of will: 
 
(…) Every such man will have the urge to give birth to himself, to recreate his 
being, and – as far as possible – his environment and his world. This 
extraordinary moment will be experienced by all who, in Nietzsche’s words, 
are able to recreate the original chaos in themselves and to become spectators 
at the drama of their own desires and deepest secrets.41  
 
Finally, the most well known, and probably most important, Nietzschean 
influence on Landauer is his perception of the state not as a structure, not as a thing or 
tool, but as a complex of relations:42 For Landauer, the state is a relation formed in the 
free space left by the incapacity of people to affirm their will. “The line which at any 
time limits this capacity forms the basis of the State at that time; in other words, the 
degree of incapacity for a voluntary right order determines the degree of legitimate 
compulsion”.43 This stems from the deconstruction by Nietzsche of the myth that 
presented the state as being the result of a social contract, thus an institution itself,44 
which made Landauer suggest the alteration of these relations in order to make the 
state and its institutions redundant.  
What needs to be stressed here is the slight but important difference of the 
conception of the state between Landauer and earlier prominent anarchists like 
Bakunin or Kropotkin. It is a fact that when Landauer acknowledges the state as a 
forced association,45 which must be abolished together with every other domination,46 
he follows the path of Bakunin and Kropotkin when they reject the idea of social 
contract,47 and, consequently, the argument that the state is the product of such consent 
rather than a dominant imposition. Nevertheless, while Kropotkin and Bakunin clearly 
                                                                                                                                                               
40 Gustav Landauer, For Socialism, Telos Press, New York 1986, p. 75. 
41 Landauer, “Anarchic Thoughts on Anarchism”, in Kuhn, p. 88. 
42 Landauer, For Socialism, p. 43. 
43 Martin Buber, Paths in Utopia, Beacon Press, Boston 1958, p. 33. 
44 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, second essay, §17. 
45 Landauer, “A Few Words on Anarchism”, in Kuhn, p. 80. 
46 Landauer, “Anarchism-Socialism”, in Kuhn, p. 70. 
47Peter Kropotkin, The State: Its Historic Role, The Anarchist Library, 
http://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/petr-kropotkin-the-state-its-historic-role, p. 11 (accessed on 
2/12/2012), and Bakunin, “Federalism, Socialism, Anti-Theologism”, in Dolgoff, p. 128. 
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distinguish society from the state,48 Landauer comes to underline the existence of the 
state within, and not just above, society since it is nothing less than a certain 
relationship between humans, a mode of their behaviour.49 Despite the fact that 
Kropotkin also seems to think in terms of relations, especially in Law and Authority,50 
and although, like Landauer, he calls for “a new social unit fitted to serve as a cell for 
the formation of a new society in the midst of the old”51 (mainly in his book Fields, 
Factories and Workshops and his brochure Anarchist Morality) there is a different 
conception of the cornerstone of such a cell. For Kropotkin it is the rational 
development of cooperative habits and feelings “that are useful for the preservation of 
society and the propagation of the race”.52 But for Landauer this is a consequence. His 
cornerstone is a by far more spiritual conception of socialism, not “a rational code 
where you might think, ‘well, it’s better for others therefore it’s better for me’”.53 It is 
the re-finding of something that lies within every individual, a mystical discovery, that 
will cause (and not begin with) the development of mutual aid and solidarity and thus 
will work as a vital presupposition for approaching people differently and constructing 
an alternative kind of relationship that, eventually, will make the state seem 
unnecessary.54 This spiritual dimension, which none of the earlier socialists 
acknowledged very profoundly, is not a mere product or reflection of the material 
world, or something explicable in terms of economic and technical relationships. It is a 
sui generis entity, closely related to the social being without being able to describe it 
in these social terms.55 This insight of Landauer explains his different, Nietzschean, 
perception of the state, not as a thing but as a complex of relations, and answers to the 
bitter ascertainment of Proudhon that confronting the state – i.e. rebelling against it – 
without sufficient communal spirit, is an act that bears the state and all its dominant 
characteristics in its own self.56  So, we must be seized by the spirit not of revolution, 
as a void destructive process of the state, but of regeneration.57   
Additionally, this vision - for realizing alternative, revolutionary communities 
                                                        
48 Kropotkin, The State: Its Historic Role, p. 9, and Bakunin, “Federalism, Socialism, Anti-
Theologism”, p. 129. 
49 Buber, Paths in Utopia, p. 33. 
50 Kropotkin, “Law and Authority” in Baldwin, pp. 201-02. 
51 Buber, p. 32. 
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hic et nunc58 into the shell of the old world - produced one more pioneering view 
within anarchist thought. Landauer’s creation of anarchist communities is based on the 
principle that those who wish to live this way cannot wait for the others to do so, nor 
force socialism on anyone. That means that the traditional socialist and, up to then, 
anarchist faith to the revolutionary instinct and potential of the masses seemed to 
fade.59 Landauer, under Nietzsche’s influence, questioned it openly by promoting, 
once again, the creative will and voluntarism of the individual. 
 
Walter Benjamin (L/M) 
The cornerstone of Benjamin’s philosophy is the nature of historical time, since this is 
where his critique of the reformist Left of his days, Social Democracy as well as the 
USSR,60 and his vision for the present and the future were based on. It is interesting to 
see how Benjamin's time-view can be connected to Nietzsche’s idea of time, as it is 
expressed through the substratum of the overman and will to power, that is, the eternal 
return. 
 Benjamin’s conception of history is a post-modern critique of post-modernity 
that expresses an innovative description of emancipation:61 Historical time is not idle, 
it does not constitute a “to be” but a “becoming”. The future determines whether an 
event will be considered an authentic historical fact; it becomes historical “post 
mortem” and because of other events that take place after it and which we have to 
seek, trace and explain retrospectively in order to give sufficient meaning to the 
original event. 
 Here we see a perception of time that, although permeated by a messianic 
spirit, departs from a linear route62 approaching a more circular one, since it includes 
the interaction between the past and the present. If the past depends on future events 
then it does not bear its own steady characteristics, while at the same time we cannot 
foretell if a past event, mo matter how insignificant, has been lost for good.63 
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 For Benjamin, revolution does not take place to secure the future of the 
oppressed but to do justice to earlier, suffering, generations. It is an act of redeeming 
their past.64 This view is reinforced by a peculiar pessimism that, without having 
anything to do with fatality, stems from the fear of “the recurrence of the blight” and 
“the ceaseless return of the defeat”. 
 As far as Nietzsche is concerned, the theory of “eternal return” carries a dual 
meaning, metaphysical and ethical. The first one has to do with eternity, the infinity of 
“becoming”. The second one deals with the argument that our responsibility in a given 
time stands for a responsibility in eternity, since eternal return is the ultimate judge of 
every one of our actions. Contrary to Benjamin, Nietzsche opines that the lack of a 
universal meaning or of a final situation is what leads to the idea that “everything 
returns”. The infinity of the past proves that if the universe were teleological, this telos 
would have already taken place. If there were a final situation, the act of “becoming” 
would have already reached it.65 Therefore, we stop believing in a distinctive “to be” 
that opposes “becoming”, but at the same time we believe in a “to be” of “becoming” 
that coincides with “returning”. The moment that is passing by is simultaneously the 
present, past and future. It is not a “to be” that returns but a “returning” that constitutes 
a “to be” and that is why eternal return is a composition of time and its dimensions on 
the one hand, and of “becoming” and “to be”, on the other:  
 
“Behold this moment!” I went on. “From this gateway Moment a long, eternal 
lane runs back: an eternity lies behind us. Must not all things that can run have 
already run along this lane? Must not all things that can happen have already 
happened, been done, run past?...And are not all things bound fast together in 
such a way that this moment draws after it all future things?”66  
 
Of course, there is a problem with eternal return. If everything returns then 
reactive forces and slave morality will also return. And here lies an analogy with 
Benjamin’s pessimism regarding the ceaseless recurrence of defeat and oppression. 
Deleuze argues that, for Nietzsche, eternal return is selective, that petty things are 
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excluded from eternity.67 However, I believe that such a view is incorrect. Firstly, 
because if, according to Nietzsche, the past is infinite then everything petty should 
have already stopped returning, so we would not be able (Nietzsche neither) to trace it 
in human history, something that Nietzsche definitely does. Secondly, because 
“becoming” – which is not static, is not “to be” – presupposes the continuous struggle 
of active and reactive forces as well as the distinction of one type from the other. The 
absence of reactive forces would possibly pose the danger of the stagnation platonic 
Ideas have. Hence, for Nietzsche, the return of everything that is petty and reactive has 
to face the war on the part of the noble values, whilst for Benjamin the return of defeat 
will be prevented only through remembrance of the past68 and the derailment of the 
“train of progress”.69 
Additionally, the continuous interaction between past, present and future that 
both thinkers recognize, is also reflected in their common dislike for a standard and 
neutral reading of history. Nietzsche’s polemic in “On the Uses and Disadvantages of 
History for Life”70 against historians that bow before the facts of history by passively 
surrendering themselves to every kind of power and authority,71 inspired Benjamin's 
severe critique of the contemporary servile historicism that praised a conception of 
historical progress which steps on the bodies of those who lie on the ground.72 For 
Nietzsche and Benjamin, history is useful only when it serves life and action73 as the 
past is always open to re-interpretation. This view highlights one more important 
feature that Benjamin and Nietzsche have in common: the rejection of the one truth.  
In his work, Benjamin fights the idea of a monopoly of historical truth and its 
imposition on others,74similarly to Nietzschean perspectivism,75 whilst at the same 
time he, tragically and in a Nietzschean way, recognizes that the historian is someone 
who always faces the danger of being untimely.76 After all, the rupture of the 
historicist progress, the derailment of the train of progress, needs acting in an untimely 
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fashion, therefore against time and even on time, in favour of a future time.77 
Nevertheless, I must point out some apparent differences between the two 
thinkers. The words “hatred” and “vengeance” that Benjamin use to fuel the struggle 
of the oppressed is a tool in Nietzsche’s hand for criticizing the socialist and anarchist 
practices of his time through the concept of “resentment”. The reason is that, for 
Nietzsche, hatred and vengeance are acceptable only when used against personal 
enemies78 and not against injustice, generally and abstractly, as Benjamin argues.  
Yet, we must keep in mind that one reason that Nietzsche prefers a personal 
enemy to an abstract idea is the whole theory he has developed about resentment and 
bad conscience. When the enemy is someone specific then it is easier to express one’s 
feelings instantly, and thus discharge and save oneself from the venom of resentment. 
Otherwise, if directed against an abstract idea, over time, resentment finds enough 
space to flourish and even, gradually, turn into bad conscience.  Still, and as shown in 
the present research when talking about the mistakes Nietzsche made when applying 
the dipole “responsibility-debt” on the anarchists,79 Löwy stresses the fact that for 
Benjamin the feelings of the oppressed stand far from resentment since they constitute 
an active revolt. Hatred has to do with the suffering of the past and the present but 
instead of creating a passive and bad conscience, it favours a revolutionary deed.80 
Given the above and when Nietzsche’s phobia of the massive revolutionary act is 
overlooked, there is no reason why we shall not see the analogy between Benjamin’s 
fighting a system (rather than people) and Nietzsche’s opposing, what he calls, the 
system of decadent values. Why not interpret Benjamin’s intention not to victimize 
someone in person as a Nietzschean lightness of a noble and free spirit, the action of 
the individual able to forget which thus expresses the morality of a true master and not 
that of a slave? After all, we must never forget Nietzsche’s explanation of his polemic 
practice in his philosophical autobiography, Ecce Homo. Here, he makes plain that he 
never attacks people but ideas, avoiding every personal quarrel, excluding every bad 
experience.81 He attacks Christianity without blaming individual Christians82 just as 
Benjamin attacks fascism and not the Italian citizens of the twentieth century.83 
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Another difference that can be also bridged, when radically interpreted, is 
Benjamin’s and Nietzsche’s views of culture and its accomplishments. Benjamin links 
culture to barbarism to say that every significant monument of humanity, like the 
pyramids of Egypt or the Palais de l’Opera in Paris, has been built by the oppressed, 
the slaves and the ones defeated. Thus, the monuments of culture are at the same time 
monuments of barbarism and destruction. 
On the contrary, Nietzsche argues that the masterpieces of art and culture take 
the heavy price of suffering and enslavement for the multitudes.84 Nonetheless, even 
this apparently absolute statement is open to Nietzsche's own distinction between three 
types of culture: the prehistoric, the historic and the post-historic. Nietzsche attacks the 
historic type of culture where the forces in charge (the Church and the state) are 
clearly reactive, aiming at the maintenance of a human type that one is of a slave 
rather than of a master, guilty rather than innocent, debtor rather than creditor.85 
Benjamin reaches the same conclusion by following, in thesis VII of his Theses on the 
Philosophy of History, a Nietzschean critique of historicism as a reactive and slavish 
reading of history. The fact that the two thinkers seem to disagree on the inevitable 
sacrifice of the multitudes for the sake of great cultural monuments must not 
overshadow the most important and common feature of their reasoning: The historical 
time that contains these monuments is a reactive one.  
Finally, while the theory of eternal return serves the individual, the hero, the 
overman, for Benjamin the intermingle of the past and the future is for the sake of all 
who have been sacrificed in the name of “progress” and constitute the oppressed, who 
in Benjamin’s theological scheme stand for the Messiah.86 
This differentiation between Nietzschean individualism and anarchist socialism 
seems to be a constant source of antithesis between the two parts, mainly because of 
Nietzsche’s dislike for what he saw to be “the herd”. Yet, the reference to prominent 
individuals, like Auguste Blanqui, on the part of Benjamin, or the foresaid views of 
Landauer and Goldman concerning the simultaneous interaction between the 
revolutionary individual and their environment show that the presence of the overman 
not only is compatible with the anarchist social project but, moreover, is essential. 
Additionally, Benjamin puts one of his most basic theological concepts, “redemption” 
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(Erlösung), primarily in the sphere of the individual: one’s personal happiness implies 
the redemption of one’s own past, “the fulfilment of what could have been but was 
not”.87 Another expression of Nietzsche’s “become who you are”, that also includes 
the transformation and incorporation of the past. 
 
Post-Anarchism 
As far as post-anarchism (or post-structuralist anarchism) is concerned, Nietzsche 
plays a significant role in the process of unfolding, on the part of post-anarchist 
thinkers, a critique that aims against various fundamental points of the Enlightenment 
and, consequently, of the political currents that blossomed within its frame as well as 
of the hegemonic policies of the present social-political scene. This critique not only 
seeks to revitalize and refresh anarchism but also to offer a new perspective for the 
present and the future of the social struggles. For example, Eric Heroux and Mohamed 
Jean Veneuse present post-anarchism as a Nietzschean project “of becoming”, with 
reference to several thinkers (notably Deleuze and Guattari, Agamben, Derrida, Hardt 
and Negri). Each, they argue, attempt to overcome all “competing alternatives” that 
fail to oppose the status quo, by introducing the on-coming singularities that go 
beyond the essential identities of the past and the present.88 Their combination of 
“becoming” with one of post-anarchism’s central concerns, namely the anti-
essentialist approach to identities, is very well illustrated by Lewis Call. He says: 
 
In the space created by this radical critique of modern subjectivity, Nietzsche 
unleashes another kind of anarchy, an anarchy of becoming. By teaching us 
that we must pursue a perpetual project of self-overcoming and self-creation, 
constantly losing and finding ourselves in the river of becoming, Nietzsche 
ensures that our subjectivity will be fluid and dispersed, multiple and pluralistic 
rather than fixed and centered, singular and totalitarian. These twin anarchies, 
the critical anarchy of the subject and the affirmative anarchy of becoming, 
form the basis for a postmodern Nietzschean anarchism. Nietzsche’s 
philosophy thus creates not only the idea of postmodern anarchism but also the 
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postmodern anarchists themselves.89 
 
Saul Newman chooses the same point of departure, meaning Nietzsche, for his 
attack on the essentialist perception of the subject, morality and rationality. However, 
for him, the exposure of these weak points of the Enlightenment derives from another 
major concept of Nietzsche’s philosophy, (will to) power.90 According to Newman, 
the Manichean classic anarchist belief of a pure revolutionary identity versus the 
impure nature of political power reveals a paradox relative to the way the two 
antagonists are defined: the political power is bad because the revolutionary is good, 
and vice versa. Yet, that means that the one cannot exist without the other.91 So, the 
(classical) anarchist view, which rejects power so fiercely, can be saved from reaching 
a dead-end only by accepting the need to re-approach power on Nietzschean (and 
Foucauldian) terms of a creative and not dominant will to power.  
In addition, the creativity of this Nietzschean power connects directly to the 
actual questioning of a universal and objective truth. Andrew Koch highlights the 
important role that Apollo and Dionysus play in Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy when he 
speaks of “illusions” and “truth”, “interpretations” and “facts”. If the life stance of the 
overman is to create the world around himself/herself, it is because he/she - and no a 
priori truth – gives meaning to it: 
 
The overman is an ideal, but it is a concept devoid of any particular content, of 
any particular image. The overman comes after the anarchistic nature of the 
world is understood, after a recognition that the world does not contain a 
singular truth or a teleologically destined way of life. The overman embodies 
creativity (…) Nietzsche cannot justify the assertion of any specific character, 
except the overman’s recognition that it must create itself in a world without 
structure. It is a world in which there is power, but a world in which all 
knowledge and meaning are recognized as human inventions.92 
 
Post and Classical Anarchism 
Before ending this section, I shall attempt to answer the second question raised in 
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chapter A.1, which refers to the importance Nietzsche has for anarchism.  
Since the appearance of post-anarchism, a lot has been said and written about it 
and post-anarchism's implication for what is called “classical anarchism”. 
Undoubtedly, the basic arguments of post-anarchists stem from a post-structuralist 
point of view that goes directly back to Nietzsche, but at the same time it is Nietzsche 
again that either directly or indirectly bridges the gap between “classical” and “post” 
anarchism in a way that will preserve the distinctive anarchist identity and the inner 
plurality which is one of its basic features.  
A quick review of the counter-arguments to the objections expressed by post-
anarchists towards “classical” anarchism can illustrate three main categories: the 
limited and selective reading of “classical” anarchism by post-anarchists, the 
perception of “classical” concepts as fixed and their problematic redefinition, and the 
so-called “Archimedean point for change”. All categories include arguments based on 
Nietzschean methods and principles reflecting the utility of the German philosopher 
for anarchist identity. 
For post-anarchists, “classical” anarchism is limited to a certain group of 
thinkers by omitting controversial anarchists, like Goldman and Landauer93 or by 
neglecting important differences of thought, time, geography and culture.94 This 
distorted and insufficient reading creates a prejudice that makes it hard for post-
anarchists to accept anything “anti” or “post” modern within “classical” anarchist 
thought. Hence, they prefer to refer to it as an exception or contradiction.95 For 
example, post-anarchists regard the relationship between human subjects and power 
presented by Bakunin and Kropotkin (at certain points humans are naturally opposed 
to power whereas at other points seem to produce power), not as a contradiction of the 
subject itself (acknowledged as such by Bakunin and Kropotkin) but as a contradiction 
of their thought!96  
It is also very interesting that post-anarchist thinkers like Newman or Day seem 
to refer to Landauer in a very positive way, either by using his Nietzschean view of the 
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state97 or through a more extended and precise approach that wants Landauer to have 
anticipated poststructuralist theory via his contact with the work of Nietzsche.98 
Moreover, Day uses quite effectively the genealogical method of Nietzsche in order to 
conclude that the logic of affinity clearly leads from Kropotkin to Landauer,99 but 
what makes it hard for post-anarchists to place thinkers like Landauer (whose views 
they seem to share) or Goldman (who is totally missing from every post-anarchist text) 
within the “classical” anarchist field instead of ignoring them or citing them 
abstractly? Süreyyya Evren gives the answer when saying that English-speaking post-
anarchists never use Goldman when discussing “classical” anarchism because she has 
been, somehow, dropped from what he calls “the anarchist canon”, meaning the 
grouping of specific anarchist thinkers and their identification as “classical anarchists”. 
Otherwise, her Nietzschean anarchism - together with all the postmodern issues it 
raises- would mean that a great deal of post-anarchism is not beyond but rather inside 
“classical” anarchism.100As a result, what Evren calls for is not just a partial genealogy 
project, like that conducted by Day, but a (once again, Nietzschean) genealogy of the 
anarchist canon.101  
Furthermore, the normalization of disputes in anarchist history made by post-
anarchists, prevents them from realizing that terms like “science”, “human nature”, or 
“power” never had a fixed definition but have become the object of several conflicts 
within anarchist circles.102 Therefore, they miss a basic thesis of Nietzsche who 
describes the world of speech as a field of invasions, disguises and struggles.103 
In addition, Sam Haraway cites the distinction of the term “power” made by Uri 
Gordon, arguing that in this way post-anarchists manage to overcome the inflexibility 
of “classical” anarchist thinkers when speaking of the always oppressive nature of 
power. Particularly, Haraway describes what Gordon defines as “power-with…a 
cooperative form of power, where individuals influence each other’s behavior in the 
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absence of a conflict of wills or interest”.104 Nevertheless, this definition of the term 
“power” is nothing but a re-introduction of what already existed within the thought of 
“classical” anarchists: The spirit of cooperation in Kropotkin, the need for 
organization in Malatesta, the designation of self-obedience and self-discipline in 
anarchism, as illustrated by Eduardo Colombo.105 The only difference is that 
“classical” texts do not name this “productive” force “power”.   
Finally, there is one more basic objection raised by post-anarchists, which 
presents “classical” anarchists as monolithic, as far as their conception of social 
change is concerned. Although Todd May admits that anarchism (in whole) denies the 
existence “of a central hinge about which political change could or should revolve,”106 
he argues that the central weakness of “classical” anarchism is that power and 
oppression are reduced to one single operation - (the state) – whereas they should also 
apply to fields like the struggle against racism, misogyny, homosexuality etc. Once 
again post-anarchists miss the action of two prominent anarchists, Emma Goldman 
and Federica Montseny who, as noted in the beginning of this part, were both 
influenced by Nietzsche and because of this influence were able to develop their 
campaign against sexual and gender discrimination. 
Moreover, in “Fields of Vision: Kropotkin and Revolutionary Change”, Ruth 
Kinna repels effectively the post-anarchist “accusations” that “classical” anarchism 
identifies one single way for change (revolution) against one single opponent (the 
state). She does this by bringing forth Kropotkin’s critique against syndicalists for 
their belief in the emancipative sufficiency of the abolition of economic exploitation107 
and by explaining what he meant by the term “revolution”. According to Kropotkin, 
revolution is not a single event that will take us to the realization of utopia but a 
complex and dynamic movement, an ongoing project dependent on the initiative and 
the will of individuals.108 Additionally, Kropotkin describes the possible parameters 
within which individuals and groups may act without giving a certain model of an 
anarchist utopia,109 similarly to Bakunin and Landauer who avoid giving a final form 
                                                        
104 Sam Haraway, “Kropotkin, Power and the State”, http://www.anarchiststudies.org/node/481 
(accessed on 29/12/2011). 
105 Eduardo Colombo, “Anarchisme, Obligation Sociale et Devoir d’ obeisance”, Refractions, No2, 
1998. 
106 Poststructuralist Anarchism: An Interview of Todd May. 
107 Kinna, “Fields of Vision: Kropotkin and Revolutionary Change”, p. 81. 
108 Kinna, “Fields of Vision: Kropotkin and Revolutionary Change”, p. 82. 
109 Kinna, “Fields of Vision: Kropotkin and Revolutionary Change”, p. 70. 
 
 
 
 
96
of a new anarchist reality.110 Consequently, “classical” anarchism’s anti-statism is not 
the basic principle that gives birth to the rejection of authority, hierarchy and 
representation, but is the rejection of all these that leads us to anti-statism.111 Hence, it 
is this dynamical change and immanent diversity in Kropotkin’s thought – that 
reminds us of the anti-static, Heraclitian, stance of Nietzsche concerning life and the 
project of becoming – which can bridge the gap between “classical” and “post” 
anarchism.  
 So, what is post-anarchism in the end? For Evren, it is an anarchism that goes 
beyond the limits of a Eurocentric approach and embraces not only political theory and 
action but art as well.112 For Benjamin Franks, the fact that post-anarchists cannot 
escape the supremacy to particular types of action or the overlooking of particular 
types of oppression shows that they represent specific practices of groups that are 
placed in a limited historical context. For this reason, post-anarchism does not go 
beyond “classical” anarchism, its principles and arguments do not differ from 
“classical” anarchism, on the contrary, they are part of it. Post-anarchism is a 
component of “classical” anarchism in the same way green anarchism is.113 
In summation, what I tried to show in this chapter is that the post-anarchist 
critique of “classical” anarchism is based on a Nietzschean perspective that, 
nevertheless, had already been absorbed by thinkers like Goldman and Landauer who 
both belong to the “classical” anarchist context. We can overcome this contradiction 
only if we acknowledge the, after all, diachronic influence of Nietzsche on the 
anarchists – precisely because of the compatibility between their principles – and the 
utility of the German philosopher as a tool of self-determination and continuous self-
criticism on the part of the anarchists of all trends. 
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C.2/ Anarchism in Nietzsche 
It is interesting that all three periods of Nietzsche’s thought, as implied in chapter 
B.5.1, reflect basic anarchist ideas and that, regardless of the evolution and 
development of his thought, “anarchism in Nietzsche” is apparent in all his writings. It 
is true that although some anarchists found an affinity with Nietzsche’s philosophy, 
his severe critique of anarchism and socialism did not seem to leave enough space for 
the blossoming of a reverse affinity. Yet although he did not seem to be influenced at 
all by contemporary anarchists (in the way the anarchists of the previous chapter were 
influenced by him) the key outcomes and theses of his philosophy can be found in the 
essays of prominent anarchists and libertarians like Mikhail Bakunin, Peter Kropotkin, 
Errico Malatesta and Walter Benjamin. This a posteriori detection corresponds to the 
first degree of elective affinity, mentioned in section B.1 – the simple affinity – whose 
potential evolution to an active interaction depends on certain historical and political 
circumstances that for Nietzsche, who in the face of mass political movements saw the 
threat of a herd soaked with resentment, did not, nevertheless, seem to be at all 
sufficient. 
The presentation of “anarchism in Nietzsche” will, more or less, follow the 
structural analysis of chapter B.4. The interconnection of Nietzschean concepts 
illustrated there, will be the guide for pointing out that Nietzschean basic theses are 
also an integral part of anarchist thought.  
Using genealogy as the starting point here also, I will show its relation with the 
anarchist genealogical method. Moreover, it is through this method that Nietzsche 
unveils the origin of resentment, which he attributes to the anarchists. By using 
Nietzsche’s approach and taking into consideration how anarchists view themselves 
we can understand why he was wrong about this accusation. 
I will then move on to perspectivism and its dealing with truth, knowledge and 
ontology. A presentation of prominent anarchists dealing with these matters will 
designate the elective affinity and by sorting out concepts like master and slave types I 
will explain how Nietzsche’s and Kropotkin’s perspectivism, while seeming to differ 
drastically, are actually very similar. 
Perspectivism is tightly linked to the will to power and the active and reactive 
forces. Anarchists criticise the dividing role of the reactive forces or praise the 
unifying aim of the active ones in a rather Nietzschean way. However, perspectivism 
also opens a window for another critical subject, morality. Here, I will show how both 
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Nietzsche and the anarchists share the same opinion about the nature of good and evil 
and the creation of an objective code of ethics. 
Finally comes nihilism, and having presented the common positive points 
Nietzsche and the anarchists find in it, and especially in the death or the inexistence of 
God, I explain why anarchist nihilism does not stem from the negative nihilism of 
Western culture, as Nietzsche thought, but is of the same type as the affirmative 
Dionysian nihilism Nietzsche admires, the one that works as a transvaluator of values. 
The method through which Nietzsche approaches history leads him to the 
several crucial points unfolded here. This practice is “genealogy” and is common 
between the German philosopher and the anarchists. 
 Genealogy serves one main goal, to reveal the secret origin of the dogmatic 
approaches that insist on being taken for granted, as eternal truths. It reveals not only 
the origin but also the mechanism that tries to hide it. It is an attack on truth, 
knowledge and ontology. Morality, for example, is such a dogmatic approach.1 
Kropotkin makes use of the same practice in works like Ethics: Origin and 
Development, Anarchist Morality, Law and Authority, Organized Vengeance Called 
“Justice” and The State: Its Historic Role. In Anarchist Communism: Its Basis and 
Principles he gives an idea of this practice: 
 
As to the method followed by the anarchist thinker, it entirely differs from that 
followed by the utopists. The anarchist thinker does not resort to metaphysical 
conceptions (like ‘natural rights’, the ‘duties of the State’, and so on)…He 
studies human society as it is now and was in the past; and without either 
endowing humanity as a whole, or separate individuals, with superior qualities 
which they do not possess, he merely considers society as an aggregation of 
organisms….2 
 
 On the Genealogy of Morals is, of course, a representative example of this 
practice. With this work, Nietzsche attempts to locate and explain the procedure that 
gave the words “good”, “bad”, “beautiful” and “ugly” the meanings they have in 
today’s moral context. Moreover, he explains the formation of what he calls bad 
conscience, which nourishes the feeling of resentment, but in order to accomplish this 
                                                        
1 Nehamas, pp. 32-33. 
2 Kropotkin, “Anarchist Communism: Its Basis and Principles” in Baldwin, p. 47. 
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he deals with all types of culture and basic institutions of Western civilization. More 
specifically, Nietzsche claims that culture is the training process that will control 
man’s forces by preserving and refreshing the active and by activating the reactive 
ones. Thus, he distinguishes three types of culture, the prehistoric, the historic and the 
post-historic one.  
 In the first type Nietzsche acknowledges those features that make the 
connections “responsibility-debt” and “creditor-debtor” discharging, pedagogical and 
emancipating. The act of punishment is independent of any presupposition regarding 
freedom of the will. Criminals are not punished as being responsible for their deeds 
but as a way for the ones wronged to express their wrath against the wrongdoer. But 
even this rage is somehow controlled by the idea that every injury has its equivalent 
and can be paid back even through the pain of the one that caused it. For Nietzsche, 
this idea derives from a contractual relationship between a creditor and a debtor.3 The 
debtor, in order to be trusted for repaying, makes a contract with the creditor declaring 
that if he fails to pay back he will give something else he possesses as a refund, his 
body, his wife or even his life. This alternative equivalent consists in the satisfaction 
the wronged one gets, by freely exercising his power on the wrongdoer, instead of 
seeking compensation through money or property: offsetting damage with pain.4 
Moreover, the debtor conceives the punishment as the ransom that will free him from 
his wrongdoing and his unfaithfulness. This liberation/redemption offered by 
prehistoric culture leads to its product, the man who is responsible for his reactive 
forces (responsibility-debt) and goes on activating them, the man who becomes able 
to promise – meaning to look not into the past but into the future – to transform 
himself into a legislator and go beyond every morality, to the post-historic culture.5 
 Here, the dipole “responsibility-debt” no longer exists, after playing its 
pedagogical role by liberating the creditor and the debtor as well – the former because 
he is part of the right of the masters, and the latter for giving a compensation even if 
the price is his flesh or his pain.6 
 Nevertheless, in the second cultural type, the historic culture, Nietzsche admits 
the prevalence of the reactive forces. The new formed societies represent a culture 
that, through mechanisms like the state and the Church, produces the tame and 
                                                        
3 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, second essay, §4. 
4 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, second essay, §5. 
5 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, second essay, §2. 
6 Deleuze, p. 137. 
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submissive man, not a legislator but a tributary.7 The dipole of “responsibility-debt” 
turns into “responsibility-guilt”. The creditor is the state or/and the Church, and the 
debtor is the one that violates their laws. Now, the punishment does not occur as 
redemption and emancipation but as a means of threat and revenge for those that do 
not comply with the dominant laws. The objective of such a culture is not to liberate 
but to maintain obedience through the creation and multiplication of feelings that 
express guilt and fear.8   
 In the Organized Vengeance Called “Justice”, Peter Kropotkin studies the 
idea of justice and penalty in primitive clans, and societies of the Middle Ages and the 
nineteenth century. His analysis is not that pervasive as Nietzsche’s but his 
conclusions are of the same gravity: primitive tribes knew no judge. In the case of an 
injury, justice would be applied not in terms of vengeance but of a redemptive, 
discharging pay-back: the pain of the wrongdoer offsets the damage or the insult.9  
Later on, the idea of compensation is developed replacing the “an eye for an 
eye, a tooth for a tooth” principle. Now, the “responsibility-debt” dipole discharges 
itself through a material equivalent that will still enable the wrongdoer to 
acknowledge the injury he has caused and to make amends, and the injured one to 
express his wrath once and for all.10 
But with the institutional emergence of the Church and the state, the idea of 
compensation to the wronged one and of redemption to the wrongdoer subsides 
increasingly in favour of the fine. This is how the idea of punishment is born and how 
the debt is turned into guilt. From now on, “an injury to a priest is no longer an injury 
to a man, it is an injury to the divinity, and no punishment is severe enough to chastise 
such a crime”.11 So, for Kropotkin the idea of justice has totally changed through 
time. Its concept, which once served the restoration of human relationships through 
compensation and redemption, has shifted towards an apparatus of the Church and the 
state in order to preserve a negative human type similar to the product of Nietzsche’s 
historical culture. Moreover, in paragraph 14, part 2, of On the Genealogy of Morals, 
Nietzsche’s views on the “utility” of penalty and imprisonment coincide with those of 
                                                        
7 Deleuze, p. 138. 
8 Deleuze,, p. 141. 
9 Peter Kropotkin, Organized Vengeance Called “Justice”, The Anarchist Library, 
http://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/petr-kropotkin-organised-vengeance-called-justice, p. 2 (accessed 
on 2/12/2012). 
10 Kropotkin, Organized Vengeance Called “Justice”,p. 2. 
11 Kropotkin, Organized Vengeance Called “Justice”, p. 3. 
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Kropotkin in Prisons and Their Moral Influence on Prisoners and of Leo Tolstoy in 
Resurrection: Penalty hardens and isolates. It humiliates and devastates will without 
awaking feelings of sinfulness. 
At this point Nietzsche notes that, contrarily to many socialists, justice does 
not originate from resentment or vengeance. It is not a punishing reaction.12 Bad 
conscience and resentment flourish when the repayable debt to an equal becomes the 
non-payable debt to divinity, society or the state. It is when 
 
the aim [now] is to preclude pessimistically, once and for all, the prospect of a 
final discharge;… the aim now is to turn back the concepts ‘guilt’ and ‘duty’ – 
back against whom? There can be no doubt: against the ‘debtor’ first of all… 
Finally, however, they are turned back against the ‘creditor’, too.13 
 
Is it possible for anarchists to escape the resentment attributed to them by 
Nietzsche, according to the above description? The answer is affirmative and can be 
given on two levels, theoretical and practical: 
Theoretically speaking, the concise approach of Kropotkin in the Organized 
Vengeance Called “Justice”, together with his more analytical discussion in Prisons 
and Their Moral Influence on Prisoners, shows that (anarchistic) justice has nothing 
to do with revenge but with compensation and restoration. The classification of the 
term “justice” is the same Nietzsche makes: we have the justice that redeems and 
liberates, and the justice that enslaves. Both types follow similar paths in both 
thinkers, especially the negative one that belongs to institutions like the state and the 
Church. 
Practically speaking, what Nietzsche viewed as socialist/anarchist justice was 
a “slave morality”, meaning a heterogeneous determination as a result of denying 
everything the “master morality” expresses. Of course, for Nietzsche this is an excuse. 
They deny everything they do not have but would love to, they spread their 
revolutionary ideas aiming at becoming masters in masters’ place, not to abolish 
human exploitation but to, at last, taste themselves the pleasure that is offered by the 
abuse of the others.14 Hence, resentment and bad conscience are two basic anarchist 
                                                        
12 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, second essay, §6. 
13 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, second essay, §21. 
14 Periklis Vallianos, Συνείδηση, Γλώσσα και Ιστορική Ζωή [Conscience, Language and Historical 
Life], Πορεία, Αθήνα 2002, p. 272.  
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features, according to Nietzsche.15 Indeed, the German philosopher may have been 
vindicated in the case of the USSR but libertarian ventures such as the Paris commune 
(1871) or the beginning of the Spanish revolution (1936) clearly show that Nietzsche 
rushed to reach his conclusions. For the practices of these ventures aimed at the 
formation of a master type not as reactive vengeance but as a creative burst of will. 
Anarchists never sought to replace the bourgeois state with an anarchist one, they did 
not even dream, like Marxists did, of a proletarian dictatorship, that is, they never 
longed for tasting the pleasure offered by the oppression of others. Thus, when 
Nietzsche applied broadly the dipole “responsibility-debt” on the anarchist circles, he 
made two serious mistakes. 
The first mistake is that this application positioned anarchists on the side of 
the debtors. In a way, anarchists never regarded themselves as debtors but as 
creditors. It was every dominant social class (the “aristocrats”, the “kings”, the 
bourgeois) that had always caused the injuries and, for that reason, were the debtors in 
the eyes of the anarchists. So, it was they that had to make amends by paying a 
redemptive price.  
The second mistake is that this dipole was presented as “responsibility-guilt”. 
But as said above, apart from the fact that anarchists have never adopted the role of 
the debtor, they have also never considered this debt to be eternally reproduced and, 
thus, unpaid. Their cause and the compatible means they choose for it – direct action, 
voluntarism, anti-deterministic worldview – (again unlike some Marxists), give the 
chance for the emancipative discharge Nietzsche and Kropotkin discussed in On the 
Genealogy of Morals and Organized Vengeance Called “Justice”. Hence, despite the 
fact that many anarchist discourses partially justify Nietzsche when speaking of 
revenge, the formation of “bad conscience” and its seed, resentment, cannot fit with 
the anarchist “master morality” once we recall the vision of the anarchist society and, 
especially, the compatible means towards it. 
 As said before, genealogy seeks to undermine the ideas of unity and identity of 
everything in the world by attacking ontology. It allows plenty of alternative options 
without discovering or imposing, once and for all, a presupposed reality. That is 
because it is based on the indeterminate vision of the world, provided by the will to 
power16 and its perceptional realization, that is, perspectivism. 
                                                        
15 Nietzsche, The Antichrist, aphorism 57. 
16 Nehamas, p. 104. 
 
 
 
 
103 
Perspectivism should be distinguished from relativism, a position that 
considers all views to be of the same value. In perspectivism, each individual's view is 
understood to be the best possible for the individual but it does not imply that it is 
suitable for anybody else.17 Nietzschean “free spirits” are well aware of the fact that all 
interpretations stem from certain values. The trick is to remember that all things 
currently taken for granted are nothing but the product of earlier subjective 
interpretations and values;18 to forget this can easily lead to absolutism. The 
uniqueness of “free spirits” lies in the fact that although, in a specific space-time, they 
may treat their views as absolute, they never forget that these interpretations are vital 
only to themselves. They know that others probably would not bear them and this 
awareness keeps them from even thinking of imposing their way of life on other 
people.19 The realisation of such worldviews is a personal, self-affirmative, matter and 
rejects any universal value or demand. 
Nonetheless, the belief that everything is nothing but interpretation, an active 
giving of subjective meaning to the neutral phenomena, does not mean that “free 
spirits” cannot produce new ideas and values.20 On the contrary, interpretation for 
Nietzsche is a personal and creative project, an expression of specific interests and 
values21 beyond what it is called “objectivity”. Nietzsche flirts with the idea that our 
categories of thought do not respond to a real world but enable us to invent and create 
a world to which we can refer in empirical terms.22 
Nietzschean perspectivism has a lot in common with anarchist perspectivism as 
expressed by prominent anarchist thinkers throughout the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. Mikhail Bakunin and Errico Malatesta attacked metaphysics in an effort to 
unveil the forgotten origin of dominant theories that were taken for granted and, 
moreover, to reject its absolute and despotic nature. In particular, Malatesta attributes 
the popular feeling that government and state have an ontological existence 
characterized by given properties of logic and justice, to a metaphysical process of 
abstraction which reaches the conclusion that the State has always been the main 
representative of the common good.23 
                                                        
17 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, aphorism 606 and Nehamas, pp. 72-73. 
18 Nehamas, pp. 5-6. 
19 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, aphorism 542 and Nehamas, p. 70. 
20 Nehamas, p. 5. 
21 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, aphorism 767 and Nehamas, pp. 64-65. 
22 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, aphorism 514 and Ansell-Pearson, How to Read Nietzsche, p. 44. 
23 Errico Malatesta, Anarchy, The Anarchist Library http://theanarchistlibrary.org/library /errico-
malatesta-anarchy, p. 6 (accessed on 2/12/2012). 
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 Additionally, Bakunin clearly states that there is no road leading from 
metaphysics to the truths of life. He opposes positivists and the so-called Hegelians 
who have created an ideal type of social organization that they try to impose on the 
rest of society as a sole truth.24 And he goes on to say that for anarchists, social and 
physical life always come before theory. According to this perspective, anarchists do 
not intend, or even wish, to impose their plans on others.25 
 Kropotkin holds the same opinion when saying that every piece of advice is 
worthy only if it is regarded as such and accepted by the person that receives it. For 
him, the only thing we can do, concerning ethical matters, is to say “follow it if it 
seems good to you”.26 However, what he adds is of the same quality with Nietzsche’s 
anti-relativistic perspectivism: the fact that everyone has the right to act as they wish 
does not mean that we deny our loving or hating something that seems to be, 
accordingly, good or bad.27  
What one could highlight here is the different objective that Nietzsche’s and 
Kropotkin’s perspectivism seem to have. For Kropotkin what is good or bad depends 
on whether it is useful or harmful to society.28 On the contrary, for Nietzsche good or 
bad has nothing to do with the interest of the majority but with the emergence and 
prosperity of an aristocracy. This seemingly fundamental difference is due to the, 
partially understandable but also phobic, stance Nietzsche preserved towards the 
masses – or what he called “the herd” – for their tendency to equalisation. 
Nevertheless, this gap can be bridged if we take a thorough look at what Nietzsche 
means by the term “aristocracy” and the possible application this aristocratic ideal has 
on a social scale. My point here is that Nietzsche’s and Kropotkin’s perspectivism are 
of the same kind not only because of the absence of any imposition on others but also 
for their social targeting. 
In part nine of Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche answers the question “what is 
noble?” In a rather provocative and seemingly incompatible way with the anarchist 
ideals, he says that the elevation of the “man” type has always been the work of an 
aristocratic society based on a long scale of hierarchy and on slavery.29 Hence, he 
adds, the fundamental faith of an aristocracy should be that society must exist not for 
                                                        
24 Mikhail Bakunin, “Critique of the Marxist Theory of the State” in Dolgoff, p. 325. 
25 Bakunin, “Critique of the Marxist Theory of the State”, p. 328. 
26 Kropotkin, “Anarchist Morality”, p. 103. 
27 Kropotkin, “Anarchist Morality”, p. 103. 
28 Kropotkin, “Anarchist Morality”, p. 91. 
29 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, aphorism 257. 
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the sake of society but for the sake of a select species.30 What affinity can one find 
between this statement and the anarchist conception of a free society? Let us follow 
the unpacking of Nietzsche’s thought, through his own way in this part of his book. 
Nietzsche starts with a very important clarification. The superiority of the 
aristocrats has nothing to do with physical strength but is relative to their psychic 
strength.31 Thus, we cannot speak of a violent imposition on others, nor of 
“exploitation” in the sense this term has in a corrupted, imperfect society. Nietzsche’s 
definition for “exploitation” is the essence of human relationships, the human 
relationships themselves. For he acknowledges that these interactions always bear 
mutual injury, mutual exploitation, just because the agents are living creatures and 
their need consists in controlling their environment.32 But are these the only 
characteristics of human relationships? Before giving his answer, Nietzsche reminds 
us of the two basic types of man. The master and the slave. According to this 
distinction the masters are the ones who affirm themselves through realizing and 
welcoming their differences with others, while the slaves are the ones who 
underestimate themselves, who let others abuse them, who are petty and think only of 
narrow utility.33 Therefore, exploitation in a conscious and passive way is rejectable 
for Nietzsche and has nothing to do with the “exploitation” that comes with a living 
and active relationship.  
Moreover, the greatness of the master type lies in one’s feeling of plenitude, 
the overflow of a wealth that seeks to be given away as a present to others. This 
greatness means that the noble person will help those in need but, like anarchists, not 
because of pity, but of an inner need to do so and to avoid “a pain of which only those 
who have felt it know the intensity”34 since “what harms me is harmful in itself”.35 It 
is the result of the same radical definition of egoism Kropotkin makes in Anarchist 
Morality. This egoism will finally make the noble soul accept and welcome the fact 
that there are also others equal to it. It will then start living among these free and self-
affirmative equals, showing them the same respect it shows itself. This co-existence 
will mean the conceding of rights through a process of self-limitation. The noble soul 
is eager, ready and capable of giving and taking. This is why, in the end, Nietzschean 
                                                        
30 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, aphorism 258. 
31 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, aphorism 257. 
32 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, aphorism 258. 
33 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, aphorism 260. 
34 Kropotkin, “Anarchist Morality”, p. 87. 
35 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, aphorism 260. 
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and anarchist perspectivisms are of the same libertarian quality and potentially of a 
same social goal. Despite the historical importance of their difference – meaning the 
gradual development of the socialist and individualist tendencies within anarchism – it 
should be noted that an anarcho-communist social vision is the vision of master – and 
not slave – individuals, thus, a commune of aristocrats, in the way Nietzsche uses the 
term “aristocrat”.  
 Another meeting point between Nietzschean and anarchist perspectivism is the 
nature of the outside world. Nietzsche does not deny the existence of the external 
world but he rejects the concept of a pre-given world, a world in itself. Without 
interpretation there is no world, because the interpretation process is inescapable.36 He 
attacks modern science for its metaphysical character, since it turns mere observations 
and interpretations into natural laws, supposed to be revealing the true essence of the 
world.37 The universe is not constructed to an end and there are no laws in nature, only 
necessities. No one commands and no one obeys, so no one transgresses.38 “The 
antithesis of the apparent world and the true world is reduced to the antithesis ‘world’ 
and ‘nothing’”.39   
Like Nietzsche, Kropotkin questions the opinion that our perception of the world 
is a true image, rather than an interpretation: 
 
What used to be called ‘natural law’ is nothing but a certain relation among 
phenomena which we dimly see, and each ‘law’ takes a temporary character of 
causality… no law placed outside the phenomena: each phenomenon governs 
that which follows it – not law… Nothing preconceived in what we call harmony 
in Nature. The chance of collisions and encounters has sufficed to establish it.40  
 
This opinion is more clearly stated by Bakunin when arguing that natural laws are 
expressed as ideal or abstract laws only through the human spirit and are reproduced 
by our brain after monitoring the phenomena. Before this, these laws existed only as 
natural processes and, hence, the term “Nature” rejects every mystical and 
                                                        
36 Christoph Cox, Nietzsche: Naturalism and Interpretation, University of California Press, 1999, p. 
161. 
37 Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, third essay, §24. 
38 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2008, book three, 
aphorism 109. 
39 Nietzsche, The Will To Power, aphorism 567. 
40 Peter Kropotkin, “Anarchism: Its Philosophy and Ideal” in Baldwin, p. 120. 
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metaphysical idea of an Essence or a Final Cause.41 Nature itself knows no laws.42 
When obeying these laws what humans are really doing is obeying their own 
thoughts, but as Nietzschean “free spirits” – whose awareness of the fact that 
everything is just interpretation does not seem to stop them from creating new ideas 
and values – Bakunin also acknowledges that after having absorbed these laws with 
their spirit, humans overcome the pressure of the outside world. While becoming 
creators themselves, obeying – from now on – their own ideas only, they are, more or 
less, transforming this outside world according to their progressive needs.43 This way, 
Nietzschean “free spirits” and anarchists give the world the meaning it lacks. 
The campaign against ontology also implies the questioning of truth and of 
homogeneity of the self. Nietzsche suggests that there is a very close connection 
between the belief that truth is something to be discovered and the belief that the self 
is a stable entity. On the contrary, he thinks of truth as something to be created and of 
the self as something that can become what it is.44 This means that the self can 
become a construction that connects coherently several conflicting tendencies and 
harmonizes desires and deeds.45 Hence, the body has no fixed identity but it is rather 
the will to power that affects it and changes it.46 
 For anarchists, and especially Kropotkin,  
 
quite recently the psychologist spoke of man as an entire being,  one and 
indivisible…Even with materialists of the eighteenth century, the idea of a soul, 
of an indivisible entity, was still upheld…The modern psychologist sees in a 
man a multitude of separate faculties…Taken as a whole, man is nothing but a 
resultant, always changeable….47 
 
Additionally, as far as truth and knowledge are concerned, there is a very 
interesting parallelism between philosophy and political practices: Nietzsche’s main 
objection to Kant has to do with the fact that the latter limited his thought to a critique 
of the methods leading to knowledge and truth without daring to expand this critique 
                                                        
41 G. P. Maximov (ed.), Mιχαήλ Μπακούνιν: Φιλοσοφία, Θρησκεία, Ηθική, Πανοπτικόν, Θεσσαλονίκη 
2006, [Mikhail Bakunin: Philosophy, Religion, Ethics], p. 19. 
42 Maximov, p. 22. 
43 Maximov, pp. 73, 74. 
44 Nehamas, pp. 173-74. 
45 Nehamas, p. 7. 
46 Ansell-Pearson, How to Read Nietzsche, p. 46. 
47 Kropotkin, “Anarchism: Its Philosophy and Ideal”, p. 119. 
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to knowledge and truth themselves. “Thus total critique turns into the politics of 
compromise”.48 
Accordingly, anarchists are the “Nietzschean response” to the reformist – 
Kantian type – critique of the contemporary political system, made by the Left and the 
Social Democrats. Because, unlike them, anarchists call neither for a political 
transformation (embellishment of capitalism), nor for a political revolution 
(participation in elections in order to subvert the political scene). Their goal is a social 
change from below which constitutes a holistic critique of the political system and of 
parliamentary democracy itself. 
As mentioned above, Nietzsche’s perspectivism – the process of interpretation 
and giving meaning to a meaningless world – is a product of the “will to power”. 
According to Nehamas’ reading of the twelfth aphorism in the second essay On the 
Genealogy of Morals “the will to power manifests itself in offering 
reinterpretations”.49 In this way, will to power plays a central role in the project of 
perspectivism. 
Gilles Deleuze, in Nietzsche and Philosophy, describes the type of relationship 
between active and reactive forces (one commanding and the other obeying) as the 
result of the relationship between the respective wills.50 An active force is the one that 
seeks to appropriate, create and transform. On the other hand, a reactive force tends to 
disintegrate and split. It denies its capabilities; it is not self-affirmative like the active 
force.51 So, for Nietzsche, a force is considered to express a master’s will if it is 
positive and life-affirmative. Otherwise, if negative and life-denying, the will is 
regarded as a slave’s will, where “master” and “slave” see the exceptional, aristocratic 
spirits and the egalitarian herd-masses, respectively.  
A similar sketch of forces (strengths) is given to us by Kropotkin when he 
rejects the security and timidity of a just equality that reactive and negative forces 
propose, in favour of an active, creative and transforming life: 
 
if you are not conscious of strength within you, if your energies are only just 
sufficient to maintain a colorless, monotonous life, without strong impressions, 
without deep joys, but also without deep sorrows, well then, keep to the simple 
                                                        
48 Deleuze, p. 89. 
49 Nehamas, p. 97. 
50 Deleuze, p. 63. 
51 Deleuze, p. 42. 
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principles of a just equality…But if you feel within you the strength of youth, if 
you wish to live, or you wish to enjoy a perfect, full and overflowing life…be 
strong, be great, be vigorous in all you do…Sow life around you. Take heed that 
if you deceive, lie, intrigue, cheat, you thereby demean yourself, belittle 
yourself, confess your own weakness beforehand, play the part of the slave of 
the harem who feels himself the inferior of his master…Do not blame humanity 
if of your own accord you thus paralyze your energies.52 
 
In part two of Thus Spoke Zarathustra and particularly in the section titled “Of 
Self-Overcoming”, Nietzsche addresses some of the main characteristics of will to 
power. And although he originally describes it as a flow of energy that seems to 
compliment life, either by interpreting, creating, commanding or serving, it results in 
the  secret of life that can even overcome it: 
 
I would rather perish than renounce this one thing; and truly, where there is 
perishing and the falling of leaves, behold, there life sacrifices itself – for the 
sake of power!...Only were life is, there is also will: not will to life, but – so I 
teach you – will to power!.53 
 
When Kropotkin speaks of courage and self-negation he surely puts both on the 
more ethical basis of the “duty”, a term that Nietzsche would rather reject (though        
he wouldn’t reject its content). However, it is very interesting to see where Kropotkin 
attributes these feelings to. They stem from this very sense of power, from the 
overflowing of life. But at the same time 
 
the condition of the maintenance of life is its expansion. ‘The plant cannot 
prevent itself form flowering. Sometimes to flower means to die. Never mind, 
the sap mounts the same’. It is the same with the human being when he is full of 
force and energy. Force accumulates in him. He expands his life. He gives 
without calculation, otherwise he could not live. If he must die like the flower 
when it blooms, never mind. The sap rises, if sap there be. Be strong. Overflow 
with emotional and intellectual energy, and you will spread your intelligence, 
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your love, your energy of action broadcast among others!54 
 
Another interesting Nietzschean consideration concerning will to power is his 
denial of the notion of the free55 or unfree will. For him, “it is only a matter of strong 
and weak wills”,56 and as Nehamas stresses, by referring to the usual appropriation – 
on the part of Nietzsche – of traditional concepts for his own purposes, a strong will, 
finally, leads to a free will.  “Free will” here does not mean the absence of causal 
determination but the above coordination and harmony between all preferences of a 
person57, the ability “to act according to our preferred judgment”.58  
This “preferred judgment” is, for Kropotkin, a “conceived ideal” according to 
which the person is called to act. If we are untrue to this ideal our active energy and 
our will ends up being paralyzed. Once wavering between our various inner 
tendencies, we will definitely break the harmony of the organism. We can only 
become complete, strong and vigorous when our acts are in accordance with our 
ideal.59 
Bakunin, also, refers to the process of strengthening one’s will, in the case of a 
child. The “preferred judgment”, the “conceived ideal”, here it is a dominant goal, 
whether good or bad, by which all willed movements of the body, every thought and 
action, will be conquered.60 
Returning to the concept of “perspectivism,” we have to keep in mind that the 
argument that everything is interpretation is, above all, an active force giving meaning 
to phenomena. Thus, perspectivism becomes the presupposition of the link between 
this meaning and morality, the knowledge of good and evil. Zarathustra makes it plain 
when saying that only the one who gives the earth its meaning, only the creator, is in a 
position to tell good from evil.61 
Nietzsche is often misunderstood for his views of morality as he is considered to 
praise all the practices that we, today, regard as immoral, but what Nietzsche promotes 
is not a reversal but a transvaluation of all existing values. He denies both morality and 
immorality but not the fact that many actions called immoral should be resisted or 
                                                        
54 Kropotkin, “Anarchist Morality”, p. 109. 
55 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, aphorism 110. 
56 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, aphorism 21 and The Will to Power, aphorism 46. 
57 Nehamas, p. 187. 
58 Nehamas, p. 186. 
59 Kropotkin, “Anarchist Morality”, pp. 111-12. 
60 Maximov, p. 77. 
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others that called moral must be encouraged. It is the actual argument that moral 
judgments are based on truths that Nietzsche rejects62 and this argument sketches one 
of the clearest differences between slave and master morality: the former seeks to 
compromise everyone with a single code of behavior, invoking its divine origin, 
whereas the latter does not even think about such an option.63 
Anarchists have also been misunderstood, mainly by every conservative political 
tendency, in the same way as Nietzsche. Their uncompromising attack on the 
foundations of dominant morality was distorted and presented as an ode to chaos and 
immorality. Yet, what anarchists reject is not morality itself but the prejudice that 
gives birth to an idea of a perennial, true and absolute morality that seeks to impose its 
principles on humanity in order to secure the interests of the ruling class.64 
Both, Nietzsche and the anarchists, express their critique by uttering some basic 
observations: “My purpose: to demonstrate the absolute homogeneity of all events and 
the application of moral distinctions as conditioned by perspective”.65 For Alexander 
Nehamas this practically means that Nietzsche denies the capability of demarcating 
good from evil.66 Similarly, Kropotkin states that when we send away both the angel 
and the devil we will not be able to say whether an action is good or evil, because 
there is no other way for us to judge it.67 Nevertheless, as said above about Nietzsche, 
the one who answers to their physical need to create, “who gives earth its meaning”, is 
capable of making this (personal) distinction. Similarly, anarchists have nothing to do 
but obey their physical need, act without addressing either the devil or the angel, and 
detest whatever they consider evil.68 
In aphorism 292 of The Will to Power, Nietzsche exposes the procedure of 
creating an objective code of ethics. The first and critical step is to separate an action 
from its agent. The second step is to regard this action as an entity and, thus, evaluate 
it separately from the agent. For Nietzsche, a force and its effect are interdependent. 
Through slave morality, and the invention of the soul, the force separates from its 
effect. What, indeed, took place was a reversal: whereas master morality was based on 
the will (no matter what the effect was), slave morality is codified in accordance with 
                                                        
62 Nietzsche, Daybreak, aphorism 103. 
63 Nehamas, p. 126. 
64 Kropotkin, “Anarchist Morality”, p. 80. 
65 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, aphorism 272. 
66 Nehamas, p. 211. 
67 Peter Kropotkin, La Morale Anarchiste, http://kropot.free.fr/morale-anar.htm, chapter III, §12 
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the effect, hence, blocking the will to power.  
This abstractive type of the procedure – also condemned as such by Malatesta69 
– creates the belief that there are actions good or bad in themselves. But for Nietzsche, 
an action in itself is of no value, it all depends on the agent, their intentions and the 
action’s impression/effect on others.70 The same view is held by Kropotkin in 
Anarchist Morality, mainly when speaking of Sofia Petrovskaya and the assassination 
of Alexander II of Russia. Regardless of the action’s usefulness, says Kropotkin, it 
was her intention – not to gain power, not to impose a new tyranny but to express her 
abhorrence for the Czar’s power – that made her “conquer the right to kill”. Without 
this right’s conquest, which had to do neither with the action itself nor with its 
usefulness, her act would be regarded as a crime.71 
This separation of one action from its agent, in combination with Kropotkin’s 
discussion of Petrovskaya, also applies to another aspect of anarchist morality, which 
is violence. A significant debate has been taking place within anarchist circles – and 
not only in these – even since the time of Kropotkin and Malatesta. It is very 
interesting that both hold the same opinion as Nietzsche when they try to distinguish 
repressive from liberationist violence. For Kropotkin, 
 
mankind has never refused the right to use force on those who have conquered 
that right…Without this, such an act whether useful or not will remain merely a 
brutal fact…People will see in it nothing but a displacement of force, simply the 
substitution of one exploiter for another.72 
 
Malatesta follows the same path in a series of articles,73 trying to clarify this 
distinction. He says that violence cannot be always considered good when we use it 
and evil whenever used by our enemies. Its approval, or not, depends on who 
practices it and for what reason.74 Therefore, we can never argue that violence is good 
or evil per se because there is no objective criterion, but instead a perspectivism that 
                                                        
69 See footnote 154 of this part. 
70 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, aphorism 292. 
71 Kropotkin, “Anarchist Morality”, p. 101. 
72 Kropotkin, “Anarchist Morality”, p. 101. 
73 See “Anarchy and Violence” (published in “Pensiero e Volonta” on 1/9/1924), “The Terror of 
Revolution” (published in “Pensiero e Volonta” on 10/10/1924), “Violence and Morality” (published in 
“Umanita Nova” on 21/10/1922) and the dialogues from Errico Malatesta, At the Café: Conversations 
on Anarchism, Freedom Press, London 2005. 
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decides on every occasion.   
Walter Benjamin does the same thing from a more philosophical, though still 
libertarian, point of view. In Critique of Violence, he separates divine from mythical 
violence based on the difference of quality between the agents (God and myth, 
respectively). Like Nietzsche, Benjamin determines the quality of the effect in relation 
to the quality of the agent: 
 
Just as in all spheres God opposes myth, mythical violence is confronted by the 
divine. And the latter constitutes its antithesis in all respects. If mythical 
violence is lawmaking, divine violence is law-destroying; if the former sets 
boundaries, the latter boundlessly destroys them; if mythical violence brings at 
once guilt and retribution, divine power only expiates; if the former threatens, 
the latter strikes; if the former is bloody, the latter is lethal without spilling 
blood.75 
 
The whole debate of violence within anarchist circles has to do with this 
distinction of the agents but also with the compatibility between the means and the 
ends. This is a position that not only fits with Nietzsche but also separates anarchists 
from the non-anarchist communist position that “the end justifies the means”. 
Malatesta reaches this conclusion by, firstly, describing the anarchist violence. For 
him, true anarchist violence ceases together with the need for defending freedom. It is 
not inspired by hatred but by love, and aims not at replacing existent dominion with an 
anarchist one but at emancipating all.76 Hence, anarchists must never forget that they 
are neither avengers nor vigilantes. Terror, has always served the outrageous plans of 
tyrants either in France (see the French Revolution) or Russia (October Revolution), 
by killing thousands and by distorting the true meaning of such revolutionary efforts. 
For this reason, revolution must develop and defend itself but it must not and cannot 
be defended by using means contradictory to its ends. If our victory meant the erection 
of gallows, then I would prefer to loose, 77 says Malatesta characteristically. The same 
opinion was held by Emma Goldman who ascertained that the slogan of the 
Communist Party in Russia “the end justifies the means” had turned revolutionary 
activity into counter-revolutionary and expressed the need for a social revolution that 
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76 Malatesta, “Anarchy and Violence”. 
 
 
 
 
114 
above all would aim at a fundamental transvaluation of values.78 
These views dovetail with Nietzsche’s warning that “he who fights with 
monsters should look to it that he himself does not become a monster. And when you 
gaze long into an abyss the abyss also gazes into you”,79 but, even more, coincide with 
the Nietzschean view of war. As mentioned in the beginning of part C, for the German 
philosopher, the means of a war cannot be justified by the cause but it is the quality of 
the means that give a cause its justification. Hence, compatibility between means and 
ends is a crucial and distinctive characteristic of anarchist morality, which also 
underlines its connection to the morality of Nietzsche. 
Earlier in this chapter, I gave a first answer to Nietzsche’s accusation of 
anarchists as being resentful. The above approach of the violence affair made by 
anarchists gives a second answer based on the dipole of Nietzschean master and slave 
morality. In his article “Anti-violent yes, Non-violent no”, Andrea Papi develops his 
arguments based on relative articles written by Malatesta. Speaking of the conflict 
between powers, he expresses a true Nietzschean master morality when saying that 
anarchy is mainly distinguished by the future type of society it desires and not by its 
confrontation to the present one. In particular, this opposition is a direct consequence 
of anarchy’s alternative stance towards dominion and not the other way round.80 This 
argument suits the master’s definition of good and evil based on self-determination: 
what is evil for masters is the result of their primary definition of what is good. 
Moreover, he underlines the fact that anarchist revolt has nothing to do with the 
replacement of existing dominion, contrarily to the resentful plans of Bolsheviks, 
Islamists or fascists, but with the deconstruction of every dominant power.81    
 The last part of this section will deal with one of the most serious 
“misunderstandings” between Nietzsche and the anarchists, which – however – is one 
more important feature of anarchism in Nietzsche: that is, nihilism. 
Nihilism is a central concept in Nietzschean philosophy that has been presented 
in several ways in his writings. Its first appearance takes place in The Birth of Tragedy 
where the separation from a primordial unity seems unbearable for humankind. King 
Midas hears from Silenus’ lips that the best thing for humans would be not to have 
                                                                                                                                                               
77 Malatesta, “The Terror of Revolution”. 
78 Marshall, pp. 404-05. 
79 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, aphorism 146. 
80 Andrea Papi, “Antiviolenti sì, Nonviolenti no”, http://www.anarca-bolo.ch/a-rivista/296/19.htm 
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been born. The second best thing: to die soon!82 
Nevertheless, this existential nihilism soon took a more historical and cultural 
turn, concerning the twilight of all values (especially the “Death of God”) in Western 
societies, and Nietzsche’s coping with this problem seems remarkably joyful and 
encouraging. Whereas Paul Ree, a very close friend of his, and Arthur Schopenhauer 
regarded this existential vacuum as a source of despair and pessimism, Nietzsche 
considered it the source of human liberation: 
 
The greatest recent event – that “God is dead”; that the belief in the Christian 
God has become unbelievable – is already starting to cast its first shadow over 
Europe… Indeed, at hearing the news that “the old god is dead”, we 
philosophers and “free spirits” feel illuminated by a new dawn; our heart 
overflows with gratitude, amazement, forebodings, expectation…finally our 
ships may set out again, set out to face any danger; every daring of the lover of 
knowledge is allowed again; the sea, our sea, lies open again; maybe there has 
never been such an “open sea”.83 
 
For Nietzsche, the idea of God was, up to now, the most important obstacle for 
human existence. The world will be free only when it denies this idea. Free spirits are 
determined to live without any avengers or mentors, without throwing their ideas 
before an ultimate power, goodness or wisdom. From now on, they will be like the 
lake that refused to overflow and by forming a dam began rising higher and higher. 
Man will start rising higher and higher once he stops flowing off into a god.84 This is 
also the reason that Nietzsche rejects the notion of free will. It is because Christian 
morality has elevated this notion to the level of its fundamental stone. Theologians 
have invented it in order to make humankind “responsible”, meaning dependent upon 
God and, thus, subject to every guilty, judgment and punishment.85 
Bakunin also shares the same view about free will when saying that this notion 
takes us to the idea of Divine Providence. If people acted spontaneously and in a way 
that was self-defining, beyond every influence coming from the natural and social 
order, then chaos would dominate the entire world and unless it was for the despotic 
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will of the Divine Providence then all these free wills would walk to their doom. That 
is why all those who support the notion of free will cannot help acknowledging the 
existence and action of Divine Providence. For Bakunin, this is the basis for all 
theological and metaphysical teaching.86 
Moreover, in the second chapter of God and State, he, like Nietzsche, relates 
humans’ state of liberty with God’s existence: 
 
If God is, man is a slave; now, man can and must be free; then, God does not 
exist…if God is, he is necessarily the eternal, supreme, absolute master, and, if 
such a master exists, man is a slave…A jealous lover of human liberty, and 
deeming it the absolute condition of all that we admire and respect in humanity, 
I reverse the phrase of Voltaire and say that, if God really existed, it would be 
necessary to abolish him.87 
 
This view of Bakunin conjoins his also nihilistic project of a social revolution, 
as he considers it inevitably instinctive, chaotic and destructive. The masses are then 
ready to express a negative pathos for destruction. Bakunin acknowledges that 
although revolution would be impossible without this pathos, it is insufficient for the 
heights of the revolutionary goal. Revolution needs an extended and fertile 
destruction, for this is the only way to give birth to a new world.88 
The fertile destruction of Bakunin is nothing but the active nihilism of 
Nietzsche. According to Michael Gillespie, passive nihilism is a kind of self-
resignation in a world without God. On the other hand, active nihilism seeks to 
eliminate everything meaningless in order to purify humanity.89 
This active nihilism seems more attractive to Nietzsche, and for Gillespie, it 
coincides with the Russian nihilism but although it lays the ground for a new creation, 
it is also a way of negation. Hence, both passive and active nihilisms must be 
distinguished from the Dionysian affirmative stance. The Dionysian human type 
grows from nihilism but it also overcomes it.90 
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Nevertheless, this assumption on the part of Gillespie sounds rather obscure. As 
mentioned above, Bakunin is aware of the fact that creating a new world needs 
something more than just destroying the old one. In addition, what can be found in 
almost every anarchist essay on revolution, and the day after, is the lack of any feeling 
related to vengeance, because anarchists never abandoned one of their fundamental 
principles: “the end does not justify the means”. Anarchists do not seek to replace the 
state with an anarchist one. They do not long for tasting the fruits produced by the 
imposition on others, and this is one of the main reasons that all anarchist or 
anarchistic resurrections have been, more or less, drowned in blood. 
Deleuze’s approach seems more appropriate: for Nietzsche, the step from man 
to overman presupposes a transvaluation of values, meaning a total subversion of all 
values, a nihilistic practice that will eliminate, rather than maintain, nihilism itself. 
Transvaluation is the shift of nihilism from a reactive to an active force, leading man 
to his deliberate doom in favour of the overman.91 
Transvaluation for anarchists is the main factor of their vision. They do not 
preach reformation. They activate their nihilism in order to reconstruct on a new 
basis: “The passion for destruction is a creative passion too!”92 This sentence 
summarizes the Nietzschean shift of nihilism from a reactive force – that separates 
everything and everyone from what they are capable of – to an active one that 
eliminates nihilism calling for a new principle and a new goal. 
The above correlation of Nietzschean and anarchist nihilism can be 
summarized in the first of Zarathustra’s discourses, “Of the Three Metamorphoses”. 
The second metamorphosis, where the camel becomes a lion in order to reclaim its 
freedom, puts “I will” before “Thou shalt”. The lion seeks to fight the great dragon 
who wants to remain the lion’s master and god. But this struggle needs a sacred “no”. 
It needs a nihilistic negation. The overcome, mentioned above, will happen as soon as 
the lion becomes a child. Now, it is the sacred “yes” of this child that will locate and 
highlight the creative dimension of destructive passion. The child is capable of 
exploiting the lion’s accomplishments. It is innocent, forgetful, without any sign of 
vengeance: a true, anarchist creator of values. 
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Summary 
This part has used the different levels of elective affinity in order to establish the 
connection between Nietzsche and the anarchists in a dual way. Firstly, by exploring 
the elective affinity through the “presence” of Nietzsche in the thought and politics of 
anarchist and libertarian thinkers (Goldman, Landauer, Benjamin) and currents (post-
anarchism), and secondly by recognizing the anarchist worldview in the Nietzschean 
philosophy.  
 The first chapter (Nietzsche in anarchism) has shown how Nietzsche has 
interacted with or been absorbed by the anarchist way of thinking, whereas chapter 
two (anarchism in Nietzsche) reveals the affinal worldview of the two parts by 
extensively using the interpretation context of part B. In addition, the location and 
analysis of the elective affinity has served the debunking of the Nietzschean concepts 
used by conservative and right-wing readings in order to appropriate Nietzsche, and 
of the accusations that the German philosopher had unleashed against anarchists, 
which reveals his misunderstanding of anarchist politics. It has also offered a view 
that challenges the boundaries between “classical” and “post” anarchism by 
promoting Nietzsche as the reference point of their essential connection.
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PART D: CASE STUDΥ 
 
 
Acronyms of the Groups, Political Parties and Organizations mentioned in this 
case study 
 
EDES: National Democratic Greek League (Right-wing partisan group during the 
Nazi occupation) 
DSE: Democratic Army of Greece (Communist and Left-wing army during the Greek 
civil war)  
KKE: Greek Communist Party  
ND: New Democracy (conservatives)  
PASOK: Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (social democrats)  
KNE: Greek Communist Youth  
KKE int.: Greek Communist Party internal  
SYRIZA: Coalition of the Radical Left  
17N: November 17 (Leninist urban guerrilla group, formed after the dictatorship of 
1967-74 in Greece) 
LAOS: People’s Orthodox Alarm (Far-right conservatives)  
EEK: Labour Revolutionary Party (Trotskyists)  
ANTARSYA: Anti-capitalist Left Cooperation for Subversion (Leftists)  
GSEE: General Confederation of Workers of Greece  
a/a/a: Anarchist/Antiauthoritarian/Autonomist Movement  
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December 08 – Athens 
 
 “And the unfamiliar things of the future, and 
whatever frightened stray birds, are truly more 
familiar and more genial than your ‘reality’. For 
thus you speak: ‘we are complete realists, and 
without belief or superstition’: thus you thump your 
chests – alas, even without having chests! But how 
should you be able to believe, you motley-spotted 
men! – you who are paintings of all that has ever 
been believed!...Unworthy of belief: that is what I 
call you, you realists!...You are unfruitful…You are 
half-open doors at which grave-diggers wait. And 
this is your reality…” 
 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 
“Of the Land of Culture” 
 
D.1/ Nietzsche and December 08  
 
The Elective Affinity Framework 
This chapter will present the context for the events of the December 08 revolt in 
Greece, and especially in Athens, in correlation with the explored and established 
Nietzschean/Anarchist affinity from the previous chapter. The location and 
establishment of such an affinity took place in the context of a detailed comparison 
between the anarchist and Nietzschean worldview, and the choice of specific aspects 
of this procedure can also offer the framework for the present case study and thus 
reinforce its anarchistic character. Hence, what I am planning to do is to present the 
anarchist perception of the events and show that certain key points of the elective 
affinity procedure were also central to the anarchist theory and practice during 
December. These key points are the transvaluation of values that the insurrectionists 
felt the need to set out explicitly through their discourse and practices, genealogy, 
perspectivism and anti-ontology, that served as weapons against the fixed identities 
imposed by the state, and finally will and nihilism – in particular its Bakuninist 
version – that determined the character of the revolt as a decisive and creative 
destruction. Then, after already having identifed these key points in the passage “Of 
the Three Metamorphoses” I will utilize another critical outcome of part C, that is the 
use of Nietzsche as a methodological tool by Goldman and Landauer. Likewise, I will 
use this Nietzschean passage from Thus Spoke Zarathustra as a tool in order to 
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theorize the anarchist reading of December, make it more cohesive and complete, and 
underline its alternative character, compared to the mainstream/reactionary reading 
made by the political parties and the media.     
 The case of December is quite special since it coincided with the dawn of the 
new world financial crisis and at the same time was the main factor for the 
reinforcement of the anarchist “space” [χώρος] and movement in Greece. Anarchists 
played the most significant1 and crucial2 role in the events of December, not only 
because of the massive participation of anarchist/antiauthoritarian/autonomist 
individuals and groups or because of the fact that all insurgents used practices that 
were, undoubtedly, anarchist. The spatial component of the revolt also formed 
decisively its insurrectional character. As Kotronaki and Seferiadis, two Greek 
scholars who studied December, explain, the spatial, insurrectional culture of 
Exarchia (where Grigoropoulos was assassinated) – product of autonomist, 
antiauthoritarian and radical activities – acted as a catalyst for the type and the size of 
the revolt’s breakout.3 Hence, although it might be inaccurate to say that this revolt 
was purely anarchist, we might regard it, at least, as anarchistic. Therefore, the present 
case study is interested in the way the events of December 08 were perceived and co-
defined by subjects who, either individually or in groups, acted within the broad circle 
called anarchist/antiauthoritarian/autonomist space.4 
December posed four central issues stemming from the radical subject: First, 
the individual right for a life with meaning, something that, so far, lay in the hands of 
public opinion. Second, the right to deviate from the rules, dominant or not, 
something that up to now lay in the hands of the social majority. Third, the claim to 
an irregular, erratic, indefinite violence beyond the law and fourth, the challenge to 
the opinion that moral principles and values are something fixed and not relevant, to 
what is good/bad, revolutionary/counter-revolutionary, the challenge to every 
normative couple.5 These four issues took shape through, and recapitulate, the 
                                                        
1 Pepe Egger, “Remnants of A Greek Past, Image From the Future”, 
http://www.zcommunications.org/remnants-of-a-greek-past-image-from-the-future-by-pepe-egger 
(accessed on 10/5/2013). 
2 Anarchists for Social Liberation [Αναρχικοί για την Κοινωνική Απελευθέρωση], “Το Ζήτημα της 
Οργάνωσης” [The Issue of Organization], http://aka.espiv.net/index.php?id=46 (accessed on 
10/5/2013). 
3 Loukia Kotronaki and Seraphim Seferiades, “Athens December 2008: The Spatial Prerequisites of an 
Uprising”, http://www.re-public.gr/en/?p=2744 (accessed on 10/5/2013). 
4 Regarding the meaning that the terms “anarchist”, “antiauthoritarian” and “autonomist” bear in Greek 
radical political life, and how they all intermingle, see part D.2 of the present case study. 
5 Epaminondas Skyftoulis, “Το Μεγάλο Συμβάν” [The Great Event], Babylonia, No 51, p. 3. 
 
 
 
 
122 
insurgents’ desires and activity. As it will be shown further on in this part, 
Decembrians questioned the existing mode of their daily life with all its rules, social 
and moral conventions. Practising a violence that could not be “justified”, “explained” 
or controlled, they broke the bonds of the normative identities that were imposed on 
them by the state and the capitalist society, as workers, immigrants, students, 
unemployed etc. This liberation allowed them to proceed with giving their own 
meaning to their lives and realizing its theoretical content through the construction of 
new bonds of solidarity and the practice of cooperative ventures like occupations, 
assemblies and cultural activities. Hence, December for agents self-defined as 
anarchists was neither a two week revolt for an emotional and physical discharge nor 
a new way to sneak into the country’s political life. It was the result of a 
social/political/financial situation walking towards a dead-end and an “image of the 
future”, recreated and revaluated. Interpreting the anarchists’ reading of December 
through “Of the Three Metamorphoses”, a part from Thus Spoke Zarathustra, allows 
us to highlight this conjunction between past, present and future. Whereas in 
Zarathustra’s discourse it is clear and dominant – as a relation between the Camel, the 
Lion and the Child – for anarchists it is rather obscure; the intenseness of the events 
together with the unexpected and broad acceptance of the anarchist methods did not 
give the necessary time or clarity to consciously create a substratum for the theoretical 
co-existence of these three stages, meaning the time periods before, during and after 
the revolt. Therefore, I claim that what anarchists’ reading of December lacks is a 
theoretical apparatus, a narrative tool that will gather the fragments of this reading – 
present in the practices, brochures, and slogans of the insurrectionists – unify it and 
thus provide a concrete alternative reading of what December was and stood for. 
 
The Nietzschean Three Metamorphoses of the Spirit 
After a first, unsuccessful effort to share his vision of the overman with the common 
people, Zarathustra visits the city of The Pied Cow in order to carry out his 
discourses. In the first discourse, he describes the procedure of a successive 
transformation. A spirit that is used for burdens, to carry foreign values and words of 
extraordinary weight, becomes a Camel that kneels down in order to bear more and 
more of this foreign burden that turns life into a desert.6 But after a while the spirit 
                                                        
6 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, “Of the Spirit of Gravity”. An other discourse that, according to 
Deleuze (Deleuze, p. 181) must be read together with “Of the Three Metamorphoses”. 
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wants to gain its freedom, wishes to become master of its desert, that is, master of its 
life and so it turns into a Lion which destroys all conventions and “debts”. 
Nevertheless, the spirit wants to embrace its own values, to live by its own rules and 
words, something that, however, takes the creation of new values, requires a 
transvaluation of values. The Lion, the destroyer of duty, is strong enough for creating 
freedom for new creations but insufficiently creative for new values. This must be the 
work of the third metamorphosis of the spirit, of the innocent Child that can turn the 
wheel of life again and make a new, fresh start. 
“The Three Metamorphoses” is a very critical passage for Nietzsche’s 
philosophy because it consolidates the essential key-concepts of negation/affirmation, 
nihilism, transvaluation of values and the overman. Following Deleuze’s analysis, 
every one of the three metamorphoses reveals its relationship with what is “real” and 
what means to affirm, deny or create “reality”.  
Zarathustra considers the Camel to be a courageous spirit, asking for the 
heaviest burdens: acceptance of pain, patience towards the chastiser and, above all, 
love of the real, even if this reality is nothing but a desert.7 However, this 
“courageous” affirmation of the Camel to “reality” has nothing to do with the joyful 
affirmation of Dionysus to life. It is a passive and slavish “yes” to all the burdens of 
the desert, because the camel does not know how to say “no”. Saying “yes” means to 
comply with a given reality and take on all of its burdens without being able to see 
into their origin. As analyzed in chapter C.2, cutting off a force from its effect, and 
treating it as something separate and independent, is a sign of a slave morality. In this 
case, the Camel passively accepts all the burdens of its desert, ignoring that they come 
from the spirit of gravity which is the carrier of negation, reactive forces and nihilism. 
Therefore, by cutting off the effect (burdens) from its force (nihilism), the painful 
desert of a given reality can be regarded as positive,8 a bunch of imposed values that 
make a life full of pain and misery seem good and desirable.  
A reality given and imposed, causing misery and pain, is a transformation of 
nihilism, a way to deny life by loading it with the heaviest burdens.9 A Camel with a 
falsely “affirmative” will (falsely, since it says “yes” just because it is incapable of 
saying “no”), is the opposite of the Lion who turns its negation, its “sacred No”, into 
an affirmation. Being truly affirmative, even by denying, means to evaluate things 
                                                        
7 Deleuze, pp. 180-81. 
8 Deleuze, p. 181. 
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from the angle of a will that enjoys its difference in life instead of suffering the pain 
caused by opposing this life. Being affirmative means to create new values 
compatible with a life that is light and active, not to load life with the burden of higher 
values that seek to crush it.10 
Nevertheless, the maximum the Lion can do is to be indirectly affirmative by 
denying the negative and the reactive, to regain its freedom in order to create, but to 
create new values, to transvaluate the old ones, means to affirm affirmation, to be 
directly affirmative. This is something that only the third metamorphosis of the spirit, 
the Child, can do. The Child takes the Lion’s “evaluation” – the weapon that allowed 
the Lion to see into the reactive forces and deny them – and upgrades it through art,11 
making it a weapon of creation. The artist uses his will in order to create a new 
reality. The transvaluation of values is an artistic creation that liberates the will from 
the element of the negative and attributes it to that of the positive. 
Having established the need for a unifying reading of the December events, I 
will deal with the case study in two ways, as an interpretative tool and as an event 
reinforcing the elective affinity. 
 
First Use of the Case Study: The Three Metamorphoses as an Interpretative Tool 
Firstly, I will use the “Three Metamorphoses”, as an interpretative tool that will filter 
the three basic stages (just before, during and just after) of the revolt. As it has already 
been said, this discourse of Zarathustra speaks of three types of spirit: the Camel, the 
Lion and the Child.  
The Camel represents the spirit that suffers by continuously taking burdens on 
its back, by abiding the Dragon’s commands – a creature which is more powerful than 
the Camel and dominates it through the axiom of “Thou Shalt”, a complex of 
disciplinary and moral rules. This spirit can help us understand the psychological and 
social/political situation of people in Greece before the 6th of December. This was a 
period when the vast majority of the population felt that it had to comply with the 
government’s rules in order to “avoid” the oncoming avalanche of the financial crisis 
that would deteriorate the already existing poverty, repression and unemployment.12  
                                                                                                                                                               
9 Deleuze, p. 184. 
10 Deleuze, p. 185. 
11 See Nietzsche, The Will to Power, book four, IV, “The Will to Power as Art”. 
12 There is a lot of evidence for the significant gradual deterioration of the social and financial state in 
Greece and for the formation of a climate of fear and insecurity. According to the National Centre of 
Social Research (EKKE), in 2008 the “S80/S20 Inequality Index” reached the value of 5.9 (meaning 
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The Lion is the second metamorphosis of the spirit that utters a “sacred No” to 
the rules of the Dragon. It desires to put an end to the Dragon’s despotism and make 
itself its own master by regaining its lost freedom, that is, by taking back its 
autonomy, strengthening its will and denying the given and fixed values of the 
Dragon. The Lion realizes that it is not capable of creating new values but its presence 
and actions are vital for ensuring the freedom needed for this recreation. Thus, the 
Lion stands for the revolting action of the insurgents, of those who decided to openly 
and practically challenge and negate the terms of every day life imposed as such by 
the state and the capitalistic financial system, and set the conditions for building a 
new type of relations.  
The Child is the last and maybe the most important figure of the Three 
Metamorphoses since it fulfills and justifies the choices and fight of the other two. It 
is a new beginning, a fruitful “Yes” after a “sacred No”, a creation after destruction. 
Once lost in an alien world, the spirit earns its own world. Likewise, the Decembrian 
insurrectionists do not limit their action to the destruction of the alien world 
surrounding them. They move on by creating new values, promoting fresh styles of 
living, putting their will in action and thus earning a brand new world created by them 
and based on totally different foundations. 
 
Second Use of the Case Study: Reinforcing the Elective Affinity 
Secondly, I will use this case study in order to reinforce the establishment of the 
Nietzschean/Anarchist elective affinity, mainly based on the Bakuninist character of 
the revolt. I will do this  in combination with the “fertile destruction” (Bakunin) – 
“active nihilism” (Nietzsche) dipole of chapter C.2, and by decomposing the 
                                                                                                                                                               
that the share of income of the richest 20% of the population was almost 6 times larger than the share 
of income of the poorest 20% of the population) and Greece was included in the list of the European 
countries with the highest rates of poverty at the time [ΕΚΚΕ, «Κοινωνικό Πορτραίτο» [Social 
Portrait], http://www2.ekke.gr/images/PDF/EKKE_Koinoniko%20Portaito_2010.pdf, pp. 11, 18 – 
accessed on 10/5/2013]. Moreover, young people, between 18 and 24 years old, in Greece were the 
main victims of the financial crisis that broke out in 2008 [Anon., «ΕΕ: Η Οικονομική Κρίση Χτυπά 
τους Νέους με Ανεργία και Φτώχεια» [Economic Crisis hits Young People Causing Unemployment 
and Poverty], http://www.tovima.gr/society/article/?aid=492025 – accessed on 10/5/2013] and Jean-
Claude Junker, former president of Eurogroup, confessed that Europe had begun to warn Greece about 
the bad state of the country’s economy since 2008 [http://www.tovima.gr/politics/article/?aid=361183 
– accessed on 10/5/2013]. Finally, a poll held by Public Issue in Greece just before the outbreak of the 
revolt (2-6/12/2008) showed that the pessimism of the consumers remained at the same level as it used 
to be within the last year, together with their increased fear of unemployment [Public Issue, 
«Οικονομικό Βαρόμετρο, Δεκέμβριος 2008 – Δείκτης Καταναλωτικού Κλίματος (CCI)» [Economic 
Barometer, December 2008 - Consumer Confidence Index], http://www.publicissue.gr/1034/cci-2008-
dec/ - accessed on 10/5/2013].   
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detestation of Nietzsche towards anarchist “resentment” on a practical level as well, 
after having done so theoretically in the same chapter. Five additional Nietzschean 
concepts used here are the “Dionysian and Apollonian forces”, “negation and 
affirmation”, “master/slave morality”, “transvaluation of values” and the “overman”, 
all extensively introduced in chapter B.4, together with “direct action”, mainly used in 
chapter B.2 as an original anarchist feature, and in C.1, in order to underline the non 
resentful character of anarchists. “Direct action” is re-introduced here through the 
work of Daniel Colson, in an article where he exposes the compatibility of Nietzsche 
and the anarchists based, among other things, on the concept of direct action.13 Colson 
takes the primary concern of anarcho-syndicalists for direct action without 
representatives, avant-gardes, or given guiding personalities from any social field 
(politics, science, religion, etc.) and compares it to Nietzsche’s detestation of anything 
that gets between a man and its will, that opposes life by substituting action with mere 
formulas of a third party’s point of view. More than once, in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 
we come across Nietzsche’s attack on these reactionary intermediaries and especially 
in his discourses “Of the Afterworldsmen”, “Of the New Idol”, “Of the Flies of the 
Market-Place” in part one, and “Of the Priests”, “Of the Famous Philosophers”, “Of 
the Land of Culture”, “Of Scholars”, and “Of Poets” in part two.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
13 Daniel Colson, “Nietzsche and the Libertarian Workers’ Movement”, in Moore, pp. 12-28. 
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D.2/ December’s Historical Background  
 
 Recent Political and Movement History in Greece  
To understand the political antitheses and the basic political identities formed in 
Greek society, it is imperative to read recent Greek history from the end of the Civil 
War (1946-1949). The brief account given here passes through the seven years of the 
military dictatorship (1967-1974), the first occupation movement of the 80s and the 
rise of social democracy, before entering into the 90s with a view of neoliberal 
political/financial practices and the second wave of the occupation movement. This 
forms the backdrop to the decade from 1999 to 2008, where the global alterations of 
the antagonist movement’s “map”, also influenced the identity and the repertoire of 
the domestic radical movement. 
 
Civil War (1946-1949) 
The end of the Second World War in Greece found the population divided roughly 
into two hostile camps. The right wing – which included the WWII partisans of 
National Democratic Greek League (EDES), the existing governmental forces, and 
lots of ultra-right paramilitaries,1 many of which had cooperated with the Nazis 
during the German occupation of Greece,2  and the left wing – consisting of the 
partisans of Democratic Army of Greece ( DSE) and the people who were mostly self-
defined as communists or left.3 The basic differential characteristic of these two 
camps was their perception of the recent occupation by the German troops (the Right 
did not reject it as fiercely as the Left did, since the conservatives would see in this a 
bulwark against the Bolshevik threat from the East, just like the Western capitalist 
countries dealt with Hitler’s rise) and the perspective of a future either consistent with 
the worldview of the West or compatible with the socialist model of the Eastern 
Europe. Thus, the Right was also supported by the British, and later on by the 
Americans, investing on the traditional values of nation, religion, and hierarchy, 
whereas the Left, mainly adjacent to the Greek Communist Party (KKE), was helped 
by the socialist states of the Balkans, promoting the values of an international 
                                                        
1 Giorgos Margaritis, Ιστορία του Ελληνικού Εμφυλίου Πολέμου, 1946-1949 [History of the Greek Civil 
War], Vol. 1, Vivliorama, Athens 2001, pp. 226-30. 
2 Margaritis, Ιστορία του Ελληνικού Εμφυλίου Πολέμου, 1946-1949 [History of the Greek Civil War], 
pp. 216-17, 220, 222-23. 
3 Giorgos Margaritis, “Από το Λιτόχωρο στο Γράμμο” [From Litochoro to Grammos], E Istorika, No 
292, pp. 6-7. 
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patriotism and social equality/sovereignty/justice.4 
 This three-year war – first act of the cold war globally – full of passion and 
atrocities from both sides, not only brought forward every existing ideological 
differentiation but also intensified it through divisions and clashes within the same 
villages and, even, within the same families.5 In 1949, the governmental army, with 
the help of the American napalm bombs, put an end to this war6 and formed the dipole 
that would determine for, at least, three decades the social/ political life in Greece: the 
winning Right versus the defeated Left. 
 
The Post War State and the Dictatorship (1949-1974) 
The consequence of this conflict was the even greater polarization of the two sides. 
The post-war state, bearing an anti-communist and police character, had clearly 
adopted an oppressive and hostile attitude towards left citizens that included tortures, 
exiles and exclusion from the public sector.7 The continuous social and political 
disorder, due to the ceaseless (post) civil-war atmosphere,8 led to the coup d’ etat of 
the military junta in 1967. For seven years the Greek dictatorship founded its 
domination on the escalation of the political differences and acted as a true and 
conscious successor of the civil war Right.9 Nevertheless, during these years we also 
had the radicalization of a youth that had not experienced an actual civil war but was 
the heir of a communist culture since their fathers and grandfathers had participated in 
both, world and civil, wars. This radicalization, occasionally expressed through 
sabotages and other, minor-scale, propaganda deeds, reached its zenith with the 
occupation of the Polytechnic University by young workers and students, in 
November 1973. Although bearing a left mentality, they were acting as an 
autonomous movement, challenging the standards and the dogmatism of the two 
communist parties.10 Despite the fact that the junta violently evacuated the occupation 
within three days, and the regime lost power no sooner than eight months later, the 
                                                        
4 Margaritis, “Από το Λιτόχωρο στο Γράμμο” [From Litochoro to Grammos], pp. 13-14 and Giorgos 
Margaritis, “Ο Απολογισμός του Εμφυλίου” [The Account of the Civil War], E Istorika, No 292, p. 45. 
5 Margaritis, “Ο Απολογισμός του Εμφυλίου” [The Account of the Civil War], pp. 44-45. 
6 Sotiris Rizas, “Οι Αμερικάνοι και το Τέλος του Εμφυλίου” [The Americans and the End of the Civil 
War], E Istorika, No 292, pp. 40-43.  
7 Margaritis, “Ο Απολογισμός του Εμφυλίου” [The Account of the Civil War], p. 47. 
8 Richard Clogg, A Concise History of Greece, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1997, pp. 155-
62. 
9 Clogg, pp. 164-65. 
10 Olympios Dafermos, “Αντιστασιακές Οργανώσεις και Φοιτητικό Κίνημα” [Groups of Resistance 
and the Students’ Movement], E Istorika, No 246, p. 23. 
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events of the Polytechnic occupation have become a legendary point of reference for 
the Left in Greece and have inspired, since then, most of the massive people’s 
struggles, therefore forming a respective identity of a communist, anti-authoritarian 
and even anarchist political agent. 
  
The Post-Dictatorship Era of “Metapolitefsi” (1974-1980) 
The following six years power was in the hands of the conservative right-wing party 
of New Democracy (ND) with its historical leader Konstantinos Karamanlis being the 
namesake and uncle of the Greek prime minister during the December ’08 revolt. 
Karamanlis came from Paris as a national saviour who would bring the country back 
to the safe road of democracy.11 He gave amnesty to all political prisoners, including 
the dictators (the junta trial took place later on and only because the people’s will for 
justice could not be avoided by Karamanlis) and legalized the Communist Party.12 
Nevertheless, he maintained the authoritarian character of the state since he did not 
abolish censorship immediately and stripped the statist organizations and security 
forces only from the prominent members of the dictatorship.13 
 The first blow of a massive occupation student movement, with Marxist-
Leninist as well as autonomist and antiauthoritarian features, took place in 1980, 
challenging the consensus that the post-dictatorship democracy was based on, by 
fighting against a legal act intending to reform the existing status of the educational 
system.14 The movement achieved the cancellation of the government’s plans and, 
although modified, kept on with a radical presence to the country’s social/political 
scene even during the period that the social-democrats were in authority.  
 
The “Socialist” Years (1981-1989) 
When Andreas Papandreou’s Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) came in 
power in 1981, it included some of the most prominent members of the Polytechnic 
Generation, that is the youngsters who had taken part in the events of the Polytechnic 
University occupation in 1973. From the very beginning, they supported a policy of a 
national reconciliation that would move beyond the resentment and hatred that had 
                                                        
11 Clogg, p. 169. 
12 Clogg, p. 170. 
13 Clogg, pp. 173-74. 
14 Christos Giovanopoulos and Dimitris Dalakoglou, “From Ruptures to Eruption: A Genealogy of the 
December 2008 Revolt in Greece”, in Antonis Vradis and Dimitris Dalakoglou (ed.), Revolt and Crisis 
in Greece, AK Press, London 2011, pp. 93-94. 
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divided the Greek society from the end of the German occupation. This populist tactic 
had a profound effect on the radical movement since its most important Marxist-
Leninist components were charmed by the unprecedented (in Greek political life) 
victory of a “socialist” party that seemed able to bring “the people in power”.15 
Nevertheless, a new breed of activists, with anti-authoritarian characteristics, refused 
to be absorbed by the “socialist” wave, unlike the trade unions and the vast majority 
of the Left, and openly challenged the supposed social/political change that was the 
subject of PASOK's preaching.  
In 1985, the murder of the fifteen-year-old Michalis Kaltezas by a riot 
policeman on the anniversary of the Polytechnic revolt, in Exarchia – an event with 
context similar to Grigoropoulos’ assassination – sparked the occupation of the 
Chemistry and the Polytechnic Schools and fierce clashes with the “socialist” police,16 
thus revealing PASOK’s authoritarian face. The promising years of “socialist” 
government ended in 1989 within an atmosphere full of scandals and political 
intrigues. After two elections without either of the two parties (PASOK and ND) 
gaining the majority, a coalition government was formed composed by 
SYNASPISMOS – the temporal unification of the two Communist Parties17 – and 
ND. The cooperation of SYNASPISMOS with the conservatives is representative of 
the explosive political atmosphere of the time. ND aimed at neutralizing PASOK by 
putting Papandreou and other first-class members on trial with the accusation of 
corruption and defalcation, whereas SYNASPISMOS, and especially KKE, hoped 
that through this procedure PASOK would become weak and marginalized, thus 
opening the road for KKE to monopolize the votes of the left spectrum. Nevertheless, 
it was KKE itself that suffered a huge crisis – with the vast majority of the Greek 
Communist Youth (KNE, KKE’s youth) being expelled from the party when they 
strongly disapproved the unholy cooperation with the Right. Eventually, PASOK 
made an effective come-back, formed a new coalition government with both ND and 
SYNASPISMOS, and set off the antagonism of the two traditional big parties for the 
                                                        
15 One of the central pre-electoral slogans of PASOK in 1981 was the “PASOK – People in power!” 
16 Giovanopoulos and Dalakoglou, pp. 95-96. 
17 The two communist parties were KKE, which is the same with the current and only communist party 
in Greece, bearing Stalinist characteristics, and KKE int., which gradually adopted a euro-communist 
orientation. The subtitle “int.”, meaning “internal”, aimed to highlight the independence from outside 
patronizing (USSR), an implication towards the relationship of the traditional KKE to the USSR.  After 
the split of SYNASPISMOS in 1991, KKE int. kept the name SYNASPISMOS (or SYN) and is the 
main component of today’s Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA). 
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social and financial restructuring of Greece on a clear neoliberal basis.18  
 
The Neoliberal Era and the Escalation of Social Antagonism (1990-1998) 
In 1990, the victory of the conservative Konstantinos Mitsotakis symbolized the 
return of New Democracy together with the second wave of the occupation movement 
in which anarchists also played a significant role. The concurrent blossoming of the 
anarchist squats throughout Athens and the do-it-yourself (DIY) organizing profile of 
the squatters transformed the hitherto rather negative and aggressive character of 
Greek anarchism, enriched its practices and helped it to address its activities to a 
broader social spectrum. As a result, the occupation of schools and universities gained 
important and massive support that lasted for up to three months.19 Anarchists’ 
participation in other significant events of movement history in the following two 
decades was also very important. This included the public bus drivers' strike in 1992 – 
where anarchists actively supported burning barricades and the occupation practices 
of the strikers; fierce clashes with the riot police around the occupied Polytechnic 
School in 1995, to commemorate the 1973 action, which led to the midnight arrest of 
more than five hundred youngsters; and the third wave of school occupation 
movement in 1998 against the educational bill of Gerasimos Arsenis (PASOK 
minister of education) – where anarchist and leftist students functioned as an 
adversarial current to the reformist hegemony of KNE, are some representative 
examples.20 
 
International and Domestic Alterations in the Antagonist Movement (1999-2007) 
One year later, the character of the global radical movement changed from the inside 
when the black bloc re-appeared in Seattle (firstly encountered in Germany’s 
Autonomen in the 80s) to create a new organizational model with a flexible and anti-
hegemonic structure.21 The Greek antagonist movement welcomed this new type of 
activism, already exercised by anarchists to some extent, and put it into practice 
during the anti-globalization protests of Prague (2000), Genoa (2001) and of course in 
Thessaloniki (the second biggest Greek city) in 2003. This period of demonstration 
gave an additional boost to the Greek anarchist and antiauthoritarian movement, 
                                                        
18 Giovanopoulos and Dalakoglou, pp. 98-99. 
19 Giovanopoulos and Dalakoglou, pp. 99-100. 
20 Giovanopoulos and Dalakoglou, pp. 105-07. 
21 See chapter B.2.3 of the present thesis about the New and Contemporary Anarchistic Social 
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particularly because of the use of technology (i.e. Athens Indymedia) and the 
diffusion of anarchist ideas to a broader social scale. This momentum reached its peak 
just one year before the December revolt, in the demonstrations of the student 
movement against the alteration of the Constitutional Article 16.22   
  
From the Neoliberal Policies of the 90’s to their Social/Economic/Political Effects: 
Economic and Monetary Union (2001), Olympic Games (2004) 
As said above, the 90s was the decade when “Socialists” and Conservatives in Greece 
based their policies on a neoliberal plan of growth and modernization that although 
seemed to, statistically, justify the relevant reformations, it gradually drove Greek 
society from the euphoria of an artificial development to the naked truth of decline, 
austerity and even poverty. These economic plans and the political reaction to the new 
economic policies did not leave any aspect of the political life in Greece unaffected, 
in other words, the impact was felt both on the side of the government and on the side 
of the governed. Controversial statistics that showed unemployment to have reduced 
from 12% to 8% in the period of 1998-2007 “forgot” to talk about the new definition 
they were giving to the term “employed”. During this period, 30,000 to 80,000 people 
were working under internship status (stagiaires) without insurance and a salary of 
maximum €600.23 Through this working status, a significant number of people 
together with all university students and youths doing their military service were 
excluded from the unemployment lists, thus providing a duplicitous way to drastically 
reduce the unemployment rates.24 Moreover, the fact that even before the eruption of 
the financial crisis, Greece had the second lowest average wages in the European 
Union, 25% of full-time workers earned less than €1000 per month and 21% of the 
Greek population lived in conditions of poverty,25 challenges the initial, generalized 
euphoria for Greece adopting the Euro currency in 2001. In 2004, three years after 
                                                                                                                                                               
Movements. 
22 Giovanopoulos and Dalakoglou, pp. 108-10. 
23 Yiannis Kaplanis, “An Economy that Excludes the Many and an ‘Accidental’ Revolt”, in Vradis and 
Dimitris Dalakoglou, p. 219. 
24 For OAED (Manpower Employment Organization), according to Regulation (ΕC) No 1897/2000 
(Article 1, Annex 1, and Article 2) and Law Νο. 1545/1985 (Article 2, §1), “‘unemployed’ people are 
individuals aged 15-74 years who i) have no job, ii) are available to the labour market, and iii) are 
actively seeking employment. http://www.oaed.gr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article& 
id=908&Itemid=821&lang=en#A0 (accessed on 25/2/2013). Hence, those who are doing their military 
service are considered to be “employed”, although their monthly salary – excluding the supposed but 
not realistic coverage of their basic needs by the army – is no more than €9, whereas university 
students, in most cases, are regarded as “not actively seeking employment”. Therefore, both categories 
conveniently serve the decline of unemployment rates.  
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Greece entered the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the country 
hosted the 28th Olympic Games. As much as these seventeen days “nourished” the 
pride and vanity of Greek society, the whole period before and after the event exposed 
the artificiality of Greece's financial growth and the extent of the state's wasteful 
expenditure: credit expansion and targeted construction of public works were the 
main factors in a development that served only the 2004 Olympic Games. The 
exploitation of the low-waged immigrants for the “express” completion of the Games’ 
infrastructure – as well as their general employment in other activities such as 
agriculture, services and construction since the early 90s – usually working without 
insurance and in unsafe conditions, gave an additional boost to economy by keeping 
the wages low and strengthening consumer demand. The cost of the Games was 
extremely high, with security measures being one of its most important components. 
One billion Euros were spent on security systems (such as C4I which was actually 
never used) and “human resources”,26 meaning the hordes of policemen and agents 
that flooded the streets, giving the image of a city occupied by an army. Nonetheless, 
in the long-term, meaning the period of the 2008 revolt, these security measures 
proved to have been a major investment for the state in order to monitor and control 
public spaces. 
 
The Anarchist Space in Greece / The Anarchist Agents of the Revolt 
December’s ground zero was Exarchia, a neighborhood directly linked to historical 
moments of the antagonist movement and especially of the anarchist one. 
Nevertheless, the blow was not limited to this space but expanded to an area that 
covered a large radius of Athens. Most events took place in the central and southern 
parts of the city with the streets, the squares and what we generally call public space 
acting as the space of revolt. In addition, the virtual space of the Internet and the 
radio, were important “revolutionary means” where insurgents “met” each other in 
order to organize and comment on activities, news and events.27  
A flashback in the history of the Greek anarchist space will help us locate its 
emergence in the political scene, its development and alterations through time and, 
thus, understand the framework in which anarchists took action during the revolt. 
                                                                                                                                                               
25 Kaplanis, p. 221. 
26 Kaplanis, p. 222. 
27 Vaso Makrygianni and Haris Tsavdaroglou, “Urban Planning and Revolt: A spatial analysis of the 
December 2008 uprising in Athens, in Vradis and Dalakoglou, p. 50. 
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Strangely, there has not been a systematic and overall recording of the history and 
deeds of the anarchists in Greece, apart from fragmental contributions, most details of 
which will be presented further, below. A presentation of the internal, genealogic 
history of the anarchist space is absent, with the exception of limited recorded views 
and documents. Maybe this is due to an immanent fear that there can never be an 
“objective” presentation of the relative experiences and ventures – thus, “nothing” is 
better, compared to a subjective view – or because of a characteristic preference of 
Greek society, in general, to an oral, versus a written, tradition.28 Nevertheless, I will 
try to give an elementary historical sketch of the anarchist space in Greece, based on 
the writings, interviews and essays of prominent anarchists and researchers, present in 
the Greek anarchist circles. 
  The first appearance of anarchism in Greece took place in the mid nineteenth 
and early twentieth century through events like the revolt against king Otto, in Athens 
(1862)29or activities that included the publication of libertarian newspapers and the 
foundation of Democratic Clubs with a socialist/anarchist orientation.30 The Bulletin 
of the Jura Federation, published in 26 August 1877, included a letter by Dionysios 
Ampelikopoulos informing readers about the creation of anarchist associations in 
Messini, Kefalonia, Filiatra and Aigio and preparations to form a federation together 
with the  already existing, anarcho-syndicalist, groups of Syros and Athens.31 
The main influences upon the Greek anarchists of that time stemmed primarily 
from prominent figures of the European anarchist movement, like Mikhail Bakunin, 
Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Peter Kropotkin and the ideas of federation and social 
anarchism32 – not to mention the excessive contacts with the European revolutionary 
circles, for example the anarchists of Bern where the International Workers’ 
Federation was based.33 Nonetheless, the Greek movement also experienced isolated 
terrorist and illegalist actions, in accordance with the relevant activities of anarchists 
                                                        
28 Panagiotis Kalamaras, Πατησίων και Στουρνάρη Γωνία [Corner of Patission & Stournari], 
Ελευθεριακή Κουλτούρα, Αθήνα 2013, p. 5. 
29 Δ. Τ., Για μια Ιστορία του Αναρχικού Κινήματος του Ελλαδικού Χώρου [For a History of the 
Anarchist Movement in Greece], Melbourne 2008, p. 27, http://ngnm.vrahokipos.net/ (accessed on 
20/5/2013).  
30 Δ. Τ., Για μια Ιστορία του Αναρχικού Κινήματος του Ελλαδικού Χώρου [For a History of the 
Anarchist Movement in Greece], pp. 32, 37, 98, 123. 
31 Δ. Τ., Για μια Ιστορία του Αναρχικού Κινήματος του Ελλαδικού Χώρου [For a History of the 
Anarchist Movement in Greece], p. 229. 
32 Δ. Τ., Για μια Ιστορία του Αναρχικού Κινήματος του Ελλαδικού Χώρου [For a History of the 
Anarchist Movement in Greece], pp. 28, 32, 85, 193, 303. 
33 Δ. Τ., Για μια Ιστορία του Αναρχικού Κινήματος του Ελλαδικού Χώρου [For a History of the 
Anarchist Movement in Greece], pp. 184-85. 
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in Europe at the time.34 There were also significant currents of 
anarchosocialists/anarchochristians on an individual or group basis.35 
The first circle of activity for the anarchists in Greece ended with the civil war 
(1946-1949) after having suffered severe strikes during the Metaxas’ dictatorship 
(1936-1941) and the German occupation (1941-1944).36 In the meantime, the gradual 
rise of the component of the workers’ movement affiliated to the Bolsheviks,37 the 
prevalence of the Communist Party38 and the crushing of the Spanish revolution 
resulted in anarchist decline. This meant that the anarchists became detached from 
current political realities. A long time passed before the passage from the dipole 
Bakunin – Marx to that of antiauthoritarian – authoritarian communism signified the 
beginning of a new, revitalized, era of anarchism in Greece, inspired by events like 
that of Hungary in 1956 and May 1968.39  
There is general consensus that the second wave of anarchism in Greece had 
no bonds with the anarchist legacy of the nineteenth and twentieth century but was 
instead deeply influenced by the youth movements in the U.S.A. and the new social 
movements in Europe during the 60s and the 70s.40  
The organizational model of the second wave of Greek anarchists is “affinity 
groups”, not the party or the syndicate. This is because anarchy in Greece was reborn 
under post-Fordist conditions that discouraged huge assemblies and their consequent 
organizing models. Moreover, the strong influence of the Situationist May, the Italian 
Autonomia and the German Autonomen on Greek anarchist space was felt in the 
                                                        
34 Δ. Τ., Για μια Ιστορία του Αναρχικού Κινήματος του Ελλαδικού Χώρου [For a History of the 
Anarchist Movement in Greece], pp. 459, 475-76. 
35 Δ. Τ., Για μια Ιστορία του Αναρχικού Κινήματος του Ελλαδικού Χώρου [For a History of the 
Anarchist Movement in Greece], pp. 92, 259, 287-88, 523, 661. 
36 Egger. 
37 Kyrillos Papastaurou, “Σύντομη Αναφορά στο Αναρχικό Ρεύμα στην Ελλάδα” [Short Reference to 
the Anarchist Current in Greece], http://www1.rizospastis.gr/story.do?id=2801152&publDate 
(accessed on 20/5/2013) and Δίκτυο Π.Δ., “Ο Αναρχικός Χώρος” [The Anarchist Space], 
http://www.anarkismo.net/article/14864&comment_limit=0&condense_comments=false (accessed on 
20/5/2013). 
38 Δ. Τ., “Η Αναρχική Οργάνωση στην Ελλάδα 1970-1990” [The Anarchist Organization in Greece], 
http://ngnm.vrahokipos.net/index.php/history/41-arthra/75-1970-1990 (accessed on 20/5/2013). 
39 Δ. Τ., “Η Κίνηση για τη Συγκρότηση Αναρχικής Ομοσπονδίας” [The Move to Set up an Anarchist 
Federation], http://ngnm.vrahokipos.net/index.php/history/41-arthra/76-omospondia (accessed on 
20/5/2013). 
40 Terminal 119, “Μια Συνέντευξη με τον Φίλιππα Κυρίτση” [An Interview with Filippos Kyritsis], 
http://terminal119archive.wordpress.com/2008/03/15/%CE%BC%CE%B9%CE%B1-
%CF%83%CF%85%CE%BD%CE%AD%CE%BD%CF%84%CE%B5%CF%85%CE%BE%CE%B7-
%CE%BC%CE%B5-%CF%84%CE%BF%CE%BD-
%CF%86%CE%AF%CE%BB%CE%B9%CF%80%CF%80%CE%B1-
%CE%BA%CF%85%CF%81%CE%AF%CF%84%CF%83%CE%B7/ (accessed on 20/5/2013),  
Δίκτυο Π.Δ., “Ο Αναρχικός Χώρος” [The Anarchist Space], and Δ. Τ., “Η Αναρχική Οργάνωση στην 
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adoption of a new model for activism. This rejected the hegemony of the Left – the 
claim to know everything concerning social progression and to occupy the vanguard 
role – and which aimed at intensifying social struggle by challenging the state's 
monopoly of violence and insisting on the right to resist. Anarchist political subjects 
provoke social rupture and once it becomes manifest they dissolve in it.41 This is also 
the reason why anarchists in Greece do not generally follow the traditional anarchist 
currents, like anarcho-communism or anarcho-syndicalism, but side with the current 
of antiauthority, regarded elsewhere in Europe and North America as a refreshment of 
anarchy. They are also called “antiauthoritarians”, in an effort to exceed classical 
anarchism.42 A possible explanation for this conjunction of anarchism, autonomy and 
antiauthoritarianism is that, firstly, the majority of the anarchists of the post-
dictatorship era were members of left groups or had a left political history,43 and 
secondly, many of those who fled abroad during the dictatorship, became familiar 
with the autonomist movements of central Europe and upon their return brought with 
them information about their practices and political stance.44  
 During the revolt of the Polytechnic School, in 1973, there was a small 
number of anarchists propagandising against the state, authority and the army, who 
after the fall of the dictatorship (1974) began to increase but never managed to 
exceed, in Athens, one hundred people. This is when the first bookshops were opened, 
mainly around Exarchia, and the first magazines, proclamations and texts started to 
circulate.45 In 1976 anarchists expressed their solidarity to the arrested members of 
the Red Army Faction (RAF) guerrilla group in Germany, pointing out the central role 
that solidarity had in their political and social “agenda”,46 regardless if the ones in 
need were anarchists or not.47 
1980-81 are “the years of change”, when PASOK came to power. There were 
many anarchists and autonomists who were seduced by the “socialistic” rhetoric of 
                                                                                                                                                               
Ελλάδα 1970-1990” [The Anarchist Organization in Greece]. 
41 Panagiotis Kalamaras, “Κύριοι, Αγαπάτε Μας και Αξύριστους, Ξυρισμένους Μας Αγαπάνε Όλοι” 
[Gentlemen, Love Us Even If We Are Unshaved. Otherwise, Everyone Loves Us], Panopticon, No 12, 
pp. 18-19.  
42 Giorgos Thalassis (Panagiotis Kalamaras), “Πριν Είκοσι Έτη” [Twenty Years Ago] in Kalamaras, 
Πατησίων και Στουρνάρη Γωνία [Corner of Patission & Stournari], pp. 22-23.  
43 Terminal 119, and  Anon., 30 Χρόνια Πίσω [30 Years Back], no time, no place, no edition, p. 34. 
44 Δίκτυο Π.Δ., “Ο Αναρχικός Χώρος” [The Anarchist Space]. 
45 Δ. Τ., “Η Αναρχική Οργάνωση στην Ελλάδα 1970-1990” [The Anarchist Organization in Greece]. 
46 Δ. Τ., “Η Αναρχική Οργάνωση στην Ελλάδα 1970-1990” [The Anarchist Organization in Greece]. 
47 Anon., 30 Χρόνια Πίσω [30 Years Back], p. 34. 
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Andreas Papandreou and did not hesitate to support PASOK in its campaign.48 Quite 
soon after PASOK’s great electoral victory, antiauthoritarians and others around them 
started occupying empty houses in order to create their eutopia here and now, satisfy 
their needs for a new world and begin with changing their own selves,49 still believing 
that despite the negative reaction of the most conservative parts of society the 
(“socialist”) police would not evacuate their squats.50 They were dramatically 
disillusioned when Papandreou chose to give a violent answer to the oncoming 
squatting avalanche.51 Those were also the years that the state tried to confront this 
restless and out of control youth by allowing drug dealers to enter Exarchia and 
promote heroin.52 This situation was also intensified six or seven years later when the 
anarchists in Exarchia attacked the nearby drug dealers and the riot police intervened 
in order to pull down a banner saying “It is the cops who sell heroin”.53   
In 1985, there was seen the first sign of a more Situationist way of thinking 
since anarchists decided to form an autonomous demonstration for celebrating the 1st 
of May, instead of following the march of the Left, which was the usual norm. The 
objective was for anarchists themselves to create the “situations” and not wait for a 
possible deviation.54 Of course, this switch towards the core of influences coming 
from May 68 posed two basic issues, which are still “hot” for the anarchist space in 
Greece, those of organization and violence. The nature of anarchists’ organization is 
the one thing that differentiates them from the left and leftists. That is its anti-
hierarchical character, the absence of a party and their mobilization through horizontal 
affinity groups. The other thing, is a use of violence in coordination with the desirable 
goals, meaning an active violence only when it is really necessary, taking place 
massively and thus rejecting both the militarist version of the (left, mainly) guerrilla 
groups and the spectacular violence that feeds public opinion as well as the vanity of 
the agents involved.55 Nevertheless, the relationship of anarchists with violence has 
                                                        
48 Manolo, Οι Κοινωνικοί Αγώνες στην Ελλάδα των Αντιεξουσιαστικών Ομάδων κατά την 8ετία του 
ΠΑΣΟΚ (1981-1989) [The Social Struggles of the Antiauthoritarian Groups During the 8 Years of 
PASOK (1981-1989) in Greece], no edition, Athens 1989, p. 9.   
49 Manolo, pp. 14-15. 
50 Manolo, p. 22. 
51 Autonomous Citizens’ Initiative, Αυτοί οι Αγώνες Συνεχίζονται [These Struggles Go on], no edition, 
Athens 1996, p. 203. 
52 Terminal 119. 
53 Manolo, pp. 104-05. 
54 Thalassis (Panagiotis Kalamaras), “Πριν Είκοσι Έτη” [Twenty Years Ago], p. 34. 
55 Thalassis (Panagiotis Kalamaras), “Πριν Είκοσι Έτη” [Twenty Years Ago], pp. 36-37. 
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not always been clear. After the arrest of many November 17 (17N)56 members in 
2002, a significant part of the anarchist space supported the “dignity” and “ethics” of 
17N and practically defended every form of violence, thus provoking a great 
confusion within the anarchist circles.57 In addition, there has been a usual internal 
debate about the practices of the anarchists in the streets (violence or non violence, 
timing, quality and quantity of violent repertoire etc.), a debate intensified every time 
riots brake out during manifestations or other gatherings. 
There are three additional years in the recent history of the Greek anarchist 
space that bear a special significance. In May 1985 Greece was in a pre-election 
period with PASOK aiming at four more years of governance. On the 9th of May large 
numbers of people started gathering in Exarchia in order to demonstrate against the 
parody of the elections. A squad of riot police approached the protesters and made 
clear that they were not allowed to march. Everyone should remain at their place; 
otherwise they would be “demolished”.58 Right away, a group of – more or less – 
seventy people decided to occupy the Chemistry School in Exarchia and, thus, show 
that they were not willing to tolerate such threats. For five days the occupants were 
surrounded by police forces that did not hesitate to beat everyone who approached the 
place in order to offer food or water to those inside and to threat the anarchists that 
they would end the occupation violently. A massive current of solidarity developed 
that led a huge march of almost six hundred people to the footsteps of the Chemistry 
School where the emotionally intense scene of the “liberation” of the occupants 
showed the government that “a bunch of anarchists ridiculed the state and its 
repression”.59 
In November of the same year, on the anniversary of the events at the 
Polytechnic School (1973), many protesters were ready to clash with the police forces 
since for the first time in the history of this demonstration the riot police made its 
provocative appearance at the outset. Indeed, within a short period of time the police 
attacked and “broke” the crowd, and many people rushed towards Exarchia in order to 
avoid the police brutality. However, police forces were there too and fierce 
                                                        
56 Leninist guerrilla group that was formed just after the fall of the dictatorship in 1974.  
57 The Children of the Galley, “Οι Ιστορικές Περιπέτειες των Εννοιών του Πολιτικού Εγκλήματος και 
της Τρομοκρατίας” [The Historical Adventures of the Meaning of Political Crime and Terrorism], p. 
53, http://www.tapaidiatisgalarias.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/historical_terrorism.pdf, (accessed 
on 20/5/2013). 
58 Manolo, pp. 56-57. 
59 Manolo, pp. 68-69. 
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confrontations took place that led to the cold blood execution of a 15 year old boy by 
a policeman.60 The murder of Michalis Kaltezas was an event that marked the 
anarchist space deeply and further intensified its rage against the state and the, so 
called, socialist government of PASOK. This event helps us understand how the 
murder of Alexis Grigoropoulos also served as a reminder of state criminality for 
many anarchists who had either participated in the manifestation of 1985 or had read 
about it in relative brochures and proclamations. 
Ten years later, again on the same anniversary, anarchists, antiauthoritarians 
and autonomists occupied the Polytechnic School reacting to the repression against 
the prisoners of Korydallos Jail, and in solidarity with the students’ fight against the 
“modernization” governmental plans in education. After fierce fighting around the 
Polytechnic School the police invaded the School, for the first time after 1973, and 
arrested 504 people. Although this invasion was a harsh blow to the Greek anarchist 
movement, since it allowed the police to complete an effective “mapping” of the 
anarchist space within a night, it also destroyed certain myths and prejudices 
concerning the anarchists and their practices: firstly, the usual accusation of a 
maximum of 50-60 provocateurs that initiate and maintain such irregularities could 
not stand anymore. Five hundred people were arrested, proving that the dynamic of 
the insurrectionist youth was beyond the distortions of journalists and the state. 
Secondly, the propaganda for the “destructive nature” of anarchists whenever they 
occupy a civil space also collapsed, since the report from the evacuated Polytechnic 
School showed that no destruction had taken place, despite the fact that this was the 
official excuse of the police in order to invade.61 
Finally, the European Union Summit of Thessaloniki in 2003 was a critical 
point in the history of the anarchist space. The significant rally of the movement 
together with the formation and promotion of new groups and ventures – that posed a 
fresh problematic on issues concerning tactics, aims and ideological matters – were 
the two main reasons for this.62   
It is not by accident that when they first appeared massively in the Greek 
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political scene, during the first occupation wave of the 80s, anarchists were called by 
the media “anarcho-autonomists” [αναρχοαυτόνομοι]. If someone checks the 
practices of the Italian Autonomia, or the German Autonomen (how to escalate a 
demonstration, how to act horizontally through direct-democratic assemblies within 
the movement, and not as a sect that bears the one and only “truth”, etc.), they will see 
that the Greek anarchist/ antiauthoritarian/ autonomist/ libertarian/ antagonist 
movement certainly adopted these tactics and views, since – before the mid 80s – 
anarchists in Greece were closer to currents like May 68 and Internationale 
Situationniste rather than the classical federations of anarchism. In this context they 
also adopted the symbol of “A” in a circle, which refers to the rebirth of anarchism 
after the events of May 68, a symbol they, however, preserved even when they began 
to approach classical anarchism, through the current of insurrectionary anarchism.63   
The main tendencies within the contemporary anarchist/ autonomist/ 
antiauthoritarian space in Greece are monothematic groups that deal with specific 
social issues (environmental, neighbourhood issues etc.) without offering an overall 
social vision, anarcho-syndicalist groups that focus on trade unions and class struggle, 
collectives that participate in specific fronts (against statist repression, solidarity to 
prisoners etc.) together with left groups, and groups of autonomists who are generally 
cut off from the rest of the anarchist space, and work systematically on matters like 
nationalism, migration etc.64 However, since the occupation of the Polytechnic 
University in 1990, there have been two major anarchist categories in Greece. The 
“insurrectionists”, who believe that clashes in the streets offer the only way to escape 
mainstream politics, and the “desiring” anarchists who also clash with the police or 
the fascists but, moreover, insist on connecting with the time-space of the metropolis, 
primarily through squats and haunts [στέκια],65thus giving an additional cultural 
dimension to the battle against authority.66 The former “family” seems to constitute 
the majority of the anarchist space, whose basic references go back to May 68 and 
who consider everything that includes a clash with the police as insurrectionist. They 
reject structures and organization and do not have any plans for a future stateless 
society. The latter family mainly focuses on the revolution of everyday life through 
                                                        
63 Panagiotis Kalamaras, “Γιατί μας Αρέσει ο Τόνι Νέγκρι” [Why We Like Toni Negri] in Kalamaras, 
Πατησίων και Στουρνάρη Γωνία [Corner of Patission & Stournari], pp. 77-78. 
64 Δίκτυο Π.Δ., “Ο Αναρχικός Χώρος” [The Anarchist Space]. 
65 Στέκι (Steki-stekia in plural) is a place, rented or occupied by small groups, used for talks, 
assemblies and other fermentations related to the objectives and causes of the antagonist movement. 
66 Kalamaras, “Γιατί μας Αρέσει ο Τόνι Νέγκρι” [Why We Like Toni Negri], p. 79. 
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changing itself, it rejects structures and invests in autonomous, free zones within the 
land of the authoritative metropolis.67  
As a result, and because of the above practice models which the anarchists of 
December fused, they managed to open a channel of communication between squats, 
university places and haunts – reference points of counter-information and assemblies 
– and the rest of society. Therefore, the agents I refer to in this chapter are mainly 
groups self-defined as anarchist/ antiauthoritarian/ autonomist/ libertarian that 
developed activity in the streets, within the radius of the primary events, and also 
articulated radicalized utterances through brochures, graffiti and other means of 
communication. As far as their discourse is concerned, in many instances Nietzsche’s 
utterances seem to fit perfectly at a level of form and aesthetics, i.e. the sarcastic and 
Situationist style of the Decembrians resembles the irony, aphorism and voluntarism 
of Nietzsche. Whether the content of the insurrectionists’ words was also consistent 
with Nietzsche’s meanings is not something to be said in advance since, except for the 
times that anarchists cited him (and even then we can not be certain that they used his 
thoughts “properly”), there was no sign of a conscious interaction with him. Hence, 
and although on many occasions it seems that I take their words at face value, what I 
am trying to do is designate their connection with Nietzsche, not just through plain 
words that sound the same, but via elaborated utterances situated in affinal 
philosophical contexts – that is, the perception of December from the anarchists and 
the “Three Metamorphoses” passage from Nietzsche. I consider this connection to 
stand for the third and fourth type of elective affinity (presented as such in chapter 
B.1), “partial fusion” and the “creation of a new figure”. The former, as two parts that 
intermingle at a level of ideas and practices and the latter, as Nietzsche’s seal on the 
ongoing project of creating one’s (anarchist) self within the circles of Greek anarchist 
space. 
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D.3/ Mainstream Perceptions of the December ’08 Revolt and their Inadequacies 
/ The Anarchist Reading 
The choice of the “Zarathustra” apparatus for my reading of December ’08 aims at 
approaching the events in a very different way to the mainstream readings made by 
the media and the political parties. These readings sometimes presented December as 
an atrocious and pointless riot that could not be justified, either by the murder of 
Alexandros Grigoropoulos or by the already existing social and political tensions, and 
at other times tried to embody the Decembrian events and activities into the present 
political system. In the latter case, the attempt was to present the whole revolt as a 
political conflict where the “protesters” were just seeking to satisfy certain political 
demands. Of course, there were cases and stances that combined the above 
dimensions, which are nothing but a continuation of the usual response of the media 
and the established political parties to ruptures of such intensity. As seen in the review 
of the past decades’ events, political parties in power and their affiliated media always 
tried to distort the nature of the opposition (party or movemental). The case of the 
post-civil war state where communists were regarded as national traitors and miasma 
is an example. Alternatively, they tried to discharge social uprisings by embodying 
them in their political agenda. This was the case with PASOK which in order to come 
to power did not hesitate to adopt the counter European and NATO propaganda of the 
Left and even the antiauthoritarian/anti-repressive rhetoric of the radical movement. 
Hence, the mainstream accounts of the December revolt and the alternative reading 
made by the agents themselves (and especially by those self-defined as 
anarchists/antiauthoritarians/autonomists), exposes the great gap between radical and 
mainstream politics that goes back almost seven decades.  
The analysis that follows will also appear fragmentarily in the main body of 
this chapter, which is the Nietzschean interpretation of the revolt through “The Three 
Metamorphoses”, in order to explain the reactionary nature of the negative forces (the 
stance of the left political parties and the role of the media, among others) related to 
the revolt.   
 
The Political Parties 
The political parties presented here constitute the main political forces of the Greek 
political scene during the December revolt. Five of them (ND, PASOK, KKE, LAOS, 
SYRIZA) were in the parliament, whereas the other two (EEK and ANTARSYA) 
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belong to the extra-parliamentary Left. ND is the traditional party of Greek Right, 
PASOK began as a social democratic party that gradually adopted neo-liberal 
policies, KKE is a traditional orthodox communist party, SYRIZA has a rather euro-
communist orientation with various components that adopt policies of the far Left, 
and LAOS is a populist party of the far Right that invests on the values of Orthodox 
Christianity and patriotism. As far as the extra-parliamentary parties are concerned, 
EEK is a Trotskyist party with a rather radical repertoire (at least in comparison with 
other parties of the extra-parliamentary Left), whereas ANTARSYA has a more leftist 
but still mainstream and moderate character. 
The relationship of the above parties on a political spectrum could be depicted 
as follows: 
 
                  
The above figure consists of two axes, offering an economic and a social 
dimension. I chose to put the parties in a way that would emphasise their actual 
political activity rather than their political philosophical background, and in terms of 
relative quality and not quantity. Hence, for example, PASOK is put on the upper 
right square, although it is supposed to be a social democratic party, but still on the 
left and below ND, without us being interested in its absolute position on the 
spectrum. Likewise, EEK is indeed more libertarian than SYRIZA, no matter if the 
former is a Trotskyist and the latter a euro-communist/radical left party. 
Keeping these political relationships in mind, let us examine the stance these 
parties bore during the events of December.      
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New Democracy (ND) 
New Democracy, the party in power in December 2008, definitely was in a position of 
defence, so it chose to gradually escalate its statements, having a double purpose: On 
the one hand, it tried to present the murder of Grigoropoulos as an isolated incident, 
an accident, rather than a generalized police tactic, expressing – at the same time – 
feelings of rage against the murderer and of sympathy towards the parents of 
Grigoropoulos, when, on the other hand, it indirectly equated the loss of a human life 
with the damages caused by rioters to shops, statist buildings etc: The statement of 
Prokopis Pavlopoulos,1 just after the murder, underlined the government’s sorrow for 
the loss of Alexandros, the decisiveness to punish the guilty and the need for new 
measures that would prevent such incidents from happening again. However, quite 
soon, the government’s communicative centre of gravity shifted towards a 
“materialistic” perception of the situation. Lefteris Zagoritis asked everyone to stay 
calm so that threats against life or property would be avoided,2 whereas the Minister 
of Finance rushed to inform about the refunds given to all those whose properties 
suffered damages.3 The next step was the continuous denouncement of violence4 and 
an effort to criminalize those acting violently, by depoliticizing their acts whilst 
characterizing them as “enemies of Democracy”,5 in order to reach out to the youth 
and absorb its rage into the existing political system: On December 16 2008 Kostas 
Karamanlis tried to disconnect the revolt from the agonies and the fights of the new 
generation and join the latter with ameliorative policies for education and the labour 
market.6   
In the end, ND’s stance was defined by a controversy with the parties of 
opposition, and especially with PASOK (its main competitor and the other, traditional 
party of power) and SYRIZA, whose obscure stance towards the revolt allowed the 
government to find a scapegoat that would disorientate the public opinion. On 
December 23rd Giannis Tragkakis criticized Giorgos Papandreou for choosing to 
defame the image of the country,7 while the president of PASOK was abroad, and the 
                                                        
1 Statement of Prokopis Pavlopoulos, Minister of Internal Affairs, on 6/12/2008. 
2 Statement of Lefteris Zagoritis, Secretary of ND’s Central Committee, on 7/12/2008.   
3 Statement of Giorgos Alogoskoufis, on 10/12/2008. 
4 Press Conference of the Government’s Spokesman, Evaggelos Antonaros, to the foreign journalists, 
on 8/12/2008. 
5 Statement of Kostas Karamanlis on 9/12/2008. 
6 Speech of Kostas Karamanlis to the MPs of his party, on 16/12/2008. 
7 Interview of Giannis Tragkakis, General Secretary of ND’s parliamentary group, to the Radio Station 
“Channel 1”, on 23/12/2008. 
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Prime Minister himself clearly implied that SYRIZA did not disapprove of the 
vandalisms,8 a stance that since then has stirred ideas about a possible involvement of 
SYRIZA with the hooded rioters. It is worth mentioning that, in the same interview, 
Giannis Tragkakis praised the responsible stance of Aleka Papariga, leader of the 
Communist Party, who condemned, with no hesitation, the activities of the violent 
rioters.9 
 
Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) 
PASOK hold a slightly different stance by criticizing governmental incompetence but 
also talking about a social explosion related to the already existing financial and 
social dead-ends.10 Nevertheless, the “socialist” party chose to diverge from the 
demonstrations organized by the Left on 6th, 7th and 8th of December in order to give 
its own clear mark, calling for peaceful protests against violence, under the title “a 
candle for Alexandros”.11 Its relevant rhetoric also included the condemnation of 
violence, “no matter where it comes from”,12 and the distinction between the 
uncountable peaceful protesters and a violent, marginalized minority of a “supposed” 
anarchist character”13: Giannis Ragkousis, secretary of PASOK’s national council, 
spoke of a “minor social hooliganism”14, whereas Maria Damanaki, MP who as a 
university student happened to be one of the most prominent members of the 
Polytechnic occupation against the junta in 1973, recognized the signs of a social 
revolt but with blind expressions of rage.15 Additionally, the party’s youth made a 
statement against the vandalisms of minor groups, and criticized the statist inability to 
protect private property.16  
Another important practice of PASOK, related to the students’ and 
youngsters’ mobilizations, was its effort to incorporate them, divest them of their 
violent and subversive characteristics and embody them in the party’s political 
agenda: Many members of PASOK will participate in the mobilizations, criticizing 
                                                        
8 Press Conference of the Greek Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis in Brussels, on 12/12/2008. 
9 Interview of Giannis Tragkakis, General Secretary of ND’s parliamentary group, to the Radio Station 
“Channel 1”, on 23/12/2008. 
10 Interview of Giorgos Papakonstantinou to the Radio Station “Athens 9,84”, on 8/12/2008. 
11 Giannis Ragkousis’ newsletter to the members of PASOK for a protest against violence under the 
name “A candle for Alexandros”, on 8/12/2008. 
12 Statement of Giorgos Papandreou, on 9/12/2008, after visiting the prime minister. 
13 Interview of Giorgos Ragkousis to the TV broadcast “Proskinio” of NET channel, on 8/12/2008. 
14 Interview to the TV broadcast “Proskinio” of NET channel, on 8/12/2008. 
15 Interview to the Radio Station “NET 105,8”, on 9/12/2008. 
16 Statement of PASOK’s Youth on 9/12/2008, regarding the riots in Athens. 
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the police violence,17 whereas the same party’s youth that had expressed its agony 
about private properties called for the preservation of the mobilizations in order to 
“turn rage into hope”.18  
However, the effort to express both indignation and legality resulted in a 
contradiction. PASOK’s leader, Giorgos Papandreou, referred approvingly to all the 
15-year-old students that crowded in the streets without any guidance19 but 
conveniently “ignored” the fact that, from Monday 8th of December, most students 
opted to pursue a strategy of violent confrontation with the police, by organizing huge 
demonstrations and attacking police stations with rocks, paints and garbage.20 
 
Greek Communist Party (KKE) 
The stance of KKE was much clearer and, the party was absolutely hostile towards 
the revolt. For the communist party, the rioters were mainly bourgeois and petite-
bourgeois, expressing violently the dead-end of their petit-bourgeois life.21 The 
murder of Grigoropoulos, although recognized as a murder which was neither isolated 
nor accidental but a result of the statist violence and repression,22 according to the 
party’s leadership should be also attributed to the continuous confrontation between 
the anarchists and the police.23 Three days after the assassination, Aleka Papariga 
intensified her attack on the anarchists by saying that their hardcore has sprung from 
the circles of statist power, serving the statist repression and fighting the people’s 
movement,24 whereas the party’s MP Liana Kanelli claimed that KKE can prove that 
the centre of Athens was burnt by pimps and drug dealers.25 
KKE’s detestation for any views regarding the events as a revolt during these 
days can also be viewed through its leader’s perception of the term “revolt”: “What is 
a people’s revolt? The real people’s revolt will have workers, employees and the 
youth as a starting point. The real people’s revolt will not smash even a single 
                                                        
17 Statement of Sofia Sakorafa, on 9/12/2008. 
18 Statement of PASOK’s Youth, on 18/12/2008. 
19 Statement of Giorgos Papandreou, on 9/12/2008, after visiting the prime minister. 
20 T. Lampropoulos, “Έφοδος Μαθητών σε 25 Α.Τ.” [Students Raid to 25 Police Stations], 
Elftherotipia, 12/12/2008, p. 4. 
21 Dimitris Gontikas, “Περί Εξέγερσης” [Of Revolt], Rizospastis, 16/12/2008, p. 7. 
22 Speech of Aleka Papariga, General Secretary of the Communist Party, to groups of the party and the 
party’s youth, on 8/12/2008. 
23 Statement of Aleka Papariga, on 7/12/2008. 
24 Statement of Aleka Papariga after meeting the Prime Minister, on 9/12/2008. 
25 Liana Kanneli at Mega Channel’s main newscast, on 9/12/2008. 
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pane”.26 This “pacifist” definition of revolt and the general practices stemming from 
such a view not only alienated the communist party from the ongoing events but also 
targeted and demonized the conflictual practices of the insurrectionists so intensely 
that it provoked the congratulations of the most conservative political parties, that is, 
ND27 and LAOS.28 This tactic also confirmed the established position of KKE to act 
within the political system and only through the means this system offers, for fights 
that will extend to the whole spectrum of the political life, from the bout of statist 
repression to the financial and social demands of the working class, against the attack 
on people’s rights.29   
 
People’s Orthodox Alarm (LAOS) 
There were some points in the perception of the revolt from the xenophobic and ultra-
right populist LAOS that designate interesting resemblances with the stance of the 
Communist Party. From the very beginning, LAOS related the murder of 
Grigoropoulos to the permanent clash between anarchists and the police30 – in 
particular, a statement of the party’s youth will consider the “out of control violent 
regime of Exarchia” to be the cause of the boy’s death31 – and characterized 
anarchist’s response as “ruthless violence”.32 These resemblances are of great interest 
because KKE and LAOS are actually the heirs of the two hostile camps of the Greek 
civil war. The fact that their views at such a critical time point seem similar, reveals 
the deep gap between KKE’s past radicalism and today’s incorporation into bourgeois 
politics, as well as the superficial interpretation of the revolt by a large part of the Left 
in Greece that feels aligned with the Stalinists. 
Within a few days, LAOS’ stance obtained characteristics closer to a defense 
of the police, based on class features – Karatzaferis linked Exarchia with the offspring 
of high-class families33 – and versus the monopoly of the “700 Euros Generation” and 
“violence victims” terms by the Left: The MP Adonis Georgiadis appropriated these 
                                                        
26 Speech of Aleka Papariga at the Parliament, on 23/12/2008. 
27 See the aforementioned Interview of Giannis Tragkakis for the Radio Station “Channel 1”, on 
23/12/2008. 
28 See the Press conference of Giorgos karatzaferis, LAOS’ leader, on 11/12/2008. 
29 Central Committee of KKE, “Για τις Τελευταίες Εξελίξεις με Αφορμή τις Κινητοποιήσεις για τη 
Δολοφονία του Δεκαπεντάχρονου” [About the Latest Developments in the Wake of Protests for the 
Murder of the 15-year-old], Rizospastis, 10/12/2008, p. 7.   
30 Statement of the party “for the death of the 16-year-old youth”, on 7/12/2008.  
31 “Όχι στη Βία και το Χάος του ΣΥΡΙΖΑ και των Αναρχικών” [No to the Violence and Chaos of 
SYRIZA and Anarchists], statement of LAOS’ youth, on 10/12/2008.    
32 Statement of the party “for the death of the 16-year-old youth”, on 7/12/2008. 
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terms in favour of the riot policemen in contradiction to the violent and privileged 
rioters.34    
Nonetheless, there were also parts of the Greek Left that had a more positive, 
even participating stance towards the uprising. This stance concerns SYRIZA and the 
most important components (based on their recent electoral results and their general 
presence in the streets) of the extra-parliamentary Left, like ANTARSYA35 and EEK. 
 
Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) 
As far as SYRIZA is concerned, although the majority of the party’s36 members and 
its youth took part in the demonstrations from the very beginning, the overall stance 
of the party seemed to oscillate between the preservation of law and order and the 
praise of the uprising. This obscure stance provoked the criticism not only of the other 
parliamentary parties but of the anarchists as well, who saw the opportunistic 
intentions of a potential electoral rise in the double face of such a tactic. The main 
slogan of SYNASPISMOS’ youth was, the quite anarchistic, “The State Murders”,37 
while Alekos Alavanos, president of SYRIZA’s parliamentary group, asked the 
government to abolish the riot police and quit.38 The party did not, officially, side 
with the violent practices of the insurgents but acknowledged the fact that this violent 
repertoire was chosen by a great amount of the protesters, giving characteristics of a 
generalized explosion of rage.39 
On the other hand, members of SYNASPISMOS, like Giannis Balafas, Fotis 
Kouvelis and Dimitris Papadimoulis condemned violence and vandalisms without 
                                                                                                                                                               
33 Press Conference of Giorgos Karatzaferis, on 11/12/2008.  
34 Interview for “Channel 10”, on 10/12/2008. 
35 ANTARSYA is a coalition of ten left and ultra-left groups and several individuals, with origins from 
the anti-capitalist, revolutionary and communist left, and radical ecology. It was formed on 22/3/2009 
as a result of assemblies and fermentations which can be traced back to the December events. Although 
this coalition did not exist during the revolt, the fact is that it works as an umbrella for all of the groups, 
with December ’08 being their main unification point. It constitutes a rather loose formation, depicts 
the groups’ common perception of the revolt and, therefore, instead of referring to all these components 
individually I chose to deal with them as a sole schema, even a posteriori. 
36 The term “party” is not accurate for describing the political nature of SYRIZA, which until the 
second round of the 2012 elections had been a coalition of left and leftist components, closer to the 
model of ANTARSYA. Nevertheless, I will adopt this term when referring to SYRIZA, as since its 
formation there has been one party, SYNASPISMOS, that plays the central role. 
37 “Το Κράτος Δολοφονεί. Πρέπει να τους Σταματήσουμε” [The State Murders. We have to Stop 
Them]. Statement of SYNASPISMOS’ Youth, on 7/12/2008. 
38 Statement of Alekos Alavanos, on 7/12/2008. 
39 Interview of Andreas Karitzis, Spokesman of the party, for the radio station “Athina 9,84”, on 
8/12/2008. 
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reservation40 and attributed the fires and damages to a minority of hooded protesters 
whose anti-social activity sided with the plans of the statist repression.41 Contrarily to 
his MPs, the president of SYRIZA, Alexis Tsipras, spoke clearly of a revolt and 
although he did not adopt the violent practices, he did not seem to condemn them 
either.42 Alekos Alavanos also tried to maintain a stance somewhere in the middle 
when he denounced hooded rioters and blind violence but, at the same time, he sided 
with the protesters.43 Moreover, a text published in the party’s newspaper, signed by a 
lot of SYRIZA members and other sympathizers, articulated positions that anarchists 
would to some extent share: December is a revolt with a social and political 
substratum; we defend it without a second thought; we do not focus on damage, thus 
neglecting the essence of the revolt; we are done with the fearful descent of the Left 
since the end of the civil war; we are not looking in the direction of elections but 
towards the future. However, it could not avoid bringing reformist demands through 
the “back door” when speaking of the need to get rid of this government, hence 
limiting the fight to a governmental change,44 a political and not a social subversion 
anarchists would call for. 
 
Labour Revolutionary Party (EEK) and Anti-capitalist Left Cooperation for 
Subversion (ANTARSYA) 
EEK and the leftist groups that would form ANTARSYA later on, had by far the most 
positive stance towards the revolt and on many occasions they stood side by side with 
the anarchists in the streets or released declarations and proclamations of full 
support.45 This stance might have saved some of the (extra-parliamentary) Left’s 
prestige but a core problem was still present. That was the inability to understand the 
anarchist meaning for a “here and now” transvaluation of values instead of a fight 
overshadowed by the hegemonic presence of a party avant-garde. This inability is 
marked by the consistent participation of these groups in the electoral procedure, that 
is, their dedication to the political struggle through elections, the most disorientating 
                                                        
40 Interview of Fotis Kouvelis for “NET Channel”, on 9/12/2008. 
41 Interview of Dimitris Papadimoulis for “NET” radio station, on 9/12/2008. 
42 Statement of Alexis Tsipras, on 8/12/2008. 
43 Statement of Alekos Alavanos after meeting the Prime Minister, on 9/12/2008. 
44 «Όταν η Νεολαία Δολοφονείται η Αριστερά δεν Απολογείται [When Youth is Murdered, Left does 
not Apologize], Avgi, 14/12/2008, and ΣΥΡΙΖΑ ΒΥΡΩΝΑ, «Προς Όλους τους Συντρόφους και 
Συντρόφισσες του ΣΥΡΙΖΑ» [To All Comrades of SYRIZA], http://syriza-
vyrona.pblogs.gr/2008/12/378245.html (accessed on 21/2/2013). 
45 Anon., http://www.sek-ist.gr/EA/home.php?article_ID=1184 (accessed on 21/2/2013). 
 
 
 
 
150 
apparatus of the bourgeois state, according to the anarchists. In addition to this come 
the unavoidable articulation of demands towards authorities that create an atmosphere 
of negotiation, thus, incorporation to the system46 and the endless hunt for new party 
members.47    
 
The Media 
The role of the vast majority of the media during December was rather reactive, 
following the tactic of presenting the events as a spectacle. In order to highlight this 
stance I will  refer to six traditional newspapers that are high in the relative circulation 
list. Without belonging to the hardcore of any political party, their “sympathies” cover 
the main political/social spectrum of the time, meaning the Right (Kathimerini, 
Eleftheros Tipos), the social-democratic Left (Ta Nea, To Vima, Ethnos) and the 
space between the parliamentary and the extra-parliamentary Left (Eleftherotipia). 
The seventh newspaper (Avriani) was chosen because in the past it has expressed its 
sympathy and support towards almost every political party (PASOK, ND, KKE, 
SYRIZA), a fact that does not of course credit it with objectivity but reveals a higher 
populist profile that has a small but significant impact to a part of the public opinion 
in Greece. Moreover, I will not refer to TV media, except for one distinctive case, for 
the reason that almost every broadcast concerning the revolt was nothing more than a 
“greedy” spectacular reproduction of the fighting in the streets, the barricades and 
whatever would maximize the viewing figures. All references focus on the coverage 
of the actual events as well as on the distortion and concealment of truth by the vast 
majority of the media. 
 The first two weeks of the revolt (6-20/12) were full of activism in the streets, 
and the relevant coverage, apart from referring to the murder as an abhorrent deed, 
focused on the insurrectionists in quite a monolithic way that did not leave enough 
room for any different or deeper approach. What monopolized the newspapers’ covers 
was the destruction and the rage of the anarchists. These were some of the most 
characteristic headlines: “Athens has surrendered to the law of the jungle. The city 
centre is a battlefield. Buildings are burnt, shops are destroyed. The rage of the 
                                                        
46Anon., «Κάτω η ΚΥΒΕΡΝΗΣΗ ΤΩΝ ΔΟΛΟΦΟΝΩΝ: Γενική Πολιτική Απεργία Διαρκείας» 
[Enough with the GOVERNEMENT OF MURDERERS: General, Political Strike], 
http://www.eek.gr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=133:2011-11-17-18-55-
05&catid=53:december2008&Itemid=62 and Anon., http://www.sek-
ist.gr/EA/home.php?article_ID=1174 (accessed on 21/12/2013). 
47 Anon., http://www.sek-ist.gr/EA/home.php?article_ID=1188 (accessed on 21/2/2013). 
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anarchists was such that they were bringing down billboards…they were even 
breaking the paving stones”.48 “Burst of rage and violence for the murder of the 15-
year-old”.49 “Ungovernable State. Athens and Thessaloniki on fire, destructions in 
Iraklio, Chania, Larissa and other cities”.50 “Uncontrolled violence, burnt shops, the 
police is nowhere to be seen”.51 “Chaos, destructions and a plan of inaction”.52 
“Nightmare disaster in the centre”.53 “Immeasurable destructions”.54 “One hundred 
million Euros: the cost of destructions and looting”.55 “The Molotov bombs are 
burning the economy”.56 “Brutalities in the streets”.57 “No tolerance towards the 
gangs of the hooded”.58 
The common place of most of the above articles was the blind character of the 
revolt, an attack against the safety and property of innocent citizens that lacked aims 
and objectives. Anarchy in the streets was described as an undesirable situation 
emerging not as a new proposal but as a decadent side effect of the absence of a 
trustworthy political world.59 Another aspect the media chose to focus on was the 
direct clash between the anarchists and the police, through time, in Exarchia,60 
                                                        
48 Anon., “Έγκλημα, Τρόμος και Βία” [Crime, Terror and Violence], Eleftheros Tipos, 8/12/2008, pp. 
6-7. 
49 Takis Terzis, “Εκτέλεσαν την Ομαλότητα” [They Executed Normality], Ethnos, 8/12/2008, pp. 16-
17. 
50 Cover page of Eleftherotipia, 9/12/2008. 
51Anon., «Ανεξέλεγκτη Βία, Καμένα Μαγαζιά, Άφαντη η Αστυνομία» [Rampant Violence, Burnt 
Shops, The Police has Disappeared], http://www.tanea.gr/news/greece/article/4491162/?iid=2 
(accessed on 21/2/2003). 
52Τάκης Καμπύλης, «Χάος, Καταστροφές και Σχέδιο Απραξίας» [Chaos, Destruction and Plan of 
Inaction], http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/_w_articles_politics_2_09/12/2008_295295 (accessed on 
21/2/2003). 
53Γιάννης Σουλιώτης, «Εφιαλτικές Καταστροφές στο Κέντρο» [Nightmarish Destruction in the City 
Center],  http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/_w_articles_politics_2_09/12/2008_295293 (accessed on 
21/2/2003). 
54Anon., «Απροσμέτρητες Καταστροφές» [Countless Destructions], 
http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/_w_articles_ell_2_09/12/2008_295316 (accessed on 21/2/2003). 
55Anon., «ΚΑΤΑΓΡΑΦΗ: 100 Εκατ. Ευρώ Καταστροφές και Λεηλασίες» [REPORT: 100 million 
Euros damage because of destruction and looting], 
http://www.tovima.gr/relatedarticles/article/?aid=246563&wordsinarticle=%CE%BA%CE%B1%CF%
84%CE%B1%CF%83%CF%84%CF%81%CE%BF%CF%86%CE%AD%CF%82 (accessed on 
21/2/2003). 
56Ζώης Τσώλης, «Οι Μολότοφ Καίνε την Οικονομία» [Molotov Bombs Set Economy on Fire],  
http://www.tovima.gr/politics/article/?aid=246570&wordsinarticle (accessed on 21/2/2003). 
57 Λία Νεσφυγέ, Πάνος Θεοδωρακόπουλος, Γιώργος Κυρούσης, «Αγριότητες στους Δρόμους» 
[Atrocities in the Streets], http://www.tanea.gr/news/greece/article/4492840/?iid=2 (accessed on 
21/2/2003). 
58 Cover page of Avriani, 12/12/2008. 
59 Stavros Psicharis, “Ανερμάτιστοι…” [Changeable…], http://www.tovima.gr/opinions/article/?aid= 
246564&wordsinarticle (accessed on 21/2/2013). 
60 Anon., “Το Γνωστό-Άγνωστο ‘Κράτος’. Στα Εξάρχεια ο Πόλεμος Μεταξύ Αντιεξουσιαστών και 
Αστυνομίας διαρκεί σχεδόν τρεις δεκαετίες”, [The Known-Unknown ‘state’. In Exarchia the war 
between antiauthoritarians and the police lasts almost three decades] Eleftheros Tipos, 8/12/2012, pp. 
8-9. 
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something that – as in the case of KKE mentioned above – implied a vendetta war 
that, occasionally, led to the loss of human lives. 
The presentation of the events by the media was challenged as unilateral and 
misleading not only by anarchists. Eleftherotipia, a traditionally left newspaper of 
high circulation but still within the mainstream current of the Greek media, 
impeached the partial way that the Greek TV chose to refer to the revolt, as well as 
the plots for creating a false truth. 
The news about the murder of Alexis was first reported, extremely accurately, 
by Athens Indymedia with a lot of witnesses describing what they had seen and heard. 
However, when the mainstream media also decided to inform the public, they chose 
to uncritically reproduce the information they were given by the police, meaning the 
supposed assault with Molotov bombs on the police car and the police firing in self-
defense.61 When information coming from police headquarters was revealed to be 
misleading, the next level of defense for the state was to attribute this foul deed 
exclusively to the policeman. Giannis Pretenteris, a well-known journalist, together 
with the director of Eleftheros Tipos, adopted this reasoning and even reinforced it by 
insisting that the murder of a child proves we cannot talk about state violence but of 
violence of the common criminal law.62 Nevertheless, the “prestigious” journalist 
seemed to “ignore” the spatial coordinates of the murder - was the centre of Exarchia, 
a region traditionally hostile towards police forces because of its left, antiauthoritarian 
and anarchist culture for over three decades. As far as the aftermath of the murder is 
concerned, with violent protests taking place, the journalists were continuously trying 
to divide the demonstrations into two basic categories. Those happening in the 
mornings, led by peaceful students, and the atrocious night-time vandalism, made by 
anarchists and immigrants. But, again, the TV news and broadcasts “forgot” to 
mention that the marches of the students, especially their first one on the 8th of 
December, had a quite severe and violent character against the police departments in 
every neighbourhood, where the students attacked the policemen with everything they 
had, including rocks and eggs.63 
The concealment of truth and the formation of a new one by the media seemed 
to happen with every possible way during this period. The case of the photojournalist 
                                                        
61The Sunday Virus, “Πώς να Κρυφτείς απ’ τα Παιδιά” [How You Can Trick Children], Eleftherotipia, 
14/12/2008, p. 41. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. 
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Kostas Tsironis was representative enough: Almost twenty-four hours after 
Grigoropoulos’ assassination, and during a huge demonstration to the police 
headquarters, a riot policeman pulled out his gun, pointing it to the protesters, whilst 
his colleague pretended to do the same “using” his hand as a weapon.64 Tsironis took 
the snapshot with his camera and with no delay returned to the headquarters of 
Eleftheros Tipos in order to inform the newspaper’s director, Serafeim Kotrotsos. We 
must take into account the importance of this snapshot, since its publication would 
definitely show that Alexis’ murder was not the isolated incident the state wanted 
everyone to believe, but the outcome of an attitude deeply rooted in the police 
mentality. Nevertheless, Kotrotsos seemed to be reluctant to publish the photo, 
justifying his unwillingness with the need for certifying the originality of the weapon, 
as if being a replica would make it lose any of its symbolic significance. However, 
even when specialists confirmed the weapon was real and although the director agreed 
to include the photo in Wednesday’s cover page, the decision was suddenly reversed 
and the same evening Kotrotsos made his appearance on the TV broadcast of the 
aforesaid Giannis Pretenteris, declaring that the assassination is not an incident of 
statist violence! Eventually, the photo was published on Tuesday, in the inside of the 
newspaper, with no comments and without a cover page reference, the main headline 
of which was “In the Mercy of Anarchy”. During the same day, Tsironis was fired 
with the excuse of leaking the photo to the Internet.65     
 
Inadequacies of the Revolt’s Mainstream Perceptions, the Anarchist Reading and its 
Zarathustrian Theorization 
For anarchists, the truth lies in between the two false perceptions of December, 
perceptions that, being contradictory, give us the right to challenge and question their 
validity. For anarchists, December was not a protest (not even a very intense one) but 
a clash in order to destroy and re-create: “Yes, indeed, ladies and gentlemen, we ask 
for nothing because we want everything (…) It is pointless to look for requests 
because we do not have any, but we aim for things we do not beg for but try to make 
true ourselves (…) We know very well that in order to make this world absolutely 
true we firstly have to demolish, once and for all, the slaughterhouse you call State, 
                                                        
64Anon., «Καταγγελία! Μπάτσοι Γουρούνια Δολοφόνοι» [Denouncement!Cops, Pigs, Murderers], 
https://athens.indymedia.org/front.php3?lang=el&article_id=936420 (accessed on 21/2/2013). 
65 The Saturday Virus, “Η Κυριότητα της Αλήθειας” [The Ownership of Truth], Eleftherotipia, 
20/12/2008, p. 52. 
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Democracy and Free Market”.66 Hence, it may not have articulated any demands but 
at the same time the violence of the revolt was neither blind nor unfruitful. The 
persistence on both violence per se and the supposed political character of the revolt, 
does nothing but blur the context of December and ignores, if not willingly conceals, 
the seeds of December, meaning the creative work of the insurgents that started taking 
place within the time limits of the revolt. The first, conservative, perception of 
December focuses on violence, and for this reason denies any trace of (mainstream) 
political action in order to penalize the revolt and, thus, easily condemn it. It is like 
focusing on the Lion without paying attention to the groans or the protest of the 
Camel. The second, leftist, aspect focuses on the protests and the supposed 
(institutionalized) political character of the uprising and for this reason denies any 
violent action that exceeds the context of the political debate between the government 
and the governed. It is like focusing on the Camel, highlighting its victimization, 
without taking into consideration the role of the Lion. In any case, and apart from the 
above deficiencies, what these two basic approaches lack is the creative role of 
December, the affirmation to certain values that, among other things, denied the 
common shared ideals of nation, parliamentary democracy, state-authority, hierarchy 
etc. Therefore, we have an alternative reading of the events that comes from the 
anarchist movement itself through certain practices, brochures, assemblies and other 
initiatives. It is a reading that embodies all stages of the revolt, the repression, 
corruption and gradual impoverishment before the 6th of December, the days and 
nights of endless attacks on statist and capitalist targets and the formation of open 
autonomous zones where the values of solidarity, equality, participation, creation, 
dignity, freedom and fraternity blossomed. Examining the anarchist material that was 
circulated during the days of the revolt, and up to two years later, we can see  how the 
anarchist agents of the December revolt perceived the events and differentiated 
themselves from  mainstream views. 
Grigoropoulos’ assassination was the peak of a general situation that included 
an escalation of unemployment, harsh working conditions for those who still had a 
job, a severe migration policy, police violence and control67 and a routine that turned 
                                                        
66 Anarchists from the Desert of the Real, “Με το Αίμα Ακόμα στα Μάτια…Με την Οργή Ακόμα στα 
Χέρια…Πληρώσανε Ακριβά αλλά Χρωστάνε Πολλά Ακόμα!” [With the Blood Still in the Eyes…With 
the Rage Still in Hand…They Dearly Paid but they Still Owe a Lot!], proclamation in Athens 2008, p. 
2. 
67 Transgressio Legis, Όταν Απαρνείται Κανείς τον Πόλεμο, Απαρνείται και τη Μεγάλη Ζωή [When One 
Denies War, One Also Denies a Great Life], no ed., no place, no time, p. 6. 
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life into misery and captivity: “The regularity of work and “free time”, of family and 
consumption, kills all passions of freedom; and these passions become resentment, 
because they are imprisoned and undermined by a normality as frozen as the most 
frozen beast”.68 Therefore, the revolt was the expression of detestation towards the 
whole social system69 that led people to a revaluation and reclamation of their lives70 
through a severe and holistic critique,71 seeking to give a new meaning to the 
alienated social relationships72 and to overcome the present reality in favour of a new 
desirable world73 that was no more utopian.74 This critique shook the foundations of, 
up to then, given “truths”, like the identities and social roles attributed to people by 
the state: “This determination to ‘destroy everything’ stated in the same way, for all 
the participants, the rupture with the social role they are to take during periods of 
social peace: the hooded student setting off to attack the police stations is no longer a 
young disciplined student(…)In a broader sense, every social role tends to be 
challenged”.75 Hence, people in the streets were not just a gathering of students, 
workers, unemployed etc, but the activation of insurrected subjects.76 According to 
anarchists, the days and nights of the revolt had certain characteristics that made it 
extremely “difficult” for politicians and mainstream media to understand: The revolt 
broke out spontaneously without having an upper or “secret” guidance.77 Contrary to 
the practices of mainstream politics, the insurrectionists chose to act directly and 
without representatives,78 practicing a nihilism whose target was the “reality” as well 
as the metaphysics of their society and world.79 Nevertheless, this nihilism was not 
only destructive but gave room to a new creation of values80 that due to the 
Decembrians’ anti-deterministic will started changing reality by the first week of the 
                                                        
68 Anon., “Ο Θάνατος Αναιρείται Ζώντας” [Death is Negated Through Living], Revolt, No 3, p. 15. 
69 Anon., Ιχνηλατώντας το Δεκέμβρη [Tracing December], no ed., no place, no time, p. 24. 
70 Proletarians from the Occupied ASOEE, “Καταστρέφουμε το Παρόν Γιατί Ερχόμαστε από το 
Μέλλον” [We Destroy the Present Because We Come From the Future], Revolt, No 3, p. 16. 
71 Anon., “Δεκέμβρης 2008: Μια Προσπάθεια να Ανιχνεύσουμε τη Δύναμη και τα Όρια του Αγώνα 
μας” [December 2008: An Effort to Detect the Power and the Limits of our Struggle], Blaumachen, No 
3, p. 5. 
72 Open Committee of the Athenian Enraged 2008, “Rez’ Publica”, Revolt, No 3, p. 12. 
73 Anon., “Κάλεσμα για μια Νέα Διεθνή” [Call for a New International], Revolt, No 3, p. 8. 
74 Transgressio Legis, p. 30. 
75 Les Habitants de la Lune, p. 26. 
76 The Children of the Galley, “The Rebellious Passage of a Proletarian Minority Through a Brief 
Period of Time”, in Vradis and Dalakoglou, p. 118. 
77 Editorial, “Ο Δεκέμβρης και το Μετά” [December and Its Aftermath], Eutopia, No 17, p. 12. 
78 Les Habitants de la Lune, pp. 11-12. 
79 Anon., “Κάλεσμα για μια Νέα Διεθνή” [Call for a New International], Revolt, No 3, p. 8. 
80 Anon., Ιχνηλατώντας το Δεκέμβρη [Tracing December], p. 50 and Transgressio Legis, p. 31. 
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revolt.81 Theory and practice were not separated any more, leading to ventures that 
blossomed within solidarity and massive participation.82 Occupations, artistic and 
cultural creations, assemblies and other activities83 were designed by people 
determined to take their lives back.84 
Finally, the insurgents recognized media and political parties as one of the two 
main reasons for the fade out of the revolt, because of their ceaseless distortive 
propaganda and their efforts to incorporate the agents’ revolutionary spirit.85 The 
other reason concerned the internal weakness of the movement which did not allow it 
to fully overcome the contradictions that derived from the insurrectionists’ activities 
in the streets (i.e. the ambiguous stance opposite looting),86 and to supersede the 
identities imposed by capitalism, even the ones – like “workers” – that bear a 
“revolutionary” dynamic.87 
 Zarathustra’s “Three Metamorphoses” is a most suitable apparatus for the 
unfolding of this alternative reading. The three metamorphoses of the spirit fit the 
three stages of the December revolt and, moreover, can help us understand the vital, 
complementary and unbreakable, for the anarchists, connection of these three stages 
(a bond “refused” or ignored by both the conservative and leftist reading, as said 
above). In the same way Friedrich Nietzsche underlines the necessity that every 
previous metamorphosis bears for its next one, and the justification the last 
metamorphosis offers to the previous two. 
              
 
 
 
                                                        
81 Anon., “Κάλεσμα για μια Νέα Διεθνή” [Call for a New International], Revolt, No 3, p. 8 and 
Editorial, “Ο Δεκέμβρης και το Μετά” [December and Its Aftermath], Eutopia, No 17, pp. 20-21. 
82 Anon., Taratsa, No 5, p. 11. 
83 Transgressio Legis, pp. 9, 23 and National Opera House squatters “Απελευθερωμένη Λυρική Σκηνή” 
[Liberated Opera House], proclamation in Athens 2008. 
84 Anon., “Τρομοκρατία είναι η Κανονικότητα” [Normality is Terrorism], Brigada, No 1, p. 6. 
85 Anarchist Collectivity “Circle of Fire”, “Αυτές οι Μέρες Είναι Μέρες Εξέγερσης Όλων των 
Καταπιεσμένων” [These Days are the Days of Revolt for all the Oppressed], proclamation in Athens, 
8/12/2009, pp. 1-2,  
Anon., “Η Εξέγερση δεν είναι Ουτοπία, είναι Ζωντανή σε Κάθε Κοινωνία” [Revolt is not Utopian, it is 
Alive in Every Society], Diadromi Eleftherias, No 79, pp. 5,  
Anon., Ιχνηλατώντας το Δεκέμβρη, pp. 29-30 and Transgressio Legis, pp. 11-12. 
86 Les Habitants de la Lune, p. 18. 
87 Anon., “Δεκέμβρης 2008: Μια Προσπάθεια να Ανιχνεύσουμε τη Δύναμη και τα Όρια του Αγώνα 
μας” [December 2008: An Effort to Detect the Power and the Limits of our Struggle], Blaumachen, No 
3, pp. 16-17. 
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D.4/ December as a Bakuninist Revolt  
December was, undoubtedly, a revolt. Firstly, the “fire” spread in time and space. The 
clashes lasted for many days with an unprecedented intensity and occurred all over 
Greece. Their blast reverberated worldwide. Nicolas Sarcozy withdrew the French 
educational bill for fear that it would provoke a reaction, similar to Greece;1 
Subcomandante Marcos sent a message of solidarity from the Zapatistas2 and the 
international media sent their correspondents to Greece. Secondly, this revolt had 
obviously social characteristics. It included individuals from every social class, 
transcending artificial divisions of social identities and forging a common “aim”: a 
desire for conflict, to attack the perceived agents of repression. December was a revolt 
because even those who did not take part expressed their approval for the actions of 
the participants.3 Additionally, what makes it exceptional, what gives us the 
opportunity to speak of a critical rupture and an important originality, compared to the 
context and repertoire of past revolts, is not only the rich practices of the insurgents 
but also the fact that this fight clearly disdained state politics and scandalously did not 
articulate any demands.4 In particular, although there were voices, slogans, articles 
and banners, denouncing “social peace”, “national unity”, repression, social control, 
police arbitrariness, consumerism and the political system in whole, this activity never 
played the role of a proposal towards the governmental status quo concerning a 
specific political change, a claim or the withdrawal of a certain bill.5 It was an open 
articulation of desires without a particular receiver. Thus, we cannot talk about 
political negotiations nor about demands.   
Shortly after Alexandros Grigoropoulos’ assassination by a policeman on 6th 
December 2008, Athens was full of furious protesters whose targets included banks, 
car trade companies, big stores, ministries, police stations, even the huge Christmas 
tree in Syntagma square: each was significant to anti–capitalist, anti–state and anti–
                                                        
1 Celestine Bohlen, “French Politicians Fear Youth Violence Along Greek Pattern”, The New York 
Times, 19/12/2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/19/world/europe/19iht-
letter.1.18819672.html?_r=0 (accessed on 21/2/2013). 
2 Subcomandante Marcos of EZLN, “Message to revolted Greece”, 
http://ainfos.ca/09/jan/ainfos00174.html and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GIYBUCrV534 
(accessed on 21/2/2013). 
3 Anon., Ιχνηλατώντας το Δεκέμβρη, pp. 5-6 and Fotis Terzakis, “Ανοιχτή Επιστολή στον Κώστα 
Δεσποινιάδη για την Ελληνική Κρίση του Δεκεμβρίου” [Open Letter to Kostas Despoiniadis for the 
Greek Crisis Of December], Panopticon, No 12, pp. 10-11.   
4 Anon.,“ Ξύπνα Κεμάλ, Αυτός ο Κόσμος Πήρε Φωτιά!” [Wake Up Kemal, This World is Set on 
Fire!], Blaumachen, No 3, p. 3. 
5 Irini Gaitanou, “Fuck December ’08 – Fight Now!”, http://ilesxi.wordpress.com/2011/12/14/fuck-
december-08-fight-now/#_ftn21 (accessed on 21/2/2013). 
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commercial protest. Those who participated in the assaults were not only university 
students, workers or immigrants. They were also school pupils, middle-aged 
bourgeois, people with or without a political background and consciousness whose 
escalation of practices can be understood as a Nietzschean “metamorphoses of spirit” 
passed from the Camel, that had learnt to bear every burden of repression, to the Lion 
that “captured freedom and wanted to be lord in its own desert”.  
The Lion uttered a “sacred No” to all the above disintegration. Decembrians 
ceased to tolerate apathetically the commands of authority and began to resist on 
every possible level: Among other actions, participants occupied state buildings 
throughout Greece, calling the residents of every neighborhood to form self-
organizing assemblies that would cancel central authority in practice. And this way,  
 
Anarchy de facto found itself at the leadership of an ample and hugely varied 
sector of society, set to create situations that often challenged the social 
institution. While most of the practices employed by the uprising – its 
organizational forms, its demands, its discourse, etc. – have all been practiced 
by Anarchy for decades, they suddenly become the property of wide parts of 
the population and viewed with aspiration, awe, and/or empathy even by 
people not involved in the uprising.6  
 
It is possible to describe the character of this revolt as Bakuninist, insofar as 
the joy of creation was hidden within the destructive urge. This was the third 
metamorphosis of the spirit, the Child who uttered a “sacred Yes” to life and to a new 
beginning. The Child was in the occupations of several theatres and the national opera 
trying to renovate art and make it art by everyone for everyone. It reclaimed central 
streets and avenues in order to turn them into fields of games and joy. It appropriated 
urban “graveyards”, places that were abandoned by the state, and transformed them 
into self-managing parks, play yards and city meeting points. Creativity through 
artistic practices answers the Nietzschean perception of the individual as an artist and 
an artistic creation simultaneously.7 This creativity was not exhausted just for 
producing new art in order to communicate it to the rest of society, as the “regular” 
artists usually do. Hence, the point here is not that the insurrectionists were just 
                                                        
6 Christos Boukalas, “No One is Revolutionary  Until the Revolution!”, in Vradis and Dalakoglou, p. 
283. 
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creative but that their own selves were an integral ingredient of this creation: The 
open plays and improvisations at the National Opera, the transformative procedure of 
turning a land of concrete into a living green park, the playful wander in the streets of 
the metropolis. All these were not for the people but with the people as an interactive 
game of creation between the artist and his handcraft, where the one changes the other 
in real time.  
The Decembrian agents gave their own answer to the dilemma that keep 
appearing “since the time authority appeared: submissive or rebel, peaceful citizen or 
human”.8 The main core of their answer was the Nietzschean anti-determinist spirit of 
the will which not only smashed the storefronts of capitalism but also the certainties 
of the status quo about social peace, and those of the established Left concerning a 
political correct revolution and the effort to explain the reasons for December’s 
uprising: 
 
For insurrection, by its very nature, refuses to be situated or interpreted: it is 
the unforeseen inception of the new that can never be translated back into the 
terms which preceded it. The event itself is a splitting off from, a fracture, a 
total break with causality. The shocks of its rupture multiply into a crescendo 
of lawless swerves counteracting any preconceived forms of determinism, 
circumventing placement in mechanistic models. Its effects are wholly 
irreducible to the previous conditions…9 
 
 Moreover, the agents of December tried to approach this period in its 
aftermath by using an active and creative method of inquiry, a method that not only 
would interpret reality but also, and mainly, modify it. Past, for the insurgents, is a 
permanent war, never interrupted, a war whose winner is still undecided,10 so, past 
incidents can never be regarded as lost or past agents as defeated. Chapter C showed 
how the Nietzschean project of “becoming who you are” ties in with Benjamin’s 
“redemption of the past”. Both perspectives are founded on the openness of history 
and its perception not as a dull, historicist narration but as an active interpretation able 
to transform the past, thus redeem it and incorporate it into the present/future. Hence, 
                                                                                                                                                               
7 Nehamas, p. 174. 
8 Anarchists from the Desert of the Real, p. 1. 
9 Kirilov, “Paper Rifles”, in Vradis and Dalakoglou, p. 188. 
10 Kirilov, p. 189. 
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by recalling all the oppressed and “defeated” of the past in their present actions, the 
agents of December unified past, present and future, as Nietzsche and Benjamin did. 
Through their present affirmative activity they welcomed the future of their 
transvalued values and, at the same time, sought to redeem the oppressed of the past: 
“Those are the days of Alexis, Kassimis,11 Tsironis,12 Koumis,13 Kanellopoulou,14 
kaltezas,15 Tsoutsouvis,16 Prekas,17 Temponeras,18 Marinos,19 Giuliani,20 
Koulouri21…of us all!”22  
 On Saturday 13th of December, one week after Alexandros Grigoropoulos’ 
assassination, a group of people decided actively to express their will and sentiments, 
in the heart of the metropolis. “We desired to pour out in the streets, invade places-
centers of amusement, setting our own terms. To invade places where life goes on 
indifferently, passively, whilst something is changing in the city… We poured out in 
the streets of Athens until 3:00 in the morning setting our terms of self-organization 
and expressing all our rage and spontaneity”.23 For some of the Athenian anarchists 
the mistake of the established Left and of all those who sought to find a new, post-
revolt, model in the ruins of the old, authoritative ones, is clear and repeated. It is the 
underestimation of the human factor. The demotion of social will to escape authority 
and clash with it.24 
 
 
                                                        
11 Christos Kassimis: The first Greek urban guerrilla fighter falling dead by policemen in 1977.   
12 Vassilis Tsironis: Anti-statist and antifascist fighter with, partially, “situationist” practices that was 
murdered in 1978 by the police special forces when they invaded his apartment in order to arrest him.  
13 Iakovos Koumis: Cypriot university student murdered by the police in 1980 during the annual march 
for the events of the Polytechnic University in 1973. 
14 Stamatina kanellopoulou: Worker, murdered by the police in the same march as Koumis. 
15 Michalis Kaltezas: Student murdered by a policeman in 1985 during the anniversary of the 
Polytechnic University revolt in 1973. His case was similar to Grigoropoulos’ since they were both 
fifteen years old and murdered by a policeman in the region of Exarchia. 
16 Christos Tsoutsouvis: Legendary urban guerrilla fighter, murdered by the police in 1985. 
17 Michalis Prekas: Anarchist murdered by policemen in 1987 during a battle with them. 
18 Nikos Temponeras: Mathematics teacher – politically belonging to the Left - murdered in 1991 by an 
exceptional member of the youth branch of the Greek Conservative Party (New Democracy).  
19 Christoforos Marinos: Anarchist murdered by the police special forces in 1996 on a boat from 
Serifos to Piraeus. 
20 Carlo Giuliani: Anarchist activist, murdered by the police in 2001 during the anti-globalism protests 
in Genova. 
21 Maria Koulouri: Mother of two minors, murdered by the riot police in 2008 during a protest of Corfu 
citizens against the construction of a rubbish dump in their area.  
22 Small flyer by the squatters of the Polytechnic University. 
23 Proclamation by the Anarchist Group Λ.Ο. in Athens 2008, pp. 1-2. 
24 Anarchist Rally, “Μέρες Εξέγερσης, Μέρες Ελπίδας…” [Days of Revolt, Days of Hope…], 
Diadromi Eleftherias, No 79, p. 3. 
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D.5/ The Three Metamorphoses and/of the Decembrian Revolt  
After giving a brief account of December ’08, this section aims at reviewing the 
uprising through a Nietzschean lens based on the pre-mentioned “Three 
Metamorphoses” of the spirit, from Thus Spoke Zarathustra. 
The three metamorphoses are not independent from one another but are a 
whole reflected in the three types. The affirmation of the Camel, bounded by 
negation, makes the spirit to become a Lion, where the affirmation is released through 
denying the negative. But if the Lion is the condition of a free will, the Child is the 
unconditional principle of an affirmative, and not only free, will that completes the 
picture, unifies the spirit and justifies the sorrow of the Camel and the fight of the 
Lion.                         
 Likewise, December ’08 was a play of three acts clearly related to one 
another. The burdens of political corruption and the financial scandals, increasing 
unemployment, the demolition of the educational system, extended poverty, the 
dogmas of political intolerance towards radical groups - values like national unity and 
social peace and the intensification of the dipole “exploiters/exploited”– all these 
made most people’s lives a desert, and turned them into the Camels that were required 
to walk through it. Suddenly, with Alexandros’ assassination being the triggering 
event, a significant part of society turns into a Lion in order to reclaim the life that has 
been stolen from it. A destructive (and at the same time creative) critique that was 
anti-capitalist and not reformative since it expressed the need for the overcoming of 
the capitalist relationships,1 the destruction of all these that stood, as an obstacle, 
between “this world and the world we desire”,2 just like the foreign burdens stand 
between the Camel and the Child. 
 Hence, the destructive actions of Decembrian insurrectionists were a 
combination of the second and third metamorphoses, a way of creation and re-
appropriation. Driven by the desire for a different world they were determined to 
destroy everything in order to reclaim their lives. This destructive violence implied, 
for all the participants, the rupture with the social roles they play in times of social 
peace: the hooded student that attacks the police stations ceases to be the disciplined 
worker of tomorrow, the unemployed who throw Molotov cocktails to the banks are 
                                                        
1 Anon., “Δεκέμβρης 2008: Μια Προσπάθεια να Ανιχνεύσουμε τη Δύναμη και τα Όρια του Αγώνα 
μας” [December 2008: An Effort to Detect the Power and the Limits of our Struggle], Blaumachen, No 
3, p. 5. 
2 Anon., “Κάλεσμα για μια Νέα Διεθνή” [Call for a New International], Revolt, No 3, p. 8. 
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no more hostage of a survival allowance, the immigrant that celebrates the 
expropriation of a DVD player is no longer the peaceful stranger that waits to be 
integrated to the Greek nation. Every social role is being challenged.3 These “Lion” 
practices allowed the insurgents to regain the dignity, the humanity and the sincerity 
of their actions whilst at the same time offered them a childish innocence which 
opened the way to liberating actions, such as the creation of Temporary Autonomous 
Zones through the occupation of Universities, Cultural Centers and old buildings in 
order to serve the needs of the revolt (assemblies, accommodation needs, counter-
media information, solidarity to those arrested, etc). 4 
 Additionally, this open highway of freed space triggered the imaginative 
possibilities of the insurrectionists, promoting humorous and sarcastic tactics5 and 
leading to a Nietzschean conception of art and its application to life itself, to life’s 
turning into a work of art! Like Nietzsche, the Decembrians acknowledged the need 
for the destruction of the self, its decline in order for a new self (the overman for 
Nietzsche) to rise. “If I don’t burn, if you don’t burn, how do you expect the darkness 
to shine?” and “let’s create wonderful lives”.6 Equally important is the perception of 
the self as a post-Enlightenment subject, meaning a self that is not a static and 
uniformed phenomenon, full of different possibilities, a Nietzschean perception of the 
self, anti-dogmatic and open to self-creation: 
 
 … Every “I” is not at all a unit but a multi-level world, a starry sky, a chaos of 
forms, situations and stages of capabilities and possibilities. It seems that 
regarding this chaos as a unity and talking about our “I” like it was a one-
dimensioned, wholly separated and established phenomenon, has become, for 
all of us, a need as imperative as nutrition and breathing. Even the best out of 
us share this illusion…7 
  
                                                        
3 Les Habitants de la Lune, p. 26. 
4 Transgressio Legis, pp. 9, 23. 
5 Taking into consideration that the defense of Alexandros’ murderer argued that the boy died by a 
bullet that had first glanced off the road, the police officers’ excuses that the murder was an isolated 
incident and that bankers and other state officers expressed their repulsion for the massive destructions 
of banks and statist buildings, a group of anarchists went on posting the following statement: “We Are 
Sorry. The Association of anarchists, anti-authoritarians and the rest of the hooded ones, sharing the 
sorrow of the domestic oligarchy, after the destructive conflagration that strikes numerous banks and 
other charitable institutes, have to say that this is nothing but isolated incidents of Molotov cocktails 
having first been glanced off”. 
6 Graffiti on an Athenian city wall. 
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In this artistic frame, we must not forget the occupation of the National Opera 
House where during “nine days and nights of autonomy, freedom, creation and self-
organization in deed”8 the squatters attacked the spectacular art the same way 
Nietzsche attacked Socrates, through Euripides, when the latter turned ancient tragedy 
from a field of participation and inspiration for the audience, into a procedure of 
detachment and rational critique: “We don’t want an ‘art-spectacle’ that is being 
consumed by passive spectators. We are opposed to a civilization that destroys parks 
and public places in the name of profit. We aim at an art immediate, open to 
everyone, where everyone can be able to create”.9  
The discourse “of the three metamorphoses” will then be the apparatus for 
reviewing the December revolt from a Nietzschean point of view. It is true that the 
incidents of December rather depict a fade out of the first metamorphosis and a fade 
in of the third one, with its main body and hardcore belonging to the second 
metamorphosis of the spirit. Hence, the following analysis will mostly focus on the 
fighting Lion but will also try to designate the connections with the passive Camel 
and the creative Child. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                               
7 Graffiti on an Athenian city wall. 
8 National Opera House squatters “Απελευθερωμένη Λυρική Σκηνή” [Liberated Opera House], 
proclamation in Athens 2008. 
9 National Opera House squatters, “Εξεγερμένη Λυρική Σκηνή” [Revolted Opera House], proclamation 
in Athens 2008. 
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The Camel – First Metamorphosis of the Spirit 
 
“…What is heavy? Thus asks the weight-bearing 
spirit, thus it kneels down like the camel and wants 
to be well laden…The weight-bearing spirit takes 
upon itself all these heaviest things: like a camel 
hurrying laden into the desert, thus it hurries into its 
desert” 
 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra,  
“Of the Three Metamorphoses” 
  
 
December was, among other things, the battlefield for a war between different 
interpretations of the same event, a ceaseless propaganda concerning what “rational”, 
“brutal” and “natural” really are. Hara Kouki, researcher and one of the December 
attendants,  describes how the rage of so many people was labeled as extreme and 
social conflict was regarded as irrational, whereas police repression and brutality, the 
failing educational system, the increase of unemployment, injustice and corruption, 
social insecurity, the economic crisis were all legitimated, taken for granted. 
Therefore, for the State, the blissful terrain of Democracy became a battlefield of 
collective action versus lawful peacefulness, nihilism versus democracy, evil versus 
good.10 And Kouki goes on by quoting Nietzsche, when the latter exposed the 
cunning way that the hetero-defined and incompetent ones chose in order to corrupt 
the brave, free spirits: 
 
 And he is good who does not outrage, who harms nobody, who does not 
attack, who does not requite, who leaves revenge to God, who keeps himself 
hidden as we do, who avoids evil and desires little from life, like us, the 
patient, humble, and just…11 
 
This tactic of turning lively and active people into domesticated animals is a 
tool used by the state par excellence. Investing on fear, social control, racism and the 
myth of social peace and national unity, the Greek state has made an effort – after the 
end of the civil war in 1949 and mainly after the restoration of democracy in 1974 – 
                                                        
10 Hara Kouki, “Short Voyage to the Land of Ourselves”, in Vradis and Dalakoglou, pp. 167-68. 
11 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, first essay, §13. 
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to defuse the tensioned political situation12 and convert the general political/social 
antagonism between exploiters and exploited to a diffused and blurred daily reality. 
We can more clearly see the peak of this tactic just before, during and after the 
Olympic Games in Athens and the success of the Greek national football team in the 
Euro tournament (2004). 
The delirium for the returning of the Games back to their cradle allowed the 
massive exploitation of hordes of “illegal” immigrants (sans-papiers), the 
uncontrolled increase of working accidents, the apotheosis of the safety dogma which 
filled the streets and public spaces with armed policemen and surveillance cameras,13 
the multiplication of taxes, for the state to deal with the unreasonable cost of the 
games,14 and the intoxication of people with the drug of national pride and the need 
for actual “sacrifices”. Additionally, the Euro success caused a general national 
paroxysm that also reinforced the nationalist imaginary, bred extensive incidents of 
racist/nationalist violence15 and disorientated the public opinion from the scandals of 
this period and the forthcoming financial decline. 
 Of course, the aftermath of the Olympics left Greece with a significant debt, 
whilst the frenzy of consumerism16 – encouraged by the global financial bubble – 
worked as a “smooth” transition to a reality less phantasmagoric and even harsher. 
When the bubble seemed ready to burst we were already at the beginning of 2008. 
The global crisis was making its distinct appearance not only in the U.S. but also in 
Europe, and Greece emerged as the most suitable experimental field for the 
application of a “shock doctrine”17 - new austerity measures, cuts in social security 
                                                        
12 The “check mate” of Konstantinos Karamanlis in 1974, after the fall of junta in Greece, is an ideal 
example of such a tactic. Karamanlis, who in his first tenure as a prime minister (1955-1963) had been 
the harshest persecutor of communism, as soon as he was re-elected, eleven years later, legalized the 
Communist Party, thus succeeding in embodying it for good into the bourgeois parliamentary 
democracy.  
13 Kaplanis, pp. 221-22. 
14Anon., «Οι Ολυμπιακοί Αγώνες του 2004 Κόστισαν 8,5 Δισεκατομμύρια Ευρώ» [Olympic Games 
2004 cost 8.5 billion euros], http://www.tanea.gr/news/greece/article/4768950/?iid=2 (accessed on 
21/12/2012). 
15 See the reports for the pogrom against many Albanians in Greece, in September 2004, after the 
defeat of the Greek football team by the Albanian one: Anon., «Το Πογκρόμ των Αλβανών στις 4 
Σεπτέμβρη» [Pogrom Against Albanians on September 4], 
http://www.antinazi.gr/articles/pogromalb.htm and Anon., «Επικίνδυνος Εθνικιστικός-Ρατσιστικός 
Παροξυσμός [Hazardous Nationalist-Racist Exacerbation], http://anasintaxi.awardspace.com/189.htm 
(accessed on 21/12/2012). 
16 According to a global report of Nielsen Company in 2008, Greeks seemed to be “The world’s biggest 
luxury shoppers” by using their “well-worn” credit cards and spending cash on expensive clothes 
brands, http://nl.nielsen.com/site/documents/GlobalNielsenLuxuryBrandsMay08.pdf (accessed on 
21/12/2012).  
17 See the work of Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine, Picador, New York 2008, where the author 
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and the shrinking of the public sector in favour of private investment. These actions 
would dramatically change the working conditions. Michael Hudson, a former Wall 
Street financial analyst and a distinguished research professor of economics, openly 
argued that the Greek crisis proved to be a neo-liberal experiment for the European 
bankers to determine how low  wages can fall, how much social care can decrease and 
privatization prevail, before there is any significant reaction.18 In the meantime, the 
university students’ conflict with the government, in an effort to avert the grading of 
education and its sell-out to private investors, had already taken place in 2006. 
Alexandros’ murder united various types of people – students, immigrants, 
unemployed – that were already connected through their abhorrence for all the 
suffering in the present, that is, the financial pressure on the unemployed, the 
economic and psychological blackmail at workplaces, the deportations and tortures of 
immigrants, the statist repression and control via the policemen, the anxious life of the 
students concerning their performance during their final exams.19 
 This climate of depression gradually escalated, covering every aspect of the 
everyday life like a spider’s web: 
 
 The normality of work, “free time”, family and consumption kills every 
freedom’s passion. And these passions turn into resentment, because they are 
imprisoned and undermined by a normativity, frozen like the most frozen 
monster. Because the will to life, before vanishing under the burden of roles 
and obligations, transforms to its opposite. Trapped in daily obligations, life 
finds itself in a situation of self-denial, again and again, reappearing in the 
image of a slave…Isn’t the massive distribution of psychotropic drugs, this 
generous offer by the – yet, gasping – welfare state, proof of the unbearable 
mode of modern lifestyle? Domination deals with captivity in every aspect, 
justifying what it has itself produced: misery. Revolt is not yet done with any 
of them.20 
  
The burden on the back of the Camel obliges the animal to kneel down, 
                                                                                                                                                               
explains the application of free market policies in countries suffering other upheavals.  
18Interview of Michael Hudson by Paul Jay, 
http://therealnews.com/t2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=74&jumival=7
948#.UTXP5FeGf-s (accessed on 21/12/2012).  
19 Transgressio Legis, p. 6. 
20 Anon., “Ο Θάνατος Αναιρείται Ζώντας” [Death is Negated Through Living], Revolt, No 3, p. 15.  
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deserting its life, leaving no way out. “The rebellion was a clear expression of 
proletarian anger against a life that is getting more and more devalued, surveilled, and 
alienated”,21 a repulsion towards the whole political, social and financial system.22 It 
was a matter of time for this realization to bring about a rupture with “reality”, the 
metamorphosis of the Camel into a Lion. 
 
                                                        
21 The Children of the Galley, “The Rebellious Passage of a Proletarian Minority Through a Brief 
Period of Time”, in Vradis and Dalakoglou, p. 116.  
22Anon., Ιχνηλατώντας το Δεκέμβρη [Tracing December], p. 24. 
 
 
 
 
168 
The Lion – Second Metamorphosis of the Spirit 
 
“But in the loneliest desert the second 
metamorphosis occurs: the spirit here becomes a 
lion; it wants to capture freedom and be lord in its 
own desert. It seeks here its ultimate lord: it will be 
an enemy to him and to its ultimate God, it will 
struggle for victory with the great dragon. What is 
the great dragon which the spirit no longer wants to 
call lord and God? The great dragon is called ‘Thou 
shalt’. But the spirit of the lion says ‘I will!’… ‘All 
values have already been created, and all created 
values are in me. Truly, there shall be no more ‘I 
will’!’ Thus speaks the dragon…To create freedom 
for itself and a sacred No even to duty: the lion is 
needed for that, my brothers. To seize the right to 
new values – that is the most terrible proceeding for 
a weight-bearing and reverential spirit” 
 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra,  
“Of the Three Metamorphoses” 
 
 
The second metamorphosis of the spirit concerns, as it has already been mentioned, 
the biggest part of the December events. However, “the struggle of the Lion in the 
desert that the Camel was led” had many different aspects and levels during the 
December revolt and can be divided into two main categories. The first one is the will 
of the Lion, its desires, the (destructive) characteristics of its iconoclastic fight against 
all the values of the dragon. The second one includes the counter-revolutionary war 
declared by the reactive forces of the dragon in order to “separate the active forces 
from what they can do” and thus decompose them. 
“There shall be no more ‘I will’”, says the dragon and this is when the revolt 
began, when the possibility of contemporary revolts ceased to be just utopian, through 
the creatively destructive will that turned against all those that deprived it of its desire: 
“The December revolt was the practical shattering of the utopia talking about the 
impossibility of such events in contemporary societies. A utopia that only direct 
action and the will of a creative destruction could demonstrate the fallibility of its 
arguments”.23 The insurrectionists realize the burden on their back, a burden that 
suppresses their instincts and desires and is a mixture of guilt, false ideologies and 
rotten values. They also realize that the time has come for the “twilight of the idols” 
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like consumerism, apotheosis and fetishism of commodities, empty social 
relationships.24 One of these idols is their own self. The image of a Camel loaded with 
every kind of “thou shalt”, the image of a slave and not that of a master. They are 
willing to attack this image of their self, destroy it and reconstruct it, turn it into a 
Lion that will reclaim the control of its desert – proletarians that will reclaim the 
control of their lives.25 The type of this destructive attack was purely Dionysian. It 
was a spontaneous outbreak without a certain plan or guidance,26 targeting the 
normality and the structures of the dragon that block the emancipative action against 
the – reactive version of – Apollonian illusions that make up structures, served as 
truths: 
 
Within these first hours the normality of the city was disrupted. What is 
important in this respect is the ultimate attack on authoritative discourses, 
power relations, systems of discipline and punishment, and imposed schemes 
of perceptions. The state, authorities, the prevalent system of law and order 
were immediately identified with the normality in the city. Therefore, the 
disruption of normality had the qualities of challenging all the above 
altogether. In addition, the targeted attack against police is strongly connected 
with ideas of emancipation and liberation in the course of action.27  
 
The nature of this Dionysian attack is also revealed by the war against the 
Apollonian individuality that leads to isolation, egotism and alienation, through a 
comeback to a social, “primordial” unity. It is a war without pleas because it is full of 
projects.28 One basic characteristic of a struggle without pleas is the absence of 
intermediaries and the practice of direct action. The insurrectionists acted here and 
now opposing the usual social-democratic tactic of postponing the clash by proposing 
the representation of the insurgents by some committee of professional politicians that 
will gradually look into the situation. Instead of “fighting” from the corridors of the 
parliament and through voting every four years, the agents of December chose to 
                                                                                                                                                               
23 Transgressio Legis, p. 30. 
24 Open Committee of the Athenian Enraged 2008, “Rez’ Publica”, Revolt, No 3, p. 12. 
25 Proletarians from the Occupied ASOEE, “Καταστρέφουμε το Παρόν Γιατί Ερχόμαστε από το 
Μέλλον” [We Destroy the Present Because We Come From the Future], Revolt, No 3, p. 16. 
26 Editorial, “Ο Δεκέμβρης και το Μετά” [December and Its Aftermath], Eutopia, No 17, p. 12. 
27 Yannis Kallianos, “December as an Event in Greek Radical Politics”, in Vradis and Dalakoglou, p. 
155. 
28 Anarchists from the Desert of the Real, p. 2. 
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attack police stations and stand against repression by being in the streets.29 
However, another aspect of such direct action was the immediate alteration – 
even in a micro scale – of social relations. The insurgents, consciously superseded the 
identities and roles imposed on them by the state. Meeting in the streets did not 
concern a gathering of students, immigrants and workers but that of subversive 
subjects, ready and willing to take over their lives.30 This identity supersession 
inevitably affected the relations between different social groups. Hence, in the eyes of 
the one who stood beside you, you were no more facing the “other”, the stranger, the 
competitor but someone who would, unconditionally, share the same creative and 
subversive will as yourself. In accordance with Nietzsche, who believed the state to 
be a complex and certain qualitative type of human relationships, rather than a 
faceless structure, December insurgents changed the social relations in which they 
were forced to live and thus managed to weaken the state itself: “The proletarian 
subversive activity (…) weakened the security-surveillance state for a month and 
proved that we can change power relations. This became possible since the rebels 
targeted the social relations in which they are forced to live…”31   
“To create freedom for itself and a sacred No even to duty: the lion is needed 
for that, my brothers”, says Zarathustra, and the “sacred No” of December composes 
the nature of this negation, its targets and the kind of nihilism it produced: 
 
If each of us gathers the power of all the activities he/she is capable of 
fulfilling, no boss can take the ability of negation away from us. What we wish 
to be starts with a no. It gives birth to the only reason for waking up in the 
morning. It gives birth to the choice of forearming and attacking the order that 
chokes us back: the possible outset of an excessive practice of freedom.32 
 
The complete negation of politics and political parties, the destruction of 
banks, supermarkets and police stations is the actual negation of this world as 
imposed by the dragon. It is the underestimation of this world’s ideals and 
                                                        
29 Les Habitants de la Lune, pp. 11-12. 
30 The Children of the Galley, “The Rebellious Passage of a Proletarian Minority Through a Brief 
Period of Time”, in Vradis and Dalakoglou, p. 118. 
31 The Children of the Galley, “The Rebellious Passage of a Proletarian Minority Through a Brief 
Period of Time”, p. 122. 
32 Anon., “Ο Θάνατος Αναιρείται Ζώντας” [Death is Negated Through Living], Revolt, No 3, p. 15. 
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metaphysics.33 This negation is Nietzschean for one more reason. It is anti-dialectic. 
While the dialectic of the Left codifies social war with the synthesis of the opposites, 
thus constructing a peaceful condition that everything finds its place, the uprising’s 
negation is the explosion of thousands of negations that, nevertheless, does not 
contain any trace of self-negation: “At the same time, the dialectics of the Left try to 
codify the clash, the battle, the war through the logic of the synthesis of the opposites 
(…) But the destiny of the clash is not a synthesis; and the destiny of war is not peace. 
Social revolt is the concentration and explosion of thousand negations, but it does not 
contain neither in one molecule nor in one moment its own negation, its own end”.34 
For Nietzsche, the dialectic ignores the nature of the forces that appropriate 
phenomena as well as the real element from which forces, together with their qualities 
and relations, stem. This ignorance has a certain origin, the ignorance of the question 
“which one?”35 As a result, thesis and antithesis give a new synthesis but the negative 
element survives this procedure. On the contrary, Nietzsche introduces the concept of 
“difference” that rather suits a master, than a slave, morality: 
 
In Nietzsche, the essential relation of one force to another is never conceived 
as a negative element in the essence. In its relation with the other, the force 
which makes itself obeyed does not deny the other or that which it is not, it 
affirms its own difference and enjoys this difference. The negative is not 
present in the essence as that from which force draws its activity: on the 
contrary, it is a result of activity, of the existence of an active force and the 
affirmation of its difference. The negative is a product of existence itself: the 
aggression necessarily linked to an active existence, the aggression of an 
affirmation…For the speculative element of negation, opposition or 
contradiction, Nietzsche substitutes the practical element of difference, the 
object of affirmation and enjoyment…What a will wants is to affirm its 
difference…What does this will which wills the dialectic want? It is an 
exhausted force which does not have the strength to affirm its difference, a 
force which no longer acts but rather reacts to the forces which dominate it – 
only such a force brings to the foreground the negative element in its relation 
                                                        
33 Anon., “Κάλεσμα για μια Νέα Διεθνή” [Call for a New International], Revolt, No 3, p. 8. 
34 Flesh Machine/Ego te Provoco, “Up Against the Wall Motherfuckers! We’ve come for what’s 
ours…”, proclamation in Athens, 14/12/08. 
35 Deleuze, p. 158. 
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to the other. Such a force denies all that it is not and makes this negation its 
own essence and the principle of its existence.36  
 
Likewise, Decembrians’ negation, the Lion’s sacred No, is not a 
presupposition or principle of the difference between the world the dragon imposes 
and the world the Lion wills (through the creativity of the child) but the outcome of 
this qualitative difference. The insurrectionists deny the Dragon’s world because it is 
not the world they wish (master morality of self-determination) – they do not wish 
another reality just because it is different from the (Dragon’s) reality they deny (slave 
morality of hetero-determination). The desire of an ideal world, an affirmative choice, 
comes first, and then the rejection of the actual world, a negation as the outcome of an 
affirmation follows - not the other way round.  
Moreover, this negation “creates freedom for new values”. Against all 
stereotypes that want social revolution to be a procedure that is activated gradually, 
depending on the maturity of the objective conditions and only concerning 
“professional revolutionaries”, December agents understand revolution process as the 
subjective activation of these conditions.37 December’s revolt is the sacred No that 
has offered the foundation for the annihilation of current values and the passage to a 
different world;38 it is the Lion that “has seized the right to new values”. 
As far as the nihilism of the insurgents is concerned, their position can once 
more be seen through a Nietzschean point of view: 
 
Because nihilists are not prisoners of this world but its sworn enemies. 
Because the nihilism that appears as one more public and personal illness is 
winsome and provides hiding places for the weakness to resort to in complete 
rest. Passive nihilism is a false construction of the cowards’ horror to deal with 
the unbearable dilemmas…Because nihilism is the absolute energetic motion 
that likes to turn things upside down; it is the adventure of the war in its most 
noble form…39   
  
                                                        
36 Deleuze, pp. 8-9. 
37 Anon., Ιχνηλατώντας το Δεκέμβρη [Tracing December], p. 50. 
38 Transgressio Legis, p. 31. 
39 Σύγχρονο Πειραματικό Ινστιτούτο Ανωμαλίας και Το Απόλυτο του Μηδενός [Contemporary 
Experimental Institute of Irregularity and the Absolute Zero], “Multum in Parvo”, proclamation in 
Athens 2008.  
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 This perspective reminds us of the Nietzschean division between positive and 
imperfect nihilism. Positive nihilism means a nihilism that overcomes itself, that 
negates negation and activates reactive forces, whilst imperfect nihilism is passive and 
limits itself to the element of negative. After all, Zarathustra has already warned his 
audience for the misunderstanding that may arise by those who will not be able to 
understand the quality of his nihilism. The creator, he says, is looking for companions 
in order to create new values with them, those who know how to whet their sickles, 
but they will be called destroyers by those who have no idea what harvesting (creating 
by destroying) means.40 
Another critical stage in December’s uprising was the reactive arsenal inside 
and outside the insurrectionists’ camp that tried to decompose the positive forces of 
the revolt. As far as the “outside” reaction is concerned, the state mobilized all its 
machinery in order to suppress the insurgents. Through media, it tried to divide 
protesters into “good students” and “bad looters”, policemen unleashed a chemical 
war together with numerous arrests and beatings of protesters – with the help of 
mayors and local officers – whilst the judges detained more than 60 protesters in an 
effort to terrorize all the rest in the streets.41 All political parties hastened to condemn 
the violence, asking people to express their rage through voting, and labour syndicates 
drew back, preferring to secure social peace rather than to reinforce the perspective of 
a general strike. Additionally, political youth inside universities tried to take 
advantage of the events but only in order to focus on corporate interests overlooking 
all that was happening in the streets.42    
In this context, it is very interesting to look, again, at the role of the political 
parties, and especially that of the Greek Communist Party (KKE), during the revolt. 
The decomposing procedures that all parties (left or right) applied under these 
revolutionary conditions aimed at increasing their influence as much as possible and 
at gaining political benefits43 either by appearing as the original supporters of the 
uprising or as custodians of law and order. Nevertheless, the case of left parties like 
SYRIZA, that originally “supported” the uprising, and KKE, that showed its most 
hideous and reactionary face and it can therefore be regarded as the main 
                                                        
40 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, part I, §9. 
41 Anarchist Collectivity “Circle of Fire”, pp. 1-2. 
42 Antiauthoritarian Haunt of Panteion University, “Από το Θέαμα της Δολοφονίας στη Δολοφονία του 
Θεάματος” [From the Spectacle of Murder to the Murder of Spectacle]. 
43 Anon., “Η Εξέγερση δεν είναι Ουτοπία, είναι Ζωντανή σε Κάθε Κοινωνία” [Revolt is not Utopian, it 
is Alive in Every Society], Diadromi Eleftherias, No 79, p. 5. 
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decomposing and negative force in the service of the state, are undoubtedly of the 
greatest interest.   
From the very beginning, members of KKE were making deprecating 
statements about the insurgents calling them “secret statist agents”, “provocateurs” 
and “instruments of foreign and dark circles that instigate the riots”. Being aware of 
the fact that the December revolt challenged not only the government but all the statist 
and political structure, the authoritarian communists of KKE did their best to remain 
faithful to bourgeois legality acting as a negative and reactionary force, in 
Nietzschean terms. Falling back on their usual practice of slandering anything they 
cannot control and manipulate, members of KKE wanted to reinforce their political 
role by decomposing the insurgents’ struggle, separating them from what they could 
do. The well-organized party’s propaganda aimed at the weakening and the division 
of the rebels in an effort to achieve a social consensus and, above all, maintain its 
internal coherence through the directive that the participation in the events in non-
party terms would constitute clear violation of the sacred party’s discipline.44 
On the other hand, SYRIZA, and the extra-parliamentary parties of the Left, 
after taking part in the events of the first days, very soon chose to play the role of the 
pressure valve, thus intending to gain political benefits. Talking superficially about 
grandiose movements did not stop them from trying to suspend the violent clashes by 
acting consensually. Insurrectionists, in their view, were like orphan sheep needing 
their political corral and they were eager to offer it them.45 This stance of the left 
parties was, according to Nietzsche, reactionary and decadent because – even if it was 
not for their sole benefit – it stood on a dialectical logic. All the values that the rioters 
rejected as the hardcore and the idols of the old world of the dragon, SYRIZA and the 
extra-parliamentary Left welcomed as the necessary ingredient of their dialectical 
recipe to create a reformist world, which seemed new  but was actually decadent. 
The other front of the war “from the outside” has to do with one of the 
dragon’s most powerful weapons: the mass media. The organized misinformation of 
public opinion and the distortion of the facts, varied in scale and intensity. Banks, 
ministries, ATMs, super markets, luxurious shops – that had become the rioters’ main 
target – “turned into” small and low budget shops burned by the hordes of the 
                                                        
44 Anon., Ιχνηλατώντας το Δεκέμβρη [Tracing December], pp. 29-30. 
45 Anon., Ιχνηλατώντας το Δεκέμβρη [Tracing December], p. 33. 
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uncivilized.46 Even though at the start of the events the media were referring to the 
rights of youth and “mourning” Alexandros’ innocence, as soon as they became aware 
of the revolt’s magnitude they changed their stance. They started to categorize 
protesters as peaceful or violent, started to question the presence of Alexis in such a 
“nasty” neighborhood (implying that whoever hangs out in Exarchia is a potential 
outlaw) and openly oppose the massive presence of people in the streets by reducing 
drastically the number of protesters reported as well as by terrorizing their audience.47 
The “show” continued when, after admitting that the information they had from police 
headquarters – about the supposed violence Grigoropoulos used to provoke the two 
policemen – were false, they kept on defending the state by considering the 
assassination not to be the result of a “supposed” state repression but an isolated 
incident. The distortion of truth went on with their persistence to attribute the 
assassination and all that followed to the “ghetto” of Exarchia, “where police cannot 
enter and criminality is high”, “ignoring” that Exarchia is one of the safest regions of 
Athens and that the riots were not an “exclusive privilege” of Greece’s capital. 
Almost every provincial city was participating in the general unrest, but journalists 
seemed to “ignore” this fact.  The same thing happened with the range of destructions. 
TV reporters kept informing their audience about the unprecedented attacks on 
buildings of the Athenian historical center (National Library, Law School) only to 
find out, after a while, that the targets were strictly capitalist and not blind.48 
This media practice, to distort truth and construct an illusory reality, can be 
compared with the reading of Apollonian illusions, made by Andrew Koch. In his 
article, Koch interprets Apollo as the creator of structures presented as eternal truths. 
Apollo’s trick is to make everyone forget the subjectivity of his creation and present it 
as an objective, given truth. Then we have Dionysus who destroys these structures 
unveiling their dogmatist and deceiving character.49 The role media played during 
December revolt was, without a doubt, that of a reactionary Apollo, trying to 
manipulate the public and monopolize the fields of information, knowledge and truth. 
The answer on the part of the insurrectionists was purely Dionysian, since they 
resisted misinformation by exposing its illusory nature and chose to circulate their 
                                                        
46 Anon., Ιχνηλατώντας το Δεκέμβρη [Tracing December], p. 11. 
47 Transgressio Legis, pp. 11-12. 
48 The Sunday Virus, “Πώς να Κρυφτείς απ’ τα Παιδιά” [How You Can Trick Children], 
Eleftherotipia, 14/12/2008, p. 42. 
49 Andrew M. Koch, “Dionysian Politics: The Anarchistic Implications of Friedrich Nietzsche’s 
Critique of Western Epistemology”, in Moore. 
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views and experience of the events through open and non-dominant channels of 
counter-information. Moreover, their response to the media's lies was also 
imaginative. Ten days after the assassination of Alexandros, and with the media's 
shameless propaganda continuing apace, a group of ten-fifteen people managed to 
sneak into the studio of the public TV channel (NET) and raise a banner with the 
slogan “Stop watching and go out to the streets – Immediate release of those 
arrested”, interrupting the newscast for one and a half minutes. In their later 
proclamation, the “invaders” underlined the reactionary stance of mass media by 
promoting the idea of self-organization and urging everyone to switch off the TV and 
take their lives in their own hands.50 
The statist monopoly of violence and the counter-violence of the protesters 
was another important issue the media dealt with, an issue that also concerned all 
political parties. Without exception, journalists and politicians made it clear that they 
condemned violence, no matter where it came from, a statement that clearly equated 
the violence of the state with the counter-violence of the protesters no matter who the 
agent is. On the other hand, Decembrians had a pure Nietzschean view on the matter: 
It is pointless to speak of an action without taking into consideration who the agent is, 
what are their intentions and what impression this act has on others. Hence, to them, 
their right to answer the monopoly of statist violence was a result of their master 
morality, based on the will (intention) of the actor and not to the cut-off effect of the 
action. 
However, above all, the December insurgents came up with a momentous 
ascertainment: media are not something discoverable; they are a relationship that 
needs two. They need ears that are ready to listen to them, they rely on individualism 
and egotism. Nevertheless, those days proved the media relationship to be fruitless – 
as long as loneliness was falling apart and the streets were filled with people acting 
and communicating, it was incapable of imposing “the truth” on the numerous 
personal truths: “Those days proved that the more loneliness declined, streets were 
full with crowds and people were active (…) the more the media became a useless 
relationship, a relationship that was unable to impose the ‘truth’ on the truths of every 
one of us”.51  
The other aspect of this war is the internal contradictions of the 
                                                        
50 So. Ma., “Εισβολή στη ΝΕΤ” [NET Invasion], Eleftherotipia, 17/12/2008, p. 17. 
51 Anon., Taratsa, No 5, p. 6. 
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insurrectionists that prevented them from the ultimate unification of their 
revolutionary self and did not allow the Decembrian revolutionary subject to affirm 
itself, incorporate all actions into a harmonic and unified plan, hierarchize between 
higher and lower forces and, therefore “become what it is”. These internal 
contradictions had two main expressions.  
The first one concerned the controversy raised by the looting practices during 
street battles, which formed two poles inside the movement. There were the ones 
arguing that looters were driven by greedy and bourgeois selfishness, did not 
contribute to the maintenance of the battles, due to which they were able to 
expropriate stuff, and their overall stance was apolitically picaresque. On the other 
side stood those who considered looting to be part of an attack on private property, an 
expropriation of the commodities that the oppressed have been producing but never 
enjoy. They reminded those who talked about political purity that class war is 
unification against all divisions produced by the social relation of commodity, the 
division between a product and its producer included, and a re-appropriation of the 
social products. Moreover, the separation between those who clash with the police 
and those who loot had already been a useful tactic to the service of statist propaganda 
and fails to recognize the different possible practices through which the oppressed rise 
up.52 In any case, these mutually excluded aspects inside the circles of the rioters 
weakened the positive forces of the revolt and, at the same time, strengthened the 
reactionary arsenal of the dragon. 
The second case of internal contradictions related to the building occupation 
of the General Confederation of Workers of Greece (GSEE). This occupation, which 
lasted for five days, expressed the need for the expansion of the revolt to the 
workplaces but included two different types of agents. Base union syndicalists, who 
had the idea in the first place, defended the labor identity of the occupation and the 
idea of autonomous syndicalism, trying to underestimate the unemployed squatters 
that were involved. The other tendency consisted of radical proletarians who, via this 
occupation, aimed at attacking the production process and turn syndicalist appeals 
into active projects. The venture of GSEE occupation clearly showed the impossibility 
of the revolt’s expansion when the roles imposed by the capitalist state, like that of a 
worker – even the revolutionary one – are not to be superseded and destroyed in 
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favour of the rising of a new, liberated, radical subject.53 The Nietzschean image of 
the higher man – prominent among the common herd but not an overman yet – 
perfectly describes the case. Attracted by the sermon of Zarathustra, two kings, a 
priest, a wise man, a sorcerer, a voluntary beggar and Zarathustra’s own shadow54 
seem to be the only ones capable of understanding the teaching about the overman. 
Nevertheless, and although they are aware of “God’s death”, these higher men still act 
as if God is alive, trapped in their petty habits and superstitions and having substituted 
God with an ass always saying “yes” to everything. Yet, Zarathustra clarifies that the 
passive, fatalistic “yes” of the ass has nothing to do with the creative “yes” of the 
overman. Likewise, base union syndicalists, though revolutionary, seemed to be 
trapped into the labour identity that the capitalist system invented, concentrating on 
labor demands, unable to utter the Lion’s “sacred No” even against their own selves, 
unable to destroy an identity (worker) inseparable from the Dragon’s world 
(capitalism) they reject.  
Conscious and sharp, the December Lion fought for its freedom, uttering the 
“sacred No” to the dragon and preparing the way for the final stage of the 
Nietzschean/anarchist vision: the transvaluation of values through the third 
metamorphosis of the spirit.  
 
 
                                                        
53 Anon., “Δεκέμβρης 2008: Μια Προσπάθεια να Ανιχνεύσουμε τη Δύναμη και τα Όρια του Αγώνα 
μας” [December 2008: An Effort to Detect the Power and the Limits of our Struggle], Blaumachen, No 
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54 See Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, part IV, “Conversation with the Kings”, “The Leech”, “The 
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The Child – Third Metamorphosis of the Spirit 
 
“But tell me, my brothers, what can the child do that 
even the lion cannot? Why must the preying lion 
still become a child? The child is innocence and 
forgetfulness, a new beginning, a sport, a self-
propelling wheel, a first motion, a sacred Yes. Yes, 
a sacred yes is needed, my brothers, for the sport of 
creation: the spirit now wills its own will, the spirit 
sundered from the world now wins its own world” 
 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra,  
“Of the Three Metamorphoses” 
 
 
In December ’08, the spirit of the Camel struck back not only through the street 
battles of the Lion but also by a territorial re-appropriation, the realization of 
Temporary Autonomous Zones (TAZ). There we saw the flourishing values of the 
Child determining the character of these ventures, which were utterly counter-
hegemonic, anti-dogmatic and creative.  
For the media, the events of December were nothing more than a nihilist 
outbreak without being able, or eager, to understand that during the destruction of the 
dragon-reality, the insurgents were part of a higher quality community and of a 
cheerful creativity. Additionally to the pure destruction, the revolt transformed every 
inch of occupied territory into a space consistent with the new world55 the Child 
envisioned. Overcoming the materialist and narrowly economistic causes, the uprising 
promoted a multiform creativity through a new type of social individuals – inspired 
by the values of freedom, self-dignity, solidarity, autonomy, self-organization and 
voluntarism – that constituted a collective individuality.56 Hence, one part of the 
Child’s “sacred Yes” is related to the TAZs and the activities developed there. 
  Until the 10th of December the reference points of the revolt were the three 
occupied universities of the centre of Athens: the Polytechnic School, the Financial 
School (ASOEE) and the Law School. All three squats included anarchists and 
antiauthoritarians and, spatially, they constituted a triangle within which the main 
December events were taking place. On the 11th of December an “occupy domino” 
began and spread to every neighborhood by squatting local town halls, culture centers 
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and municipal buildings away from the centre of Athens. The reason was that the 
insurrectionists felt the time had come for their more direct communication with 
society and the decentralization of the revolt. The idea of occupying public spaces, 
not symbolically but bodily, and the practice of transforming them into places of self-
organization and direct democracy, began to spread all over Greece.57 These local 
squats and open assemblies were the Child’s next step after the battle given by the 
Lion in order for it to become a “lord in its own desert”. New structures arose from 
these practices with horizontal procedures and nonhierarchical features that 
questioned political parties and statist decision makers. All who participated were 
determined to self-define their lives, take their lives in their own hands: “At the same 
time, new structures are set up, within these assemblies, that function horizontally and 
with anti-hierarchical and self-organizing characteristics. They challenge and oppose 
political parties and statist “decision making” centers, taking their lives in their 
hands”.58  
Two such ventures that are still in effect after December are the parks of 
Kyprou & Patission and of Navarinou. In the first case, the municipality of Athens 
tried to turn the park into a private parking lot, by cutting many old trees and thus 
deprive the residents of the neighborhood from an “oasis” in the middle of one of the 
most central Athens avenues. This provocative action of the mayor caused a fierce 
street battle and the constitution of an open assembly for the protection and 
maintenance of the existing park. In the second case, hundreds of Exarchian and other 
citizens, occupied an open space used as a parking lot and from a place full of 
concrete, created a lively park with a children’s playground and a meeting point for 
several cultural events.59  
The hallmark of December’s transvalued values was solidarity, and the most 
typical case was that of Konstantina Kouneva from Bulgaria. Working as a cleaner, 
Kouneva had also developed a significant syndicalist action within her union. On 23 
December she was attacked and seriously injured with vitriol by sidekicks of her boss. 
This resulted in a huge wave of solidarity, which was expressed and organized 
through the formation of a relevant assembly that promoted her case, highlighting her 
migration and class status. Moreover, this element of solidarity was also received by 
the Decembrian insurgents from all over the world: Germany, UK, Italy, Turkey, 
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France, Ireland, Spain, Switzerland, Holland, USA, Poland, Bulgaria, Republic of 
Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Rumania, Slovenia, Cyprus, Egypt, South 
Korea, Portugal, Russia, Finland, Sweden, Brazil, Argentina, Ukraine, Belarus, New 
Zealand, Austria, Mexico and many more. This solidarity was not only verbal but was 
also followed by activist deeds – like occupations, battles with the police, even 
bombings against statist targets – and made it plain that the oppressed all over the 
world are capable of a new morality against the old world of capitalism: “As opposed 
to the globalized violence and terrorism of the capital, rebels throughout the world 
showed that they can put forward a new type of ethics, through words and deeds”.60  
The compatibility between means and ends is another important feature of 
December, directly related to squats and solidarity. The insurgents not only occupied 
public spaces in order to create the foundation of a new world, but the way these 
ventures were working was in accordance with this desired world, a foretaste of the 
new world in solidarity. All those who despised politics until then were now 
participating actively by taking initiatives, forming workshops, turning to self-
organization, and contributing selflessly to these new structures. The existing 
solidarity which coordinated the means within squats, revealed a different reality 
without the dominant relations of the past, without the split of theory and action, 
leaders and disciples, canvassers and voters. All were involved in making and in 
implementing decisions.61 This compatibility of means and ends is essential for 
Nietzsche. It is so essential that, as said in the introduction of part C, he reaches the 
point of declaring that the end does not justify the means. On the contrary, it is the 
good means/war, a war that transvaluates values, that justifies a cause.62 
However, the above practices of squats and open local assemblies promoted 
one more basic Nietzschean characteristic. The project of unifying different aspects of 
one’s self in order to become who one is. Gradually, these new communities started 
dealing with general and more specific issues, overall, without distinguishing the 
resistance to the state from the resistance to the existing working status or the general 
living status. There were no separated or isolated fields of action anymore. All aspects 
of rioter’s lives were now seen under the perspective of a unified activism63 that 
would also, exemplary, link the several individualities with collective action for the 
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realization of “being”,64 or else, for the becoming of who one really is. 
In the previous metamorphosis of the spirit (the Lion) we saw how the 
revolutionary syndicalists of GSEE occupation could not supersede the identity of the 
proletarian and thus give the opportunity to the rising of a new radical subject. 
Nevertheless, this practice and view, concerning identities, was not the only one 
during the December events. There were also voices calling for the definite rapture 
with the capitalist world and the production procedures, something that included the 
destruction of the working class as such. Because only when the daily activity 
coincides with revolutionary activity, labour, value and all social classes can be 
destroyed and the former proletariat will be able to live in communist conditions.65 
After this partial destruction of identities in certain occasions (street battles, squats 
open assemblies),  
 
no one was representative of any group, but everyone was represented…our 
need for belonging somewhere that had made us part of a whole dissolved in a 
few seconds and we immediately stopped feeling dispersed and alone…we 
were transformed from invisible solitary figures rambling around in our urban 
misery into political subjects who managed to challenge, not the solutions that 
had to be applied to a situation, but the situation itself.66 
 
A Dionysian resolve whatsoever, a primordial unit that did not just reform 
reality, did not only change it utterly in an effective way but through the 
transvaluation of values that occurred during those days it created wholly new spaces, 
followed by the recreation of the rioters themselves: “Our coming together violently 
spoiled the facades of all those urban places that actually cancel out our possibility of 
interaction and chain us to the role of a non-citizen; it gave birth instantly, instead, to 
(…) a multiplicity of small new personal relations of trust, commitment, and direct 
action (…) During the days of December, we did not transform the spaces given to us, 
but we created new ones where we could also let ourselves be created”.67 This 
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transformed situation was, undeniably, an image of the creative Child from the future, 
a foretaste of a new world. This stance of the rioters, their frequent self-definition as 
“an image from the future”, states a revolutionary potential, the possible and probable 
destruction of the capital in the future, in the future of anarchy.
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D.6/ A Nietzschean Critical Synopsis of December ’08 
Shortly after the December riots, a very ambiguous slogan decorated a wall in 
Exarchia: “December was not the answer but the question”. Journalists, political 
analysts, ministers, all expressed their enthusiasm for December’s “political heritage”. 
Of course, their intention was to read this slogan outside its original frame, to 
convince public opinion that the gist of December was a question concerning the 
function of democracy, to convert a fight for absolute freedom to an appeal for 
reforming the political system. 
 According to Nikolakis the fact that this slogan only appeared in a specific 
street of Exarchia rather meant that it was addressed to all those related to the 
antiauthoritarian circles, meaning that – among other things, and especially for the 
anarchist “space” – it was a question concerning the anarchist/ 
antiauthoritarian/autonomist (a/a/a) movement, its repertoire and self-criticism. For all 
the rest – social institutions, media and capitalism – December was an answer.1 
Therefore, a critical retrospect of certain points of December could be very useful for 
the a/a/a movement and even more interesting from a Nietzschean point of view. 
 There are two main categories that are worth being viewed through such a 
lens. The causes of the revolt’s failure to develop, escalate and prevail, and 
Nietzsche’s classic accusations against anarchists. 
 As far as the first category is concerned, at first sight what rioters missed was 
the organizing potentiality and experience.2 But a more thorough look reveals the 
deeper causes: the critical point of the revolt was that “apart from school and 
university students, and a significant part of young workers the revolt did not manage 
to infiltrate the workplace”3 and thus “set off a bomb” in the heart of the capitalist 
beast. One serious reason for that – except for fear and insecurity, since financial 
crisis had already made its presence obvious – was the inability to destroy the 
fundamentally capitalist identities, like that of the worker. The GSEE squat was a 
good example of this weakness that consequently led the revolt to a lack of self-
affirmation. And what Nietzsche teaches us is that when an active force is not 
affirming itself then it is either hetero-defined or static. In any case, it loses its 
positive quality and turns into a decadent, negative force. In addition, and similarly to 
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2 Transgressio Legis, p. 32. 
3 Editorial, “Ο Δεκέμβρης και το Μετά” [December and Its Aftermath], Eutopia, No 17, p. 9. 
 
 
 
 
185 
the Higher Man of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Decembrians did not even manage to 
destroy their “higher” type of identity, that of “insurrectionists”. The adoption of a 
particular kind of image and practices seemed to prevent rioters from changing social 
relationships utterly, because 
 
…identity politics creates imaginary collectivities that are easily manipulated 
by capitalism as a way to divide and conquer potential revolutionaries…At the 
limit of any insurrection, the identity of the insurrectionaries must be 
destroyed or become an obstacle to insurrection itself.4 
  
 Thus, like the Higher Man, anarchist rioters were aware of “God’s death” – in 
their case they were aware of the need for destroying every kind of identity – but they 
were still bound to the same habits and identity processes, “the ideology of the 
‘insurrectionary’ as separate from the general population”.5 In order to confront 
capitalism, the “sacred No” is the first decisive step, “but to go beyond capitalism 
requires new metaphysical foundations for social relationships”,6 a “Child’s” 
transvaluation of values. This is something anarchists could have generalized if they 
indeed dissolved the boundaries of their identity by intermingling with the population, 
sharing their experience and “technical know-how”, so that the population has, 
equivalently, the base to resist authority.7 Nonetheless, there were few cases that 
anarchists – especially during popular assemblies – showed an ideological rigidity, 
expressed by their indifference, if not hostility some times, towards those who were to 
discuss issues that anarchists consider to be self evident. One other obstacle for this 
supersession of the insurrectionary identity was anarchist’s excessive faith in the 
principle of unanimity during assemblies,8 a tactic that often discouraged people from 
participating in a decision-making procedure until the end. 
 The last part of this short review belongs to Nietzsche’s accusations to 
anarchists of being resentful, petty and power lustful. It would be very interesting to 
reflect what Nietzsche would think about December, if he was alive. Given his prior 
stance towards massive revolts (see his rejection of the Paris Commune) and his 
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difficulty in thinking on a social, rather than an individual, scale, we must assume that 
he would once again be hostile. After all, the deepest reason for Nietzsche not being 
an anarchist was that he could not turn his personal insurrectionism into a collective 
one, and this is exactly where Nietzsche and Decembrians part. Hence, it is true that 
in many occasions rioters’ proclamations were full of hateful comments against the 
state and its sidekicks,9 presenting a totally hetero-defined logic, like that of 
Nietzschean slavish morality. In fact, what was taking place was an ongoing and 
dynamic war inside the movement, between the active and reactive forces, a war that 
at most – not all – levels had given victory to the former. The intensity of this 
contradiction can be seen in many parts of rioter’s written speech. A typical example 
is the reference to human will and a life-affirmative stance as the ticket to revolution 
and a new reality, together with hate and a desire to provoke pain to the enemy.10 
 On the other hand, we have a straight answer to Nietzsche’s accusations, 
through a Nietzschean reasoning, when Decembrians make it clear that if they fought 
power only because they would like to seize it, then they would have sided with the 
Left.11 And this is where Nietzsche’s anarchist aspects of philosophy apply to the 08 
revolt: December never wished to purify or control the dragon’s system, only to deny 
it, destroy it and create a new world on the relics of the old one. 
 
Summary 
This chapter consists of the case study of my research which is the December 08 
revolt in Greece and, mainly, in the city of Athens. The aim of this case study was to 
review the revolt through the Nietzschean passage “Of the Three Metamorphoses”, 
from Thus Spoke Zarathustra, in order to provide an interpretation of the events 
which is different than the mainstream one, and reinforce the previously established 
affinity between anarchists and Nietzsche. 
 In order to do this, I firstly presented a historical background of the recent 
Greek political and movement history, as well as a short genealogy of the anarchist 
space, thus offering a context of the revolt. I, then, talked about the mainstream 
perceptions of the events by the main political parties and the media, I located the 
contradictions and inadequacies of these perceptions and gave the anarchists’ 
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alternative view. 
 Secondly, and based on this alternative view, I highlighted the Bakuninist 
character of the uprising and continued with an analytical interpretation through the 
apparatus of the “Three Metamorphoses”. I examined all three metamorphoses of the 
spirit separately, arguing that each one of them corresponds to a different level of the 
revolt, and tried to analyze the events from this Nietzschean angle. 
 Finally, I developed a short critical approach of the revolt, focusing on the 
reasons for which it failed to escalate, and the all time classic accusations of 
Nietzsche against anarchism. The causes of the uprising’s long-term failure were 
reviewed and explained through the German philosopher’s theories of 
negation/affirmation and active/reactive forces, whereas his objections to anarchists, 
although true at some extent, were challenged via his own philosophy, meaning the 
gist of the analysis produced by the Nietzschean interpretation of the revolt.
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  PART E: CONCLUSIONS 
The present research has set specific central goals and secondary aims from the very 
beginning. My main hypothesis has been the existence of an elective bond between 
anarchist and Nietzschean philosophy. My secondary aims emerge from this point and 
focus on the importance of reading Nietzsche as a radical political thinker – closer to 
anarchism than to fascism – and Nietzsche’s utility for the anarchist movement. 
 The first goal – the establishment of an elective affinity between Nietzsche 
and the anarchists – is the backbone of my thesis. After exposing the qualitative levels 
of the elective affinity, I continued with the review of the influence Nietzsche had on 
prominent anarchist figures and currents. The analysis in the cases of Goldman, 
Landauer and post-anarchism showed that Nietzsche’s presence was a catalyst for the 
construction of the respective theories and thus played a critical role in the synthesis 
of anarchist thought.  
 Emma Goldman acknowledged the elective bond between Nietzsche and the 
anarchists and used his philosophy as a methodological tool for almost every aspect 
(morality, human relationships, feminism etc.) of her social/political worldview. This 
“arsenal” also helped her respond to the Marxists, in correlation with the nature of 
revolution and the road towards it. Through Nietzschean will and individualism, 
Goldman defended an anti-essential type of subject living within an anti-deterministic 
environment. By rejecting the Marxist linear progress of history, she highlighted the 
voluntaristic factor in historical events and ended up identifying social revolution as a 
transvaluation of values, a concept she also borrowed from the German philosopher. 
Therefore, she was in a position to explain why the revolution took place in Russia, 
instead of Western Europe, but also gave a simple but crucial reason for the long-term 
failure of the Bolshevik revolution, which was again based on a Nietzschean point of 
view. Bolsheviks sacrificed human will in favour of a historical determinism and 
believed that even the end of a revolutionary society justifies every possible means. 
 Gustav Landauer also focused on the Nietzschean will, in order to describe his 
views and practices as well as differentiate anarchy from Marxism. His preference of 
“becoming” versus “being” designated the Nietzschean aspect for the fluidity of 
human existence and the ceaseless struggle between higher and lower forces. 
Moreover, the adoption of a revolutionary human type able to recreate themselves and 
their environment, was his Nietzschean answer to the endless Marxist projection of 
the revolutionary utopia in some unspecified future. 
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 The quality of the perception of Nietzsche from Goldman and Landauer 
responds to the “cultural symbiosis” and “partial fusion” levels of elective affinity, 
respectively. In the first case, the two parts of the affinity are organically connected 
but remain distinct – Goldman uses the German philosopher as a methodological tool 
– whereas in the second case Landauer has set Nietzschean philosophy as a 
foundation stone of his own.  
 Post-anarchism is a current of anarchism that deliberately used the 
Nietzschean philosophy in order to criticize central axioms of modernity, like 
essentialism, morality and rationality, and weak points of classical anarchism, like 
power, that post-anarchists regarded as immanent. The fact that the whole post-
anarchist project is so deeply based on Nietzsche, brings forward the fourth level of 
the elective affinity which is the “creation of a new figure”, meaning the decisive role 
Nietzsche played in the formation of post-anarchist thinking.  
The comparison of Nietzsche’s worldview with that of other prominent 
anarchists, like Kropotkin, Bakunin and Malatesta, reinforced the hypothesis of the 
affinity since basic views of anarchism coincide with fundamental principles of 
Nietzschean philosophy. This comparison took place on the grounds of the first level 
of elective affinity – that is, “simple affinity” which gives the potentiality of an 
effective mingling and interaction of the two parts – and through concepts like 
genealogy, perspectivism, ontology, active and reactive forces, will to power and 
nihilism. The fact that these concepts enfold the whole thought of the German 
philosopher, as shown in chapter B.4, is of significant gravity for the establishment of 
the affinity.   
 The other field of the elective affinity process was the December case study. 
The anarchist perception of the events by the Decembrians, together with their 
practices, relied on certain Nietzschean concepts like transvaluation of values, 
perspectivism and anti-ontology. Therefore, I examined the affinity between 
Nietzsche and the anarchist agents of the revolt by theorizing the whole perception of 
the uprising on the part of the anarchists through a Nietzschean schema, the Three 
Metamorphoses of the spirit, a passage from Thus Spoke Zarathustra. The review of 
the events via this passage not only designated the importance of all three periods of 
the revolt (before, during and after the uprising) for the anarchists but also gave a 
possible overall account for their stance, practices and interpretation of those days.  
Definite as it may seem, this theorization of mine does not indicate the 
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production of a Nietzschean anarchist theoretical model able to read anarchist actions 
in every occasion. This theorizing was founded on (and tried to enrich) the elective 
affinity between Nietzsche and the anarchists and my suggestion is that every 
theoretical model attempting to offer a holistic explanation clashes with the flexible 
and open nature of elective affinity, providing a rigid schema that drives us back to 
ideology. On the contrary, this “three metamorphoses” theorization of the revolt did 
not give the only and true explanation of the Decembrian deeds, neither did it offer 
the only possible Nietzschean reading of the events. It actually acted as a tool that 
tried to unify the fragments of narration offered by mainstream sources (media, 
political parties) and then read this narration critically in favour of one possible 
Nietzschean perspective for the approach of December. The richness of Nietzschean 
literature cannot, of course, be limited to this passage from Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 
hence, the outcome is that the concepts constituting Nietzschean philosophy are 
present here and affirm the elective affinity between Nietzsche and the anarchists but 
the “three metamorphoses” reading is only one possible Nietzschean reading of the 
December revolt. 
 In this case study, the levels of the elective affinity seemed to gradually 
escalate. The location of basic Nietzschean concepts in the anarchist’s perception of 
the revolt – transvaluation of values, genealogy, anti-ontology, nihilism and will to 
power – set the ground for a “simple affinity” between the two parts. However, this 
dynamic relationship became the framework within which the discourses of Nietzsche 
and the anarchist Decembrians superseded a superficial similarity and reached, once 
again, the third degree of the elective affinity, mainly because of the Bakuninist 
character of the uprising. The adoption of a Bakuninist nihilism on the part of the 
insurgents and the affinity of this nihilism with Nietzsche’s active nihilism, as shown 
in chapter C.2, leads to an indirect “partial fusion” of the two parts.   
 The importance of reading Nietzsche as a political thinker is summarized in 
the effects that his thought may have when shifted to the field of politics. Nietzsche’s 
release from the bonds of Nazism is not something new of course, nor is the hint of 
connecting his philosophy with the left or even anarchist political thought. 
Nevertheless, a more extensive application of the “essential” philosophical concepts 
of the German thinker to a political family similarly radical and subversive, like that 
of anarchists, can more effectively monitor the actual results and changes in everyday 
life that arise from putting into effect principles like anti-normativity, anti-universality 
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or transvaluation of values. Hence, the location of the several degrees of the elective 
affinity between Nietzsche and the anarchists served both goals. On the one hand it 
offered an anarchist interpretation of Nietzsche that updated his philosophy within the 
context of political action and contemporary political issues, and on the other hand it 
indirectly contributed to the debunking of the way that fascist, conservative and right-
wing readings tried to appropriate Nietzsche. 
 Nietzsche’s utility for the anarchist movement is, again, an outcome of the 
procedure for establishing the elective affinity between the two parts, and is divided 
into three categories. The first has to do with those features of anarchism that 
constitute its special character, a qualitative distinction from the Left and the Marxist 
communists, together with a Nietzschean account of December ’08. 
 What we saw is that a basic point of Nietzsche, the means in use define the 
quality of the desirable goals, is also shared by anarchists, summarized in “the end 
does not justify the means”. This principle not only helped anarchists of all times to 
resist the bait of “effective” politics that communists always launched, or give 
sufficient arguments for proving the inadequacy of policies that lack a transformative 
content for both the agents and their environment (see the October Revolution), but 
can also serve as a criterion for issues that prey upon anarchist thought through time, 
like that of violence and the ethics of its usage from an anarchist point of view. In 
addition, the case of December made clear that meeting in the streets and fighting the 
same enemy will never be enough for anarchy and the Left to bridge the gap between 
their worldviews. Anarchists’ Nietzschean preference to direct action and tactics 
based on a “here and now” transvaluation of values, leaves no room for negotiated 
politics, electoral procedures and hegemonic/party activities that sooner or later will 
lead to the incorporation to the existing political system. 
 However, the importance of Nietzsche for the contemporary anarchist 
movement can also be seen in “his” critique of the reasons for which the December 
revolt faded out, as a future guide for similar historical challenges. The lack of a 
decisive self-affirmation on the part of the insurrectionists, which was mainly 
expressed through their inability to completely supersede the status identities – even 
that of the insurgent/anarchist agent, gradually led to the decomposition of the 
revolutionary forces by the reactive inner forces (hesitation, lack of self-affirmation, 
hetero-definition) of the uprising. As presented in chapter B.4, Nietzsche’s theory of 
active and reactive forces best describes the way that a force which does not confirm 
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itself by avoiding being static, degenerates into a hetero-defined, and therefore 
slavish, one.   
  The second category is of great importance for the internal reconstruction of 
the anarchist movement since through the affinal project we saw how the dichotomy 
between classical and post-anarchism is superseded and how political trends like 
anarchism and libertarian Marxism are organically connected.  
 The post-anarchism’s critique of the absolute concepts of the Enlightenment is 
summarized in an anti-essential perception of the subject, a preference to today’s 
revolt versus tomorrow’s revolution and the reduction of structures to human 
relationships. Nevertheless, these elements also survive in classical anarchism if we 
read the latter through a more Nietzschean lens. It is clear that the post-anarchist 
critique of modernity, and therefore of classical anarchism, stems from a post-
structuralism that goes directly back to Nietzsche. But at the same time Goldman and 
Landauer are two prominent anarchists that lived and got active within the time limits 
of anarchism’s “classical” era and bore a significant affinity with Nietzsche on the 
same concepts upon which the post-anarchist critique is based. Hence, the important 
views of Kropotkin, Bakunin and Malatesta about ontology, essentialism, truth and 
objectivity that, as presented in chapter C.2, coincide with Nietzsche’s, and, mainly, 
the presence of Goldman and Landauer in the portrait of classical anarchism, show 
why post-anarchism offers a fresh and vital self-criticism of anarchism, not beyond 
but inside “classical” anarchism, thus promoting a unification of the anarchist “self” 
through the prototype of the Nietzschean harmonization of one’s self’s inner 
tendencies in order to achieve the “becoming of who one is”. Thus, Nietzschean 
philosophy became the decisive factor for which post-anarchism seems to remain 
within the limits of “classical” anarchism, since – on the one hand – it is the 
foundation stone of post-anarchist critique and – on the other hand – develops an 
elective affinity with anarchism’s “classical” thought. 
 On a second level, Walter Benjamin, a libertarian thinker who reads Marx 
anarchically, also served to challenge the boundaries between libertarian Marxism and 
anarchism. Nietzsche’s role in this case was critical in order to bring Benjamin even 
closer to the anarchist field, through the formation of an interactive triangle between 
Nietzsche, Benjamin and anarchy, founded on the approach of elective affinity. 
Finally, the Nietzschean critique to anarchists and the analysis based on the 
elective affinity of the two parts made clear that the accusations of the German 
 
 
 
 
193 
philosopher are withdrawn through his own philosophy, and this offers an additional 
analytical tool for anarchy’s self-determination and self-knowledge. 
Nietzsche’s prejudice against anarchism – mainly because of his fear of the 
“herd” – was expressed by his accusations about the petty and resentful nature of 
anarchists. Apart from the fact that the acknowledgement of these attitudes in 
occasional anarchist practices can be very helpful for the conduct of a productive 
anarchist self-criticism, the analysis of chapter C.2 based on the genealogical method 
of Nietzsche, the concept of nihilism and the dipole of debtor-creditor, reveals that the 
anarchist worldview is neither resentful nor destructive, like the slavish forces. 
Bakunin’s nihilism, Kropotkin’s genealogy, Andrea Papi’s presentation of Malatesta 
on power, all signify a master anarchist morality, creative and familiar with the 
project of the transvaluation of values. The reading of Nietzsche’s anarchist 
contemporaries – as well as their posterity – through the established elective affinity 
rather than Nietzsche’s prejudice, constrains resentment and bad conscience to a 
minor part of anarchist practices, and definitely expels them from anarchist theory. 
However, both secondary aims of this research and their outcomes were based 
on the nature of the elective affinity and the way it approaches anarchist thought, not 
as a rigid and closed ideological schema but as a dynamic and fluid spectrum of 
principles, inseparable from practices. That is, the prevalence of anarchy over 
anarchism.  
Following the dominant model for categorizing anarchist tradition, in the 
context of political ideologies, there were two points that questioned the ideological 
perception of anarchism. The first was the anarchist canon and its problematic 
foundations, and the second highlighted the diversity concerning the perception of the 
same concepts by different currents of anarchism. Nonetheless, such points shake the 
usual ideological perception and construction of anarchism, favouring a more anti-
dogmatic and dynamic profile, in accordance with a correlation of the various 
anarchist trends, based on their elective affinity. The “anarchy” of elective affinity 
allows a more penetrative reading than the “anarchism” of political ideologies, since 
the former promotes the unique features of anarchy (anti-homogeneity, fluidity, 
inseparability between theory and practice) that differentiate it from every other 
political current. 
Additionally, the “anarchy” perception made anarchist thought and practice 
much more reachable for the seemingly hostile philosophy of Nietzsche, precisely due 
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to the the qualitative affinity of the two parts, an affinity that could not have been 
accomplished between Nietzsche and “anarchism”.    
 Likewise, my reading of Nietzsche also followed a tactic compatible with his 
philosophy and worldview. It constituted an active and “perspectival” reading 
between the lines that would not limit itself to the superficial paradoxes of his writing, 
but would be able to look behind his filigree style. This way, the hostility of Nietzsche 
to anarchy was not softened or beautified but subverted through the perspectival 
interpretation of his discourse. 
 Nietzsche cannot be regarded as an anarchist. The distance he consciously 
kept from the anarchism of his time, together with his obsessive individualism, drew a 
clear line between himself and the anarchists. Nevertheless, the quality and openness 
of his philosophy sealed the connection with anarchist thought, offering a dynamic 
that reaches even the highest degree of this affinity.  
Is there a representative picture within Nietzsche’s worldview that can give us 
an anarchist taste of his mentality? Strange as it may seem, this picture can be found 
where one would least expect. In the ordinary life of a god, of Nietzsche’s champion 
god, Dionysus. In the libertarian synthesis of his disciples, his rage against anything 
that opposed harmony, joy and fraternity, his approval of everything that promoted 
life, creativity and freedom. In his simplicity and generosity, his empathy and love. In 
Dionysus, the “anarchist” god of Nietzsche!  
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